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ABSTRACT
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974 enabled Congress, for the first time to take a
comprehensive approach to the budget. The Act created two
Budget Committees, one in the House and one in the Senate,
as well as the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).
At the time of its creation, CBO was thought to be
one of the principal mechanisms for Congress to secure a more
active role in budgetary control and the setting of national
priorities, since CBO was conceived in part to provide
Congress with the resources to assess the policy implications
of the budget.
This thesis presents an empirical analysis of CBO
which focuses on two principal areas: assessing CBO's dis-
crete impact on the balance of power through identifying
the governing factors of that impact and determining the
impact of CBO strategy on its ability to establish itself
as a viable congressional support agency.
The thesis first establishes the background for
the 1974 Act by revisiting the budget process in its
historical context. Second, it recreates the environment
which directly created CBO by examining the legislative
process which eventually resulted in the 1974 Act. Third,
CBO is examined in terms of its organizational development.
Fourth, CBO is assessed in terms of how it is viewed by its
principal client, the Congress. Finally, the thesis
examines CBO in the context of the balance of power and in
its role as a congressional support agency.
Thesis Supervisor: Donald A. Schon
Ford Professor of Urban Affairs
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
4
Confronted with the vast array of figures in the Budget
of the United States, one is likely to think of budgeting
-as an arid subject, the province of stodgy clerks and duZZ
statisticians. Nothing couZd be more mistaken. Human
nature is never more evident than when men are struggling
to gain a larger share of funds or to apportion what they
have among myriad claimants. Budgeting deals with the
purposes of men. How can they be moved to cooperate?
How can their conflicts be resolved? How can they find
ways of dealing effectively with recalcitrant problems?
Serving diverse purposes, a budget can be many things:
a political act, a plan of work, a prediction, a source
of enlightenment, a means of obfuscation, a mechanism of
control, an escape from restrictions, a means to action,
a brake on progress, even a prayer that the powers that be
wiZZ deal gently with the best aspirations of faZZible men.
Aaron Wildavsky
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Four years ago, the 93rd Congress passed the
"Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974."
(See Appendix B) Until that time, Congress took formal action
on the budget only in piecemeal fashion. The Act requires
that Congress take a comprehensive look at the budget, specifi-
cally: budget authority, outlays, revenues, and any resulting
deficit. The Act called for the appointment of two Budget
Committees, one in the House and one in the Senate, and gave
them the central role in developing and managing the congres-
sional budget process.
The 1974 Act can be viewed as the most recent episode
in a continuing battle between the Congress and the Executive
for the Power of the Purse. The new budget process works as
follows: After receiving the President's budget in January,
the Senate and House Budget Committees receive reports from
the other principal committees in their respective houses,
setting forth their views as to budget authority, outlays, and
revenues within their own jurisdictions. By 15 April, the
calendar calls on each budget committee to submit to its
respective house a budget resolution that not only recommends
budget totals, but also sets targets for outlays for each of
the 16 major functional categories into which the Federal
budget is presently divided. This resolution is to be based
on the relative implications of alternative fiscal policies
(including the President's proposed budget). By 15 May, a
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first concurrent budget resolution is to be worked out and
accepted by both the House and Senate. Between that date and
early September, the various authorizing, appropriations, and
revenue committees proceed to take action on individual bills.
The Act also created the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) as the fourth support agency to the Congress, the others
being the General Accounting Office (GAO), the Congressional
Research Service (CRS), and the Office of Technology Assess-
ment (OTA).
At the time of its creation, it was thought that CBO
would be one of the principal mechanisms for Congress' attempt
to have a more active role in the setting of national priorities.
My purpose was to conduct an empirical analysis
of the Congressional Budget Office from the point of view of
the balance of power and control between the legislative and
executive branches of government, where the budget is seen as
a key element in that process.
My inquiry is an organizational study of the sort
which takes a large part of its direction from the literature
on the balance of power and from Sarason's important work,
The Creation of Settings.
My inquiry focuses on two principal areas:
o Discovering whether the Congressional Budget Office
had a discrete impact on the balance of power, and
what were the governing factors of that impact.
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o Determining the impact of CBO strategy on its ability
to establish itself as a viable congressional support
agency.
The scope of the inquiry -did not include an evalua-
tion of the new budget process, or either of the two budget
committees, all of which were mandated by the same act which
created CBO. Nor have I attempted a comprehensive survey of
CBO's users. (Two such surveys have recently been completed
and are discussed briefly in Chapter 5.)
My intention was to try to place the birth of this
new organization in a broad historical context, in an effort
to uncover those forces which account for there being a
Congressional Budget Office, as well as what its real signifi-
cance is.
Since the great bulk of the information concerning
the birth of CBO resides in the personal notes and memories
of living people, my principal sources of data, in addition
to examining various committee prints and draft documents,
were past and present staff members of CBO, as well as past
and present staff of other relevant organizations such as the
Senate Budget Committee, the House Budget Committee, the Joint
Study Committee on Budget Control, the Senate Government
Operations Committee, the Senate Rules Committee, the House
Rules Committee, the General Accounting Office, the Congres-
sional Reference Service, the Brookings Institution, and
the National Journal.
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My primary vehicle for gathering data was structured
interviews with more than 40 of the key actors involved in
fashioning the legislation which created CBO, designing and
setting up the organization, or interacting with CBO in the
course of their work. My intention was to work my way from
the outside in and from the bottom to the top; i.e., to start
with the drafters of the law, move to the founding group
(the implementers), then on to those in the Congress who
interact with CBO on a day-to-day basis. In some instances,
it was necessary to quote people by position rather than by
name. This was done in an effort to be sensitive to individual
reputations and professional relationships of long standing.
This anonymity resulted in a candor and comprehensiveness
which would not have been forthcoming otherwise.
In order to avoid introducing bias into the findings,
the interviewing consisted of recording voluntary responses to
a series of basic questions, including the following:
o Can you tell me a little about your background before
your present position?
o Why did you come here?
o What were your expectations with respect to CBO?
o What were the organizational antecedents for CBO?
o In what principal ways does CBO differ from the other
three congressional support agencies?
o What were the principal obstacles that CBO faces?
o How did you come to know them?
o What was CBO's response to these obstacles?
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o How would you define CBO's strategy?
o What kind of time frame was CBO operating on?
(What was long-run; short-run?)
o What are the principal outputs of CBO?
o What were the House (or the Senate) expectations
concerning the Congressional Budget Office?
o How has what happened differed from the House (Senate)
expectations?
o What accounts for the difference between the House's
(or the Senate's) expectations and its experience
with CBO?
o Is there a difference between the House and the
Senate with respect to their expectations for CBO?
o What accounts for this difference in expectations?
o How does the House (Senate) assess CBO's performance?
What are its principal strengths and weaknesses?
o What is the role of CBO-type analysis in congressional
decision-making?
o What are the appropriate performance measures for CBO?
o Has CBO made a difference in the balance of power?
o What accounts for this difference?
o Has the fact that the same party now controls both
the White House and the Congress affected CBO?
If so, in what ways?
A bibliography of relevant books and articles, as
well as an alphabetical list of persons interviewed is ap-
pended to the study.
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CHAPTER 2
THE BALANCE OF POWER
11
There is a saying on the Hill
that Congress is sZow to react
but quick to adjust.
Eugene Wi lhe lm
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THE CONSTITUTION
The new congressional budget process of which CBO is
a part, can be viewed as the latest in a series of events which
relate to what is known as the balance of power. The idea of
government balance is an ancient proposition, but the type
which was adopted by the framers of the Constitution has its
origin in the 18th century writer, Montesquieu. Montesquieu
proposed that different persons exercise the different
functions of government as a deterrent to the tyranny of a
single all powerful individual.
The Constitution, leaning heavily on Montesquieu
in this area, established the three branches of the federal
government and their individual areas of jurisdiction. The
three branches are independent of one another, yet a system
of checks and balances ensures an interaction among the
branches. Throughout United States history, however, this
balance of power has more often reflected a disequilibrium
rather than a perfect harmony among the three branches,
particularly between the legislative and the executive.
This disequilibrium represents an inherent and possibly
benevolent fluidity.
Though the founding fathers (and mothers) borrowed
freely from the British system of social order and juris-
prudence, they proposed a very different system of managing
government revenues and expenditures. The United States
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Constitution states that:
No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in
consequence of appropriations made by law; and a
regular statement and account of the receipts and
expenditures of all public money shall be published
from time to time.
(Article 1, Section 9)
In addition, all revenue measures must originate in the House.
(This special provision was given to the House of Representa-
tives because it was the more frequently elected of the two
houses of Congress and, therefore, thought to be more repre-
sentative of the people who would have to bear the brunt of
the cost of government.)
The Constitution does not, however, specify whether
the legislative or executive branches of the federal government
should have principal responsibility for the formulation and
execution of the budget. This ambiguity exists partly because
the budget system of Great Britain was in its infancy at the
time of the Revolution and there really was no model on which
the framers of the Constitution could lean, and partly because
there was a strong desire not to endow a monarch-like execu-
tive, given the recent experience with King George.
Beginning with Alexander Hamilton, the first Secre-
tary of the Treasury, sovereignty with respect to the budget
evolved without benefit of clear constitutional guidelines
and has, therefore, been particularly vulnerable to pressure
and redefinition. Precisely because of this vulnerability,
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Congress has since Washington's first term, gradually, and
at times dramatically, lost control over the budgeting
process. As a result, what began in 1787 as a deliberately
vague assignment of budgetary responsibility evolved by 1970
into an Executive so powerful that it was termed the "Imperial
Presidency"; precisely what the founding fathers had attempted
to avoid.
The almost 200 years between Washington's first
government in 1789 and the establishment of CBO in 1974
witnessed a series of events which strengthened the power of
the Executive over the budget at the expense of the Congress.
Though this shift was due in the beginning to the Constitution's
omission of explicit budgetary responsibility, it was more
often due to the force of personalities, politics, and to
Congress' own lack of foresight in responding to issues and
events.
The history of budgeting in the United States can
be broken down into broad periods of time which were punctu-
ated and shaped by critical events. In each period of time,
Congress' response to these critical events almost invariably
was to react in a manner which increased Executive budgetary
control and diminished the control of the Congress.
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Alexander Hamilton, first Secretary of the Treasury
(1789-1795), entered office with a shrewd understanding of the
importance of budgetary control and initiated the first attempt
in the history of budgeting to assign this responsibility to the
Executive. Hamilton was the first and perhaps most impressive
of the personalities who shaped the balance of power and control
with respect to the budget, and he seized the opportunity in
the face of not only constitutional vagueness but also within
the context of a general ignorance of finance.
In addition, Hamilton was able to assume a strong
leadership role because during the critical first six months of
the new administration he was the dominant figure in the cabinet,
since Thomas Jefferson was late in assuming office as Secretary
of State:
Chief Justice John Jay temporarily assumed the
additional duties of secretary of state while
waiting for some litigation to work its way up
the trial and appellate court ladder to give the
highest court something to do. By the time
Jefferson was officially installed in his office
on March 22, 1790, Hamilton had already been in
office more than six months. In Jefferson's
absence, Hamilton had been actively dealing with
a range of foreign as well as domestic affairs.
Various personal matters and a monthlong migraine
headache during May 1790 kept Jefferson from taking
up official duties in earnest until shortly before
the mid-June candlelight dinner he arranged for
Madison and Hamilton at his new house on Maiden
Lane. His long absence gave a little color to his
later claim of being an uninformed "stranger to
the ground" when he forced Madison to let Hamilton's
assumption bill pass the House.1
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In the first fifty years of the government, the central
debate with respect to federal financing concerned who should
have the principal responsibility for budgeting. From the out-
set, Hamilton recognized the importance of this budgetary control:
"Most of the important measures of every government are connected
with the Treasury."2 To Hamilton,
... a sound economic order was of even more im-
portance than the political order created by the
Constitution because the political order had its 3foundation in the economic order and rested on it.
Hamilton believed in a centralized governmentand this
belief,along with his understanding of power as related to fiscal
control,prompted him to recommend to the Congress that the
executive branch be given complete responsibility for budgeting.
However, his request was denied, and the Treasury Act of 1789,
passed by the second Constitutional Convention, empowered the
Secretary of the Treasury only to provide estimates of public
revenue and expenditure, not to review expenditure estimates or
to oversee the use of appropriations.
Though Hamilton was rebuffed in his efforts to establish
executive control over the budget, he is associated with a number
of important actions which ultimately established the primacy
of the executive branch over the budget. On his own initiative,
he prepared a Book of Estimates which set forth the expenditure
requirements of the various departments and agencies at the
beginning of each session of the Congress:
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It was by direct, personal, administrative
initiative that the government was set in
operation. Only by such agency could the
finances receive the radical treatment by
which Hamilton almost at a stroke lifted
the nation out of bankruptcy, established
its credit and secured its revenue....
His personal initiative transcended even the
function of an English Chancellor of the
Exchequer on which it was distinctly model-
led, for he had no other compact party on
which he could depend.4
The state of American finance in the fall of 1789 was
chaotic,and on 21 September the Congress passed a resolution
directing Hamilton to prepare a plan for the provision of
public credit since it was a "matter of high importance to the
national honor and prosperity":
The conduct of the Union's military affairs and
foreign affairs, like its Congress, its presidency
and its judiciary, all needed funds for day-to-day
operations; and Hamilton was the man to whom all
looked for funding. It is not surprising that with
a firm belief in the implied powers in the Consti-
tution, and few precedents except his own from
The Federalist Papers to constrict his sphere,
Hamilton as Secretary of the Treasury could spread
his influence into all branches and offices of the
new government. Little in his experience of life
to date at 32 had taught any sense of limits to
his inward perception that no limits existed to
the number of possibilities and opportunities
that would open up to application of the steady
pressure of his ideas, energy, and push.
No American's rise except Washington's, and pos-
sibly Benjamin Franklin's, could come close to
matching his. In all history and literature, as
far as the public was aware, there were only a
few comparable successes -- Julius Caesar, Shakes-
peare's Othello, the Joseph of Genesis, Alexander of
Macedon, and a handful of Plutarch's avatars --
that equaled his to date.
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As Secretary of the Treasury, Washington's former
chief aide immediately became the functional
equivalent of prime minister of the new government,
partly on the strength of the trust his chief
reposed in him, partly by default of rivals, partly
by superior knowledge of how the system was sup-
posed to work, and partly by seizing the opportunity.
In one important way, his power in the tripartite
constitutional system exceeded that of a parlia-
mentary prime minister in that he was not subject
to overthrow by the legislative branch.5
On 4 January, Hamilton informed the Congress that the
report which they had requested was ready and that he was pre-
pared to deliver it to them. A fierce debate arose since Congress
was fearful that the eloquent Hamilton might sway their opinions
as he had on previous occasions. Because of this apprehension,
a motion was made in the House requiring that Hamilton's report
be in writing, and that he not be allowed to accompany it. The
motion was overwhelmingly passed and in the process an important
precedent was established; namely, that cabinet members would
not appear before the Congress as a whole to explain or defend
proposals.
This first example is characteristic of almost the
entire history of congressional responses to executive budget
initiatives. Unsure of its own capabilities and strengths,
Congress adopted a proposal simply, it thought, to limit the
visibility of the charismatic Hamilton. Instead, Congress
shortsightedly misjudged the potential impact of this decision,
and what was intended as a rather limited action against Hamilton
became the basis of an important decrease in legislative power.
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Because of this episode, the interaction between
cabinet members and the Parliament, which was an essential
characteristic of the British system, never became part of the
American government. As a result, the American cabinet developed
as an adjunct to the Executive instead of to the Legislature.
Of even greater significance in terms of the history of budgeting
is that this episode clearly marks the beginning of Congress's
often unwitting abdication of fiscal control to the Executive.
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POLITICAL PARTIES
Political parties did not exist at the time the
Constitution was written but their emergence came to exert
considerable influence on the budget process and consequently
strengthened executive control over the budget. The President
came to exercise influence on legislation in his capacity as
the elected leader of a political party as well as in his
capacity as the head of the executive agencies of government.
Some critics view this dual role of the Presidency as a develop-
ment which was not anticipated in the Constitution and which
was Contrary to the espoused role of the President.6
It was one of Hamilton's proposals, together with the
formation of Republican and Federalist groupings in Congress,
which was the principal engine in the development of political
parties:
Hamilton's "Report on Public Credit" and the pas-
sage of his program with Jefferson's and Madison's
help and acquiescence constitute a watershed in
American history. It marks the end of an era of
American bankruptcy and repudiation of debt and
the beginning of a long era during which the
public credit of the United States would be
sounder than that of any other nation. At the
same time, the debates on discrimination and
assumption opened a wide gulf in opinion between
Hamiltonian nationalists on one side and of the
proponents of states' rights, now championed by
Madison, on the other. The cleavage led shortly
to the formation of the Federal Republican or
Federalist and the Anti-Federalist or Democratic
Republican parties .7
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Gradually, as two opposing factions came to dominate
the legislative process, congressional members were more and
more forced to choose sides and, simply by voting, they became
identified with one party or another. This partisanship began
to filter out to voters as members of Congress campaigned for
their own reelections. Through this process, the congressional
factions were able to achieve mass followings throughout the
country and make the transition from capital factions to national
political parties. The process did not occur overnight, how-
ever, and was greatly influenced by other factors such as major
disagreements over domestic policies and the crisis in foreign
affairs that dominated much of the 1790's.
Political parties at their inception proved no im-
mediate threat to the balance of power for the Congress since
surplus was the rule rather than the exception. Nevertheless,
this desire to initiate an agenda became increasingly visible,
and it was because of this dual role of the President as both
chief executive officer and head of a political party, that
gave rise to an important shift in the balance of power between
the legislative and the executive branches of government.
The secular importance of this development was only
evident as the locus of initiative shifted from the Congress to
the Executive with presidents being nominated because they had
espoused explicit political agendas called platforms and as
their ability to execute their espoused platforms became the
standard for judging their performance in office:
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Closely related to his role as electoral leader is
the executive's role as the symbol of his party,
for the president...stands as its most salient
representative, In the public's mind, his programs
are the party's programs. His successes and
failures are its successes and failures; his im-
aginativeness and vigor are the party's...it is no
exaggeration to speak of the American parties as
"executive-centered coalitions."8
As a result, what emerged were presidents who initiated legis-
lation rather than ones who merely executed the will of the
Congress.
One of the first concrete incidences of executive-
legislative friction brought on by this dual role of the presi-
dency occurred during the term of Andrew Jackson. Before this,
there had been relative harmony between the Executive and the
Congress. 9 It was Andrew Jackson who combined election to the
presidency with political party leadership and, in so doing, he
began, according to Frank Sorauf in Party Politics in America,
a revolution in the American presidency and the American polit-
ical party;
The presidency ceased to be a repository of elitist
good sense and conservatism that Hamilton saw in it
and became, slowly and fitfully, an agency of mass
political leadership and representation. It was
ultimately the president rather than the Congress
who became the tribune of the people in the American
political system. Popular democracy found its two
chief agents -- a popularly elected leader and a
mass political party merged in the American chief
executive, the power of the office reinforced by
the power of the party.10
Andrew Jackson took the position that Congress had
no power to incorporate a national bank; a position which had
become an article in the creed of the Democratic party:
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When Congress assembled on December 6, 1830, the
President sent in his message, in which he violently
attacked the National Bank, (He) recommended that
Congress should direct the removal from the bank of
the government's deposits. This Congress refused to
do. He repeated this recommendation at the next
session, with the further one that the stock in the
bank belonging to the United States should be sold.
Both propositions were voted down. Instead, a bill
to renew the bank's charter was passed, which the
President vetoed July 10, 1832. In the spring of
1833, Jackson instructed his Secretary of the
Treasury to direct that no more government money
should be deposited in the bank. The Secretary
refused, and off went his official head. Roger B.
Taney was appointed, and the President's order
obeyed.11
From the time of Jackson's veto of the charter renewal until the
war period, the Democratic national conventions declared every
four years in their party platforms that "Congress had no power
to charter a National Bank."
Andrew Jackson's term of office clearly marked a
significant change in the relationship of the Executive to Leg-
islative; a change which would have substantial legislative im-
pact in general and budgetary impact in specific.
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THE CIVIL WAR
Initially, the House of Representatives carried out
its tasks through a committee of the whole, After each discus-
sion had been held, a specific committee was appointed to bring
in a bill incorporating the views expressed by the committee.
However, in 1796, a Ways and Means Committee was appointed which
was made a permanent standing committee in 1802,
During this period, there was relatively little public
concern about budgeting, in part because the laissez-faire
philosophy of the time favored a kind of minimal role for
government and in part because the revenue from the tariff
regularly exceeded spending. This was a time (as incredible as
it sounds today) when the principal financial problem that
Congress faced was how to dispose of the large surpluses brought
in by the tariff.
During Jefferson's reign (1801-1809), the informal
and almost collegial way of budgeting ended and the separation
of Cabinet officials from the day-to-day work of Congress was
made complete. It was the weight of government more than any
other factor which caused the change in process. Direct oral
communication between the two branches of government gave way
to written communication. In the new process, the Executive
lost much of its former ability to initiate legislation and as
a result, friction in financial and budgetary matters increased
between the Executive and the Congress, often centering on the
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use of very detailed appropriations which effectively restricted
Executive discretion,
Congress's temporary control of the budget process
was due primarily to the Ways and Means Committee which handled
not only tax legislation but also revenue raising and appropri-
ations. The Committee served as a planning agency and provided
the only mechanism for a comprehensive overview of the state of
the government's finances, This comprehensive view emerged,
however, only sequentially as one department after another was
heard,
During the Civil War, Congress recognized that Ways
and Means had just too much work for any one committee to
handle, and so the Committee on Appropriations was established,
leaving Ways and Means with responsibility only for revenue
raising, Again, one sees the Congress in a genuine effort to
increase efficiency, adopting an approach which not only fails
in its espoused objective but also diminishes their power rela-
tive to the Executive,
In creating the Appropriations Committee, Congress
actually ended its ability to view the budget comprehensively.
From that point on, revenue and appropriation actions would
not be considered as two inherently related components of the
same process.12 By 1885, there were eight committees of the
House and eight committees in the Senate with authority to
recommend appropriations.
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Beginning with the misguided effort to restrict the
personal appearances of Alexander Hamilton, Congress lost ground
in exercising control over the budget, Not surprisingly, each
action which tilted to the balance of power toward the Executive
paved the way for further executive control at the expense of
the Congress.
27
DEFICITS AND GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY
The surpluses which characterized the post Civil War
years were not as evident after 1894 and the terms of both
Theodore Roosevelt and William Taft were marked by deficits.
With increased expenditures came an increased public concern
and a more responsive attitude to the proposals of budget re-
formers.
For example, on 4 March 1909, in a spirit of innova-
tion, an amendment to the Sundry Civil Appropriations Act pro-
vided that if appropriations exceeded revenues, the Secretary
of the Treasury should immediately advise the Congress as to
how appropriations could be reduced or additional taxes levied
(35 State. L 945 1027). Certainly this was an important sounding
step; however, there is no evidence that Franklin MacVeagh, the
Secretary of the Treasury, ever implemented this directive,
On 22 March 1909, the Senate appointed a special com-
mittee to investigate the deficits. It reported that:
...The application to the business of the govern-
ment of improvements in systems and methods similar
to those which have produced the high degree of
business efficiency in the great business corpor-
ations of the country will result in the saving of
many millions of dollars annually and in a much
higher degree of efficiency in the conduct of the
government business .13
This also sounded fine; however, no action was taken
as a result of the special committee,and it was presidential
initiative which eventually produced the first comprehensive
study of the budget, a study which was to provide the foundation
for our present budgeting system. In December 1909, President
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Taft requested an appropriation of $100,000 ",,,to enable the
president to inquire into the methods of transacting the public
business,..." This request was granted by the Congress on
25 June 1910, and the President immediately appointed the Com-
mission on Economy and Efficiency.
According to Burkhead, writing in Government Budget-
ing, 4the Taft Commission on Economy and Efficiency conceived
its responsibilities very broadly and for two years undertook
investigations of: (1) the budget as an annual financial
program; (2) the organization and activities of the federal
government; (3) personnel problems; (4) financial records and
accounts: and (5) business practices and procedures in the
government.
The Commission secured information from federal
departments and agencies classifying expenditures by type such
as personnel services, materials, supplies, and equipment. On
the basis of discussions with department heads and in consul-
tation with the President, the Commission prepared a set of
forms to be used by departments in the submission of their
annual budgetary requests. The Commission also prepared the
first organizational chart of the federal government, a chart
which showed numerous instances of overlapping.and duplicating
operations within the government.
The Commission's report further weakened congressional
control over the budget. By allowing the President the oppor-
tunity to "inquire into methods of transacting the public
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business," Congress emasculated its own special committee set
up nine months before,
The work of the Commission, sponsored by the Executive,
represented a major study of the federal budget process, some-
think Congress had not been able to accomplish.
This was the first time in the history of the
federal government that its organizational
structure had been studied in detail, and the
first time that detailed information had been
assembled on the character of governmental
expenditures. Of even greater significance
was the fact that these documents represented
an assumption of responsibility by the chief
executive for financial planning and for the
management of the 'government's business', as
it was then called.15
The Commission's recommendations amounted to a com-
plete turnaround in budgeting procedure. The work of the Com-
mission, in addition, represented a substantial effort to define
budgeting control as the responsibility of the Executive by
recommending that the President prepare an annual executive
budget. Such a budget was to be built around proposed programs
designed to carry out certain goals of the government as defined
by the President in his party's platform. The proposed execu-
tive budget process was also comprehensive in that it discussed
not only spending, but revenues as well. The existing procedure
was for individual departments and agencies to request funds
directly from Congress on their own initiative with no coordi-
nation or approval from the President. On 17 January 1912,
President Taft sent the Congress a message on Economy and Ef-
ficiency in the Government Services. 1 6 On 27 June 1912, the
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report of the Commission, entitled The Need for a National
Budget, was likewise transmitted. 1 7
President Taft's message to Congress was devoted to
a description of the conditions which had necessitated the
creation of the Commission, a description of the work of the
Commission, and the transmission of the organizational chart
which they had prepared. Throughout his address, President
Taft stressed the importance of establishing an executive budget
system as an instrument of management and control. He stated,
"The constitutional purpose of a budget is to make government
responsive to public opinion and responsible for its acts." 1 8
To the Commission, the budget served a number of
purposes. It was a document for congressional action, an
instrument of control and management by the Chief Executive,
and a basis for the administration of departments and agencies.
On the latter point, the Commission stated:
In order that he (the administrator) may think
intelligently about the subject of his responsi-
bility, he must have before him regularly state-
ments which will reflect results in terms of
quality and quantity; he must be able to measure
quality and quantity of results by units of cost
and units of efficiency.19
A central concern to the Commission was the constitu-
tional question of how such an executive budget process would
fit within a governmental structure based on a separation of
powers. The rationale that the Commission suggested was that
the government was constitutionally based on a trusteeship
theory.. .where citizens were the beneficiaries and creators of
the trusts, where the government was the trust instrument, and
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where government officials were the trustees. Because of the
importance of the budget in carrying out the objectives of the
citizens, the President, as the principal government official,
must be responsible for the budget: he should submit the
budget; the heads of departments and agencies should transmit
their data to the President; the Secretary of the Treasury
should assist the President in discharging these obligations.
The implication of this line of reasoning is that the
Pres-ident's responsibility runs not only to the Congress, but
directly and independently to the public at large, The budget
is seen as the only effective means by which the President can
be made responsible for putting a comprehensive program before
the people.
The Congress recognized this threat to its control
over the budget and opposed all of President Taft's recommenda-
tions on the budget and no legislation ensued. Congress op-
posed the budget reform largely because many of them thought it
would involve relinquishing the power they held over expendi-
tures, and because they felt it was in conflict with the
Constitution.
Shortly after the Commission's report was received,
the Congress attached an amendment to the Sundry Civil Ap-
propriations Bill of 1912, requiring heads of departments and
agencies to submit their appropriation requests at the specified
time and in the usual form required by existing law and at no
other time and in no other form. President Taft, however, in-
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sisted that he had the necessary constitutional authority to
require that appropriation requests be submitted as he directed.
Thus, the Cabinet officials and agency heads were forced to
prepare two sets of appropriation requests -- one in accordance
with the requirements of the Congress, and the other in accord-
ance with the requirements of the President as set forth in the
Commission's report.
Despite the fact that the work of the Commission on
Economy and Efficiency led to no immediate legislation, it was
of tremendous secular importance. The prestige of the Com-
mission and its strong presidential support made budgeting an
issue of national significance. The Commission's work stimu-
lated attention to budgetary reform in city and state govern-
ment, and it led to considerable literature on the subject of
budgeting, 20
There is no doubt that the work of the Taft Commission
contributed greatly to the eventual passage of the Budget and
Accounting Act in 1921. Four years after the Commission's
report, all three major political parties (Progressive, Republi-
can, and Democrat) included a plank on budgeting in their party
platforms. In addition, business groups, especially the National
Chamber of Commerce, were concerned about budgeting. The Chamber
conducted a referendum of its members as a means of stimulating
interest in this reform and reported, "The business interests
of the country today are practically a unit for this reform by
the federal government."21
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Not everyone, however, was rushing toward an executive
budget. Edward Fitzpatrick, an experienced public administrator,
writing in Budget Making in a Democracy, expressed a concern over
two aspects of "the budget idea."22 The first, which relates
to the balance of power, was his sense that there would be an
inherent increase in the relative power of the president with
the establishment of an executive budget system. The second,
which can be called a liberal fear, was that although seemingly
neutral the budget system would find its principal use as a
tool for retrenchment and not as a means for improving the ef-
ficiency and quality of government services as it was being
marketed.
Fitzpatrick's condemnation of the executive budget
was not sugar-coated:
Without the executive budget, the dominant Prus-
sian military caste could never have permeated
the German people with its immoral ideas and made
Germany synonymous with organized terror and
frightfulness.23
and further:
The so-called "executive budget" program proposes
a shifting of the center of gravity of our govern-
ment. Its tendency is toward autocratic executive
power. It would achieve this change in government
as a by-product to the budget scheme.24
Notwithstanding Fitzgerald's concern, by now the only
real opposition to the executive budget came from a small number
of Congressmen, such as Speaker of the House, Joseph Cannon,
who stated:
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.When Congress consents to the Executive making
the budget it will have surrendered the most im-
portant part of a representative government, and
put this country back where it was when the shot
at Lexington was heard 'round the world'.25
Cannon's point, however prescient, was overwhelmed by
the view of the majority of Congress that its budgetary power
would actually increase with an executive budget. Newspaper and
magazine articles of the time expressed only optimism about how
much would be saved by the new Act. And most members of Congress,
including James Good, Chairman of the House Appropriations Com-
mittee, pointed out that an executive budget system would
strengthen and improve the ability of Congress to control
national finances. 26
As it became more apparent that an executive budget
would soon be established, most of the debate shifted to the
relative roles of the Executive and the Congress within such a
system. Congress was now as much interested in budget monitor-
ing and accounting control as in the establishment of an execu-
tive budget. In fact, it saw budget formulation as a kind of
tedious, clerical function when compared with the power of
keeping track of expenditures.
As part of its reform of federal finance, the Congress
incorporated into the bill the establishment of a General Ac-
counting Office, to be headed by a Comptroller General who was
to be appointed by the President but could not be removed by
him. Since President Wilson's view was that appointment and
removal power could not constitutionally be separated, he
vetoed the bill.27
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In 1920, the platforms of both major parties strongly
endorsed the executive budget concept. The Republicans won;
President Harding pledged a 'business-like' administration, and
the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act was a reality. It
became law, in much the same form as had been vetoed by President
Wilson, on 19 June 1921. In his first budget message, President
Harding said that this was "...the greatest reformation in
governmental practices since the beginning of the Republic."
The Act had three main purposes: (1) to provide for
an annual and comprehensive presidential budget; (2) to provide
the President with the Budget Bureau (BOB) to assist him in the
preparation of the budget; and (3) to assign responsibility for
fiscal oversight to a General Accounting Office (GAO) under a
comptroller General who reported to the Congress.
The Act directed the President to prepare and trans-
mit to Congress each year a budget showing federal revenues
and expenditures for the previous and current years and esti-
mates for the ensuing year. The Act also provided that the
President would appoint the director and assistant director of
the Budget Bureau without Senate confirmation. It was felt
by Congress that the Budget Bureau and its directors were
"peculiarly" the President's staff, and that since he needed
to have explicit trust and confidence in them, Senate approval
was inappropriate,28 (The far-reaching effort of this action,
however, was to further weaken the executive branch's responsi-
bility for the budget.)
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The President also was required to submit to Congress,
within the first 15 days of each regular session, a document
containing (inter alia);
(a) Estimates of the expenditures and appropriations
necessary, in his judgment, for the support of
the government for the ensuing fiscal year
(except that the estimates for such year for
the legislative branch of the government and
the Supreme Court of the United States were
to be transmitted to the President on or before
15 October of each year, and were to be in-
cluded by him in the budget without revision);
(b) His estimates of the receipts of the government
during the ensuing fiscal year, under (1) laws
existing at the time the budget is transmitted,
and also (2) under the revenue proposals, if
any, contained in the budget;
(c) Appropriations, expenditures, and receipts of
the government during the last completed fiscal
year;
(d) Estimates of the expenditures, receipts, and
appropriations of the government during the
fiscal year;
(e) The amount of annual, permanent, or other ap-
propriations, including balances of appropri-
ations for prior fiscal years, available for
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expenditure during the fiscal year in progress,
as of November of such year;
(f} Balanced statements of C11 the condition of the
Treasury at the end of the last completed fiscal
year, (2) the estimated condition of the Treasury
at the end of the fiscal year in progress, and
(3) the estimated condition of the Treasury at
the end of the ensuing fiscal year if the
financial proposals contained in the budget
are adopted;
(g) All essential facts regarding the bonded and
other indebtedness of the government; and
(h) such other statements and data as, in his
opinion, are necessary or desirable in order
to make known in all practicable detail the
financial condition of the government.
The principal engine for the new budget process was
the Bureau of the Budget. The Bureau of the Budget was intended
to be a strong addition to the executive component of the govern-
ment. The 1921 Act states that:
The Director of the Budget, in requesting inform-
ation for the use of the President, acts for the
President, and his calls upon the chiefs of bureaus
and other administrative officers for purposes of
consultation or information take precedence over
that of cabinet heads or other departments.
Under the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, only the
President had the authority to release to the Congress studies
done by the Bureau of the Budget. This feature was a major
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factor 53 years later when Congress was forced to establish its
own budget office in part because it could not get sufficient
access to the supporting information used in presidential
budget decisions.
Although the Bureau of the Budget was originally
located in the Treasury Department, from the beginning its
charge related more to expenditures -- while the Treasury was
responsible for work on the revenue side. The location of the
Bureau of the Budget in the Treasury building was a residual
of a friendly disagreement between Representative Good and
Senator McCormick over whether BOB should report directly to
the President or be a part of the Treasury Department.
Locating BOB in the Treasury Department (as sponsored
by McCormick) would have been consistent with the historical
functions of the Treasury under Alexander Hamilton. The Senate
felt that since the Secretary of the Treasury was the specified
fiscal official of the Government, he should be given the
responsibility of budget preparation. In the Senate version of
the bill the department heads had the responsibility of desig-
nating someone in the departments to prepare estimates and then
sending the estimates to the Secretary of the Treasury. The
Secretary of the Treasury would then make any revisions he
thought necessary and then send the revisions as well as the
original estimates to the President. The President would make
any modifications he thought were justified and then send the
budget to Congress.
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Having BOB report directly to the President Cas spon-
sored by Good) would have emphasized the overriding responsi-
bility of the President for the budget. However, after some
deliberation and further study, the Senate agreed to the House
point of view that such a budget procedure (via the Secretary
of the Treasury) was too cumbersome and time consuming. The
final language of the Act represented a victory for Representa-
tive Good's view and a gesture toward Senator McCormick's
position.
The Bureau of the Budget got off to an extremely good
start. The first director, General Dawes, enjoyed close personal
relations with President Harding, and was able to operate in-
dependently of the Treasury Department, where it was located.
According to A.E. Buck in Public Budgeting -- the physical re-
lationship of BOB to the Treasury contributed to its prestige
in the business community and to a general understanding, both
inside and outside government, of the nature of its work.2 9
General Dawes enjoyed a similar success in his
relations with the Congress. Congressmen came to rely on the
estimates that he presented, and the work of the appropriations
committees was thus reduced. The chairman of the Senate Com-
mittee on Appropriations in 1923 said:
The Budget law has demonstrated its worth. It helps
separate the chaff from the grain. It gives ac-
curacy, as well as integrity, to estimates, which
results in less work on the part of Congress.
Under the old system, congressional committees were
obligated to spend a great amount of time on ex-
travagant and questionable estimates... Now that
estimates mean something, the work of all is ac-
celerated.30
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General Dawes' stay at the Bureau of the Budget lasted
only one year, but his imprint continued to dominate BOB for
the next ten years, Dawes' approach to the role and functions
of the Bureau was appropriate to the times. The Bureau of the
Budget operated with a minimal staff (30-40), and it continued
to perceive its principal role as that of management improve-
ment to be accomplished through the budget formulation and
review process. This approach emphasizes reductions in expendi-
tures as the measure of its success. Because of its size and
because of its orientation, in the beginning BOB came to operate
more nearly like the Treasury bureau and less like a special
staff to the President, Even the New Deal did not at first
bring a change in BOB's role, nor increase its staff.
The 1921 budget reform was not an isolated incident.
It was hammered out during the era of Woodrow Wilson's "New
Freedom" as part of a package of reforms whose fundamental pur-
pose was to establish effective national leadership in full
public view. Moreover, some kind of reform was probably in-
evitable in view of the change in the nation's revenue structure.
Taxes had replaced tariffs as the major revenue source, and
this shift exposed the operations of the federal government to
direct scrutiny in much the same way as state and local govern-
ments had always been exposed.
The executive budget was brought about by an alliance
of reformers (political scientists and public servants) who
wished to transform government into a positive instrument for
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social welfare, and conservatives Cthe business community) who
wished to reduce governmental expenditures and lower taxes.
Fifty years later, this same alliance, for much the same reasons,
would converge to create a new order with respect to the budget.
The Act was the combined product of two separate
movements: one, a strong retrenchment movement directed toward
the federal government; the other, a reform movement designed
to make government more responsible and responsive.
Although Congress thought that it was merely delegating
power in a way that was necessary to achieve the larger goal of
fiscal responsibility, in its own words, they "...were not giving
up very much."3 1
There was a substantial difference between the House
and the Senate. On the one hand, the Senate was not quite as eager
as the House to invest the President with budgetary responsibility.
However, the House felt that by making the President responsible
for the budget, he could be held more accountable.
During the debate on the Act, the House appeared to
take as a given that the primary responsibility for the budget
rested with the President. In their eyes, the Act provided the
President with the machinery to perform the duties required of
him by the Constitution; that is, to lay out a work program and
to report to the Congress on the state of the Union. In addition,
the House felt that since the President was the only official of
the U.S. elected by all the people, budgetary responsibility
should rest with him.
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According to Murray Weidenbaum, writing in Matching
Needs and Resources: Reforming the Federal Budget, when Congress
changed the budget process, it intention was to increase con-
gressional control over spending.32 Greater centralization
within the executive branch was thought to be necessary if the
President was to prepare a coordinated budget. In retrospect,
this was a most ironic defense given that with this Act, Congress
created an executive office of the President and a Bureau of the
Budget which would one day grow into an imperial presidency so
strong that it would not only haunt the cabinet agencies but
would also blatantly frustrate the will of the Congress.
And Congress was not content to stop there. Again,
in a move ostensibly designed to increase efficiency, the Congress
precipitated an important structural change in the budget process
and a corresponding shift in the balance of power. Prior to the
1921 Act, the individual cabinet officers brought their budget
requests and accompanying information on projected costs direct-
ly to the appropriate congressional committee chairmen with no
presidential review, in much the same way as Hamilton had done
132 years before. Now these requests would be routed through
the President so that he could come up with an aggregate budget
request for all of government. By passing the 1921 Act, Congress
was inadvertently endowing the President with his first real
control over the bureaucracy of government. Though the 1921 Act
was designed to assist the President in his capacity as chief
executive officer, this action also gave the President the means
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from which to more effectively exercise his other role as the
initiator of legislation. With the dual role of the President,
it was understandable that, given the opportunity, the President
would, unlike Alexander Hamilton, not only critique and coordi-
nate the agency requests but would also substantially change
them to reflect his own political agenda.
But Congress was very optimistic about what it hoped
to achieve by the 1921 Act:
...We shall have better-prepared estimates. We
shall have a more carefully thought-out program
for the year's work, because the President will
have in the Budget Bureau the machinery which
will enable him to perform the duties imposed
upon him by the constitution... This is a great
forward movement in the direction of efficiency
and the centralization of responsibility in
government... A measure which may be properly
characterized as the greatest measure of legis- 33
lative and administrative reform in our history.
Initially, no conflict occurred between the Congress
and the new executive budget process. The conflict occurred
later as the Executive and, therefore, the Bureau of the Budget
became more powerful in budgetary matters, and the Congress less
able to exert control:
The Executive gained more control over budgetary
policy through centralized management but Congress
became specialized and fragmented. As a result,
the expectation for a shared exercise of financial
powers went glimmering. In its place, an Executive
budget process emerged.34
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 represented the
most significant budget action to that time. It clearly in-
vested the Executive with power over the budget by establishing
a Bureau of the Budget and by routing budget requests directly
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to the President, and it shifted the balance of power and control
unmistakenly to the Executive. On previous occasions, Congress
had informally relinquished budget authority to the Executive,
but the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 was the first major
piece of legislation which legalized this executive control.
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THE DEPRESSION
During the Depression, Congress temporarily suspended
its normal appropriations procedures in an effort to provide
large sums of money for relief. Requests for emergency ap-
propriations were transmitted to Congress in special presidential
messages throughout the calendar year, and were not considered
with the regular budget. These special appropriations were
granted directly to the President; not to specific agencies.
This arrangement had the effect of eliminating the President
from close congressional supervision. This situation continued
until fiscal year 1939, when Congress began to make appropri-
ations to the agencies involved in their respective emergency
relief programs.
An important effect of the Depression was that it
substantially reinforced the power of the Executive in budgetary
control while significantly weakening the already diminished
power of Congress.
William Brown, in The Federal Budgeting and Appropri-
ations Process, says that the enlarged scope of federal economic
activities during the Depression and the increased complexity
of budgeting during that period gave rise to a number of new
inquiries into budget reform.35 Two of these studies, published
in 1937, were of special significance: (1) the "Report of the
President's Committee on Administrative Management," and
(2) the "Report of the Select Committee to Investigate the
Executive Agencies of the Government" (known as the Byrd Com-
mittee Report).
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Both committees recommended that the staff of the
Bureau of the Budget be increased substantially and that BOB's
responsibility in both budget formulation and program monitor-
ing be broadened. In order to facilitate this, the Byrd Com-
mittee recommended the transfer of the Bureau of the Budget
from the Treasury Department to more direct presidential super-
vision (thus strengthening the Budget Director's ties with the
President). The President's Committee recommended the estab-
lishment of an Executive Office of the President which would in-
clude the Bureau of the Budget.
The potential importance of the 16-year-old Bureau of
the Budget as a staff agency was clearly set forth by the
President's Committee in 1937:
If the Bureau of the Budget is to be developed into
a serviceable tool for administrative management to
aid the President in the exercise of overall control,
it needs greater resources and better techniques...
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget is one of
few Government officers in a position to advise the
President from an overall as opposed to a bureau or
departmental, point of view. He should therefore
be relieved to the greatest possible extent from
the minor details of administration. He should be
released for duties of maximum importance to the
President... The Bureau of the Budget as a man-
agerial agency of the President should, therefore,
be made responsible for the execution, as well as
the formulation, of the budget as a national fiscal
plan.36
The studies of the two committees resulted in the
enactment of the Administrative Reorganization Act of 1939.
The Act permitted a series of presidential reorganization plans.
Under subsequent plans, the Executive Office of the President
was created, and the Bureau of the Budget was transferred to
it from the Treasury.
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The Bureau of the Budget did not play a significant
role during the Depression, in part because it was understaffed
and in part because it was unprepared for such an economic
emergency. However, the Deparession can be considered the mid-
wife of the modern Office of Management and Budget (0MB), as the
power that the Congress lent the Executive on an emergency basis
to fight the Depression was never really returned and instead
was institutionalized by the Administrative Reorganization Act
of 1939.
The Bureau of the Budget was the beneficiary of the in-
creased executive responsibility associated with the growth of
the federal government during the Depression. It was in this
way that the Bureau of the Budget was transformed from a rather
small agency concerned primarily with preparing the annual
executive budget to an agency concerned with wider budgeting
issues. Prior to the Administrative Reorganization Act of 1939
in fiscal 1938, the Bureau of the Budget had a staff of 45; the
following year, the staff had more than doubled to 103 employees.
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WORLD WAR II
In the history of budgeting, nothing seems as certain
to increase the power of the Executive as does a crisis, and World
War II was no exception. The Executive Office of the President and
the expanded and strengthened Bureau of the Budget were soon put to
a major test by the organizational and program requirements of the
pre-war period, beginning in the summer of 1940. As a result, the
executive budget control which occurred during the Depression was
reinforced during World War II.
From fiscal 1940 to fiscal 1943, under the direction
of Harold D. Smith, the Bureau's appropriation increased from
$67,000 to almost $2,000,000,37 By the end of 1940, five
divisions were established: (1) Estimates, for the review of
department and agency budget submissions; (2) Fiscal, for the
economic analysis of programs; (3) Legislative Reference, for
clearing legislative proposals of agencies and departments and
reviewing their reports on legislation enacted but not approved
by the President; (4) Administrative Management, for conducting
studies of organization and work methods; and (5) Statistical
Standards for coordinating federal statistical programs. This
divisional organization continued without important modifica-
tion until 1952.38
During the war, the Bureau of the Budget was assigned
major responsibility for establishing emergency agencies, for
the planning and budgeting of military outlays, and for the
formulation of programs for inflation control. 39 The war seemed
to prove the soundness of the Executive Office philosophy, and
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the role of the Bureau of the Budget, as an important agency
of presidential management, was secured.
The sense that there needed to be congressional reform
became especially clear during the war when the powers of the
executive branch were enlarged, but budget reform was subordi-
nated by the Congress to the war effort. However, the conversion
of the economy back to peacetime pursuits put renewed emphasis
on the reform of the federal appropriations process.
After World War II, Congress found itself facing many
of the same problems that had prompted the original Budget Ac-
counting and Control Act of 1921. And Congress, while recog-
nizing that wartime conditions necessitated broad presidential
powers, was increasingly aware of the need for control and
limitations;
Even before World War II ended, the tremendous
expansion of the size and the authority of the
government, especially the executive branch, led
to a debate on reform of Congress....
.,.Two themes dominated the debate -- the relation-
ship between the organization of Congress and its
increased workload, and the relations between
Congress and the executive branch.40
An important factor leading to the 1921 Act was the
cost overruns of the various executive agencies. In 1946, with
Congress facing the same problem, the mood had shifted and
Congress now felt it necessary to prevent the Executive from
committing funds without authorization.
In 1945, the American Political Science Association
asserted that:
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Congress must modernize its machinery and methods
to fit modern conditions, if it is to keep pace
with a greatly enlarged and active executive branch.
This is a better approach than that which seeks to
meet the problem by reducing and hamstringing the
executive. A strong and more representative legis-
lature, in closer touch with and better infomed
about the administration, is the antidote to
bureaucracy. 41
The Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress
was created in 1945 in response to congressional and public
opinion which held that the nation was witnessing a shift in
the balance of power which represented a "grave constitutional
crises." 4 2 The Committee was composed of six members from each
House, equally divided between Democrats and Republicans. The
feeling of many members of Congress was expressed by Represen-
tative Jerry Voorhis when he urged approval of the concurrent
resolution which established the Joint Committee:
In the midst of this war we have to grant executive
power...of the most sweeping nature.... In order
that this Congress may perform its functions ef-
ficiently, effectively, and in accord with the needs
of the people of this nation and so that it will
become not merely an agency that says yes or no to
executive proposals, but an agency capable of, and
actually performing the function of bringing forth
its own constructive program for the needs of the
people of this nation. Thus it will take its place
as an altogether coequal branch of our government.43
Senator Robert La Follette (R) was named chairman with
Representative Mike Monroney (D), vice-chairman. From 13 March
through 29 June 1945, the Committee interviewed more than 100
witnesses, including many members of Congress.
The Committee's final report was issued on 4 March
1946 and included a comprehensive set of recommendations designed
to streamline the congressional committee structure, to strength-
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en congressional control over the budget, to reduce the work-
load of Congress, and to increase the equality of staff. Most
of the Committee's recommendations were incorporated into the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 that was signed by
President Truman on 2 August 1946. Clearly, the Committee saw
the 1946 Act in the same light that Congress viewed the 1921
Act: an opportunity to thoroughly reorganize the legislative
arm of the government:
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 at-
tempted to assert new and meaningful control over
the budget process through the creation of a
legislative budget... The legislative budget's
main feature was the establishment of a maximum
amount to be appropriated each year.44
The Act attempted to improve budgeting efficiency in
Congress: "(it) was designed to duplicate in Congress the delib-
erations on the budget that occur in the executive branch."4 5
The Act created a Joint Committee on the Legislative Budget,
consisting of all members of revenue raising and appropriating
committees in both Houses of Congress. The Act also required
a meeting of the Joint Committee on the Legislative Budget dur-
ing the opening weeks of each regular session, at which time
Congress would examine proposed spending in the context of the
expected revenue and then develop an appropriations ceiling for
the forthcoming fiscal year.
Section 138 of the Legislative Reorganization Act
provided for adoption of the Legislative Budget as follows:
(a) The Committee on Ways and Means and the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the House of Repre-
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sentatives, and the Committee on Finance and
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate,
or duly authorized subcommittees thereof, are
authorized and directed to meet jointly at the
beginning of each regular session of Congress
and after study and consultation, giving due
consideration to the budget recommendations of
the President, report to their respective Houses
a legislative budget for the ensuing fiscal
year, including the estimated overall federal
receipts and expenditures for such year. Such
report shall contain a recommendation for the
maximum amount to be appropriated for expendi-
ture in such year which shall include such an
amount to be reserved for deficiencies as may
be deemed necessary by such committees. If the
estimated receipts exceed the estimated expendi-
tures, such report shall contain a recommenda-
tion for a reduction in the public debt. Such
report shall be made by 15 February.
(b) The report shall be accompanied by a concurrent
resolution adopting such budget, and fixing the
maximum amount to be appropriated for expendi-
ture in such year. If the estimated expenditures
exceed the estimated receipts, the concurrent
resolution shall include a section substantially
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as follows: That it is the sense of the
Congress that the public debt shall be in-
creased in an amount equal to the amount by
which the estimated expenditures for the en-
suing fiscal year exceed the estimated receipts.
The Legislative Reorganiztion Act of 1946 reduced the
number of standing committees from 33 to 15 in the Senate and
from 48 to 19 in the House, dropping inactive committees and
merging others with related functions; and prohibited the intro-
duction of private bills for the payment of pensions or tort
claims, the construction of bridges, or the correction of
military records -- categories of legislation that at one point
consumed much time. (The Act did not include the Joint Committe's
proposal that the District of Columbia be given home rule, a
step that would have eliminated the District Committees in both
Houses and a considerable amount of legislative work.)
The principal purpose of the Act was to help Congress
hold its own against the rapidly expanding power of the execu-
tive branch and, like the 1921 Act, it was regarded at the time
as a major achievement. Hopes were high that the Act and its
legislation budget would be an effective barrier to the ever-
increasing cost of government, But the passage of a law does not
mean that the prescribed actions will be taken. Laws have to be
implemented, and some implementations are more perfect than
others,
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The procedure called for in the Legislative Reorgani-
zation Act of 1946 was followed in only two years, 1947 and
1948. Budget resolutions passed both Houses in 1947, but the
amounts differed, and the resolution died in a deadlocked joint
committee. In the following year, agreement was reached on the
level of funds to be appropriated, but Congress proceeded to
disregard the resolution and voted appropriations approximately
$6 billion higher. In 1949, Congress extended the deadline
required for reporting, but the date came and went every year
without any substantial effort to comply with the law:
One of the principal reasons the legislative
budget failed was the inability of the four
Committees to make accurate estimates of spend-
ing so early in the session and before individual
agency requests were considered in detail. In
addition, the Joint Committee was said to be
inadequately staffed and, with more than 100
members, mucy to unwieldy for effective operation.
The budget ceilings -- as indicated by the 1948
experience -- did not prove to be binding.
Another reason for the failure was simply Con-
gress's practice of passing appropriation bills
separately without strict control on total out-
lays.46
According to Arthur Smithies, writing in The Budgetary
Process in the United States, the legislative budget provisions
of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 were doomed from
the outset:
The estimation of receipts is hazardous, and the
staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue
Taxation was faced with the same inherent dif-
ficulties as the staff of the Treasury. No one
inside or outside the Government has yet been
able to forecast with great assurance the changes
in economic conditions to which tax receipts im-
mediately respond.
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On the expenditure side-, the difficulties were
even greater. By habit, inclination, and
tradition, the appropriations committees have
arrived at their expenditure estimates by detail-
ed processes that take months to complete. How
could these same committees be expected to antici-
pate their conclusions and impose a ceiling on
their own activities after a few weeks? They
could feel quite legitimately that they were being
asked to behave irresponsibly. Yet it would clear-
ly be no solution to require some other body to
arrive by other methods at expenditure figures
that would bind the appropriations committees.
Those distinguished and entrenched committees
would never stand for that.47
The 1946 Act did not treat expenditures and revenues
in a symmetrical manner. While the authority was provided for
the Joint Committee on the Legislative Budget to recommend a
ceiling on expenditures other than the President's, there was
no parallel authority for it to recommend increases or decreases
in taxation. The Act did not include a recommendation that the
President be required to reduce appropriations if expenditures
were later found to be exceeding receipts.
One part of the 1946 Act relating to congressional
staffing became an enduring plus in the balance of power on the
congressional side. It was noted at the time that Congress was
dependent upon information and analysis from the various execu-
tive agencies who could determine the amount and nature of
information to release according to their own needs. It was
the 1946 Act that began the professional staffing of Congress
to help with analysis. This provided the Congress with a
capability that thus far had been enjoyed solely by the Execu-
tive. The staffs were proposed as a timesaving measure. It
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was felt that these staffs would be able to digest information,
to handle routine matters, and to provide a source for the
Members to remain well-informed; tasks which before the 1946
Act were overwhelmingly time-consuming and nonproductive.
The Act authorized each standing committee to appoint
four professional and six clerical staff members, although no
limit was placed on the number that could be hired by the
Appropriations Committees. The Act also made the Legislative
Reference Service, whose task was to provide information for
committees and members requesting it, a separate department of
the Library of Congress.
By 1948, Congress recognized that the balance of power
and control rested with the President. During the post-war
period, Congress was predominantly concerned not with regaining
the power of the purse but with preserving its remaining right
to approve, revise, or reject legislative initiatives from the
Executive.
Congress's hopes for the 1946 Act were as high as
those for the 1921 Act but perhaps having learned from the
limitations of the 1921 Act, their praises were more tempered:
.The result is gratifying in more ways than one.
It paves the way to better and more efficient
government and it also proves that the Senate is
readier than most cynics had believed to overhaul
its antiquated ways of doing business.... The
bill does provide a major overhauling of congres-
sional procedure -- the first since 1921.... (Its
reforms) will go a long way toward enabling Congress
to cope with the mass of business which comes
before it.48
Twenty-four years would pass before Congress would
attempt another budget reform.
57
CHAPTER 3
THE ANTECEDENTS OF CBO
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One of my most treasured communications when I was
Director of the Bureau of the Budget, after having
had a slight altercation with Senator Metcalf over
some matter, was a very neatZy done piece of paper
from the Senator which purported to be a memorandum
dated March 1491, from the Spanish Budget Bureau to 0
their Excellencies Ferdinand and IsabelZa, pointing
out why Christopher Columbus should be turned down
on his project proposal.
Charles Schultze
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INFORMATION, IMPOUNDMENTS AND THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY
The legislation which established the Congressional
Budget Office represents the final stage in a series of modifi-
cations in the concept, organization, and responsibilities of a
congressional budget staff.
The Congressional Budget Office would probably not
exist today if the General Accounting Office had moved more
effectively to implement the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1970 (Title II, Section 201 of the 1970 Act had required that
GAO, the Treasury, and OMB, develop a standardized information
and data processing system for budgetary and fiscal data).
The 1970 Act was conceived by the Joint Committee on
the Organization of the Congress after extensive hearings dur-
ing the 89th Congress. The Joint Committee was partly a post
mortem by the Congress, necessitated by Congress's failure to
implement the reforms of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1946.
The 1946 Act failed because it tried to impose too large a
change too quickly and because Congress did not have the
analytical capability to support such a comprehensive change.
For example, the 1946 Act required the Congress to estimate
gross revenues in order to determine the limit of aggregate
expenditures. However, at that time Congress had no
credible way of doing so.
The memory of the failure of the 1946 Act made the
1970 Act more- humble, but it was nonetheless an authentic
attempt by the Congress not only to reform the way it handled
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the budget but also to regain some of its lost power, The
principal objective of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1970 was to acquire the kinds of information that the Congress
needed in order to perform the function of overseeing the
Executive. In a way, the 1970 Act was a strengthening of the
1921 Act, which also had placed its emphasis on the accounting
function rather than the budgeting function. It was especially
fitting that the-General Accounting Office be given the chief
responsibility for implementing the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1970 since it was the 1921 Act which created the General
Accounting Office in the first place.
As flawed as the 1946 Act was in its implementation,
it was correct in putting its finger on the heart of the congres-
sional budgeting problem. It recognized that the basic problem was
the separation of the expenditure and the revenue processes; a
separation which dates back to the Civil War when the Ways and
Means Committee was overburdened, resulting in the creation of
the Appropriations Committee.
By 1972, Senator Metcalf, Chairman of the Senate Sub-
committee on Budgeting, Management and Expenditures (and others
who had oversight responsibility for GAO) were becoming exasper-
ated with GAO's apparent inability to produce the kinds of
information that the Congress had mandated in the 1970 Act.
At the time, the country was experiencing its highest un-
employment rate since World War II, federal deficits beyond
anything in American history, growing inflation, and a
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President who regularly accused the Congress of being fiscally
irresponsible.
In 1972, the Joint Committee on Congressional Oper-
ations reviewed GAO's. progress in implementing the budgetary
and fiscal information provisions of the 1970 Act, and issued
a series of recommendations which stressed the need for GAO to
be more comprehensive in accommodating the needs of the Congress;
We are not seeking to strengthen either the Congress
or the Executive at the expense of other. Our purpose a
is to overhaul and supplement existing fiscal, budget-
ary, accounting, and management information systems
to better serve the needs of both branches. What we
expect is a parallel development, to make more mean-
ingful information more readily available to Congress
and to other users throughout the federal establish- L
ment.49
The Committee concluded that:
...The problem of meeting the needs of Congress is
not the lack of financial data, but the fact that
data is scattered in many different documents and
files, fragmented, difficult to aggregate in con-
sistent formats and committees often cannot go to
any one source to obtain information which cuts
across agency lines.50
1973 was the first year of President Nixon's second
term and while Watergate had not yet broken, things had begun to
leak badly. There was a bitter fight between the Congress and
the President over the budget. The President's veto of Senator
Muskie's water pollution act had just been overridden in the
Congress by a substantial margin when President Nixon impounded
the money. Many in Congress felt that President Nixon was using
impoundments in a way which was illegal and that his announced
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"New Federalism"' was nothing less than a sophisticated attempt
to further undermine the balance of power and control between
the executive and the legislative branches of government.
This entire period was characterized by incredible
hostility between the Congress and the Executive;
o In January 1973, a special ad hoc committee
chairedby Senator Childs held hearings which
which were the scene of bitter exchanges between
Roy Ash, then Director of the Office of Manage-
ment and the Budget (OMB) and the Committee.
o In February and March 1973, there were hearings
on the "New Federalism" and since there was no
budget process as yet, these served as a forum
to debate the President's budget and its extensive
cuts in social programs. Here, again, Senator
Muskie attacked Mr. Ash for witholding inform-
ation that Congress needed to make responsible
decisions.
o In April 1973, there were hearings (which turned
out to be of crucial importance) on executive
privilege. It was here that Attorney General
Richard Kleindienst announced that the right
of the Congress to information was limited to
whatever the President wanted to disclose.
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o In April 1973, Senators Muskie and Ervin intro-
duced a bill (S,1214) which was designed to re-
a
affirm the right of Congress to executive budget
estimates,
o At approximately this same time, Senator Ervin
drafted a budget control bill in his Committee
on Government Operations and assigned it to
Senator Metcalf's newly-formed Subcommittee
on Budgeting Management and Expenditures.
Senator Metcalf's opening statement underscored
Congress' frustration with its attempts to improve its control
over the budget. In particular, the hearings highlighted the
animosity between OMB and the Congress and the allegiance of
OMB to the Executive:
This is a continuation of a series of hearings by the
Subcommittee on Budgeting, Management, and Expendi-
tures on more than a dozen bills on improving congres-
sional control of the budget. We have invited our
friends from the Office of Management and Budget, but
they will not be here today. We had hoped that they
would not be too busy reorganizing their office and
contemplating White House cleaning to be here. We
were particularly interested in talking with them,
since the Comptroller General will be testifying in
part on his work toward improving the flow of fiscal
and budgetary information in Congress as required by
Title 2 of the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act.
Unfortunately, according to Director Ash, he and his
staff are preoccupied with House appropriations hear-
ings on the OMB budget or with other hearings and
budget matters. Also, although I didn't mention it,
today is the day the OMB confirmation bill comes up
in the House. In any event, Director Ash did convey
OMB's views on S.1215 in a letter to Senator Ervin
dated April 27, strongly recommending against the
enactment of this bill which I introduced on March 14.
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OMB's comments on my bill, Director Ash argues, are;
it is unworkable, unwise, unnecessary, and probably
unconstitutional. The comments can be summed up in
one word. It is pathetic.
Let me give you a few samples. Early he questions the
constitutionality of proposed section 203(e). This,
he states, would give the Comptroller General the
authority to recommend changes in the form, content,
and reporting procedures prescribed by existing laws
without the opportunity for Presidential review.
I think that that probably is one of the most out-
rageous statements I have ever heard since I came to
Congress, that anybody should have to have Presidential
review before he gives advice and recommends changes g
as to legislation.
Mr. Ash is probably suggesting there is a constitutional
prescription of court opinion requiring White House
clearance before Congress can act on a recommendation
of the Comptroller General. Perhaps there is a corol-
lary derived from the clear constitutional right the
Nixon administration has asserted to impound funds and
terminate federal programs established by Congress.
Director Ash says he believes in the approach of pre-
scribing principles and standards for agency systems,
as is the case with the accounting system under exist-
ing law, but that leaving the development of the systems
themselves to the agencies is a more sound approach.
That more sound approach is precisely the approach
taken in S.1215. Director Ash says OMB has always
been and will be responsive to the informational needs
of any committee of Congress.
Moreover, in an attachment, he denies the fact that
OMB has refused to comply with the letter and intent
of the present Title 2 requirements. He also claims
that OMB is currently undergoing an extensive internal
reevaluation of its organization and workload in con-
nection with this. He adds, "We are examining alter-
native ways in which additional resources could be
made available for clarifying the congressional needs
and developing a plan for responding to those needs."
This is essentially the same line peddled by OMB last
year at this time in connection with hearings on Title
2 in the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations.
At this time, the Office of Management and Budget had
the equivalent of two people working full-time on
fiscal and budgetary information projects. Today
they only have the equivalent of one person working
half-time.
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The OMB-GAO steering committee, which supposedly is
directing this effort, hasn't even met in all these
intervening months,
In short, we won't have to wait almost a year to
determine the credibility of these OMB comments.
They were, to coin a phrase, inoperative the day
they were written, (U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on
Budgeting, Management, and Expenditures, Committee
on Government Operations, 1 May 1973.)
The Office of Management and Budget's failure to co-
operate with the Senate hearings represented a deliberate posture
that held that supplying information to Congress was unnecessary
and not OMB's responsibility:
(If Congress insisted) that such information is
essential, which we question, we do not believe
the Office of Management and Budget (or any other
agency of the Executive Office of the President)
is the appropriate agency.51
Willfred H. Rommel, the Office of Management and Budget's
legislative director, further argued that:
Too much detail can and does obscure an under-
standing of the major issues... We will be glad
to furnish such program and fiscal data as we
have for the coming year. This would, of course,
not include any working papers of an internal
nature, showing advice to the President that
may or may not have been reflected in his budget
recommendations.52
Rommell also indicated that the Office of Management and Budget
would "discourage any attempt" to request "more across the
board information."53
During hearings of Metcalf's Subcommittee on Budget,
Management and Expenditures, the Comptroller General, Elmer
Staats, indicated that the lack of responsiveness on the part
of OMB specifically was still a problem:
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Q. CSenator Metcalf), In your most recent report,
on February 7, 1973, you stated flatly that fiscal
and budgetary systems being developed by the executive
branch will not fulfill the information needs of the
Congress. In short, this means that OMB is not com-
plying with provisions of Title II of the Legislative
Reorganization Act. In your statement, however, you
suggest that Treasury and OMB are only "moving too
slowly" on this project. What evidence do you have
of significant progress since February 7, which leads
you to believe the OMB is now prepared to meet the
requirements of Sections 201-203?
A. (Elmer Staats). We have no formal commitments for
the new Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
but during our discussions with him and his staff, we S
have been assured that a higher priority will be given
to the implementation of the 1970 Act and that starting
on June 1, 1973, at least six people from the executive
branch will be assigned on a full-time basis, to work
on it, and to coordinate closely with my staff. (Sub-
committee on Budgeting, Management, and Expenditures, W
1 May 1973.)
In the case of the GAO, it has been speculated that
its failure was due not because of any genuine lack of ability
but rather because of a lack of will. Senator Hubert Humphrey
noted this lack of will in his statement before the Subcommittee
on Budgeting, Management, and Expenditures on 9 April 1973:
...Mr. Chairman, there is vast unused potential in
the GAO. The GAO could assist this office through
an analysis of the executive branch budget justifi-
cations and requests assisting in the evaluation of
programs as well as the auditing of those programs,
and working with this new office in examining the
budget assumption and underlying theories of the
Presidential budget, and periodic observation and
analysis of the management functions of the Execu-
tive. The GAO could and should expand its evalua-
tions and audits of both the impact and the admin-
istration of concurrent programs....
67
0One reason which explains GAO's lack of speed in
implementing the requirements of the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1970 is the fact that the General Accounting Office was
just too close to the executive branch to undertake such a
project. In addition, the Director of the General Accounting
Office has unusual security in terms of the Congress since. he is
appointed for a 15 year term, and it requires a joint resolution
of both houses of the Congress to remove him, Lastly, he has
considerable discretion in deciding which projects to take on
and when they should be completed. The job of providing analytical
support for the budget might have forced an unwelcome change in
the relatively autonomous way that GAO was used to working, by
imposing a new set of tasks to be done; tasks which had more
visible deadlines and which could easily be measured. 54
It was this failure of GAO to provide information and
analysis which caused Congress to go back to the drawing boards
to develop some other mechanismand it was from Senator Metcalf
and his staff that the idea of a Congressional Office of the
Budget began to take shape. Senator Metcalf felt that Congress
did not have the information it needed to be effective, was not
getting such information from the Executive, and was reduced
to accepting whatever the executive branch told the Congress.
The availability of information and the capability 9
to analyze the information were noted as essential throughout
the hearings of Metcalf's Subcommittee on Budgeting, Management,
and Expenditures:
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aSENATOR MUSKIE: Forgetting the mechanics and procedures
for a moment, the whole budget process depends upon the
information available, one, and the ability to evaluate
it, two. Without those two ingredients, all the pro-
cedures that you establish- by law are meaningless.
Unless we focus on those essentials,I think we are
going to be more and more at the mercy of the Executive
and the enormous establishments that the Executive has
for mobilizing the information, evaluating and process-
ing it, and moving it toward set conclusions. I think
we are just helpless in the face of that kind of execu-
tive momentum,
I would hope that out of this discussion we can come
up with a budget procedure that gives us a handle on
those two essential points.
SENATOR METCALF: Senator Muskie has brought forth a most
important point. You represent great national organiza-
tions which can help us. As the budget is formulated in
the executive department, if the information which forms
the basis flows into the Congress, then you would be in-
formed as to the process of the establishment of a budget.
As it is now, we are faced with the ultimate mystery
on the 21st of January, with the budget coming out. It
is a big, thick book, an accomplished fact. Most of the
things are phrased so that you can't understand them.
We have to start on that basis.
We haven't had any part, nor have you, in the formu-
lation, I want to say if Mr. Ash can handle the mountain
of information that goes down to make the budget, every
Member of Congress and everybody down to the pages can
also handle that mountain of information, develop it
and ascertain what should be part of the budget process.
I wish you would think about this Congressional Office
of the Budget and this idea of input of information into
the congressional office at the same time that it goes
into the budget.
We don't have to make the determination at the same
time, but we should have the same inflow of information
that the Office of Management and Budget has.
Ralph Nader sat in the same place you are sitting at
one of the other hearings before Senator Muskie's com-
mittee and made one of the most significant statements
that has been made in the last Congress. He said that
information is the currency of power, that the real
currency, the dollars and cents, the cash and flow of
the legislative process, is information, and if you
don't have the information then you don't have anything
upon which to base the legislation or the appropriation
or anything of that sort. (Subcommittee on Budgeting
Management, and Expenditures, Committee on Government
Operations, 7 May 1973.)
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During the hearings Senators Metcalf and Mondale in-
dicated the problem for Congress was not solely a lack of
available information. They outlined a larger problem; in
many cases, the data was available, but there existed a very
formidable resistance on the part of the established agencies
to supply Congress with the information:
SENATOR METCALF: My bill was introduced at the sug-
gestion of the majority leader, who said we had to
get some information in order to be able to adequately,
with intelligence, pass on these budgetary problems.
I found out Mr. Ash says it may be unconstitutional
for the GAO to make unilateral suggestions about the
budget.
SENATOR MONDALE: Did he invoke executive privilege?
SENATOR METCALF No, he didn't but he said he thought D
it was unconstitutional for the GAO to recommend
changes in form, content, and reporting procedures,
prescribed by law, without Presidential review.
SENATOR MONDALE: Even the GAO?
p
SENATOR METCALF; Or anybody else, apparently. The GAO,
which is an arm of the Congress and not part of the
executive department, shouldn't be permitted, under
the Constitution, to comment on legislation, they say,
without Presidential review.
SENATOR MONDALE: The Budget Bureau, of course, while
it is a branch of the executive, was created by the
Congress with the intention that it would be an in-
dispensable partner with the Congress in developing
budgets because the magnitude of the job was getting
beyond our personal reach.
For many years it was just that. The Budget Bureau,
its technicians and its Director were very helpful to
the Congress and spent a good deal of their time
testifying and working with Members of the Congress
on these complicated matters. Then under the re-
visions which developed in the so-called OMB, it
was made a part of the White House and, in effect,
executive privilege was constructively imposed upon it.
Thereafter, the Congress was left to swim on its own,
which I think has helped create the crisis that we are
trying to deal with today.
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SI think we must end this with. a program and an office
that has theability to analyze that budget independently,
from zero on up, to evaluate, to do field studies, to do
the kind of hard analytical work that we need to deter-
mine independently of the executive the wisest course
to follow with respect to any of these programs and with
respect to the overall budget.
We don't have that today. We all know that. That is
one of the main things that I think can come out of the
work of this subcommittee and of the joint committee,
to develop that facility, to arm the Congress with its
own independent power to really tear down a budget,
look at it and develop one of its own.
I think the joint committee proposal, which I re-
ferred to earlier could well destroy that whole effort.
(Subcommittee on Budgeting, Management, and Expenditures,
Committee on Government Operations, 9 May 1973.)
Senator Ervin's Budget Control Bill was rather hard-
nosed and reminiscent of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1946 in that it imposed stringent rules upon the Congress.
Senator Metcalf wanted a more flexible bill that would operate
only as the majority of the House and Senate wished it to.
Senator Metcalf felt it was more important for the Congress to
have an in-house capability with respect to information than a
new budget process.
He also thought that the Congressional Office of the
Budget should be an agency that would assemble and analyze
information and then present it to the House and the Senate
as a series of alternatives from which the Congress could make
its political decisions. This meant (as far as Senator Metcalf
was concerned) that the Congressional Office of the Budget had
to be an independent, non-political agency and not a congres-
sional committee.
The distinction between a committee and an indepen-
d
dent agency is important. Senator Metcalf felt that a
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committee's staff, no matter how well intentioned, would
inevitably be forced to reflect the political will of its
members. This would jeopardize the credibility of the inform-
ation to other members of Congress in much the same way as OMB
is suspect on the Hill because of its allegiance to the President.
Senators Ervin and Muskie had tried unsuccessfully to
move their Congressional Information Bill (5.1214) without a
hearing,and the Republicans filibustered it in committee.
Rather than go through a protracted battle over S.1214, they
decided to give the proposed Congressional Office of the Budget
the power to get the kind of information that was necessary.
This was an important step in the balance of power between
the legislative and the executive branches since, i effect, the
Congress was opting to develop its own institutional capability
instead of settling for right of access to executive data.
There was never really much disagreement that there
be a budget staff for the Congress. There was a dispute, how-
ever, which persisted until close to the end between the
House version of the staff and the Senate version of the staff.
Originally, the 32-member Joint Study Committee on
Budget Control of the House and Senate proposed a Joint
Legislative Budget staff which would serve both the House and
Senate Budget Committees, and would have no separate staff of
its own other than administrative personnel. The Director
would be appointed by the two Budget Committees, and approval of
the chairman of the Budget Committees would be required to 0
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appoint other personnel. In addition, in order to secure data
from executive agencies, the Joint Legislative Staff would have
to have the approval of the chairman of the Budget Committees.
Since the Legislative Budget Staff would function as the staff
of the two Budget Committees, it would be responsible neither
to Congress as a whole nor to other congressional committees or
members,
One reason why the committee may have recommended a
Joint Staff is because it was dominated at the time by members
who sat on either the Ways and Means Committee in the House or the
Finance Committee in the Senate, both of which were accustomed to
working with an excellent (and highly atypical) joint staff.
The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation was headed at
the time by Larry Woodworth, the dean of congressional staffers.
The second version, that proposed by the House Rules
Committee (H.R. 7130), retained the concept of the joint staff
for the Budget Committees, but expanded the responsibility into
a Legislative Budget Office which would have the authorization
to provide data and technical assistance to other congressional
committees and members, This was done with the provision that
the Legislative Budget Office would maintain "a special relation-
ship to the Budget Committees,.
The Senate people did: not accept this version and they
had the required leverage because under existing Senate rules,
once any Senate committee was created, that committee could
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automatically establish its own staff. The House people had to
go along since it was inconceivable that the Senate Budget Com-
mittees would have their own staff, while the House Budget
Committee would not.
A second point of difference concerned CBO's size; should
it be a rather modest or fairly~large organization? The language in
the Conference Report can be used to justify either approach.
The principal responsibilities for the office proposed
by the House Rules Committee were:
o Preparing five-year projections of budget outlays
resulting from any authorizing or appropriations
bill providing new budget authority.
o Issuing periodic reports comparing all new budget
authority in legislation to the amounts included in
each functional category in the most recent budget
resolution.
o Issuing at the beginning of each fiscal year a five-
year projection of all outlays and budget authority,
estimated revenues, and the surplus or deficit for
each year.
With the purpose defined, a Joint Budget Staff was
proposed to carry it out. The joint staff was later
modified into separate staffs for the House and for the Senate,
yet the joint staff concept remained in the report, and it is this
concept that ultimately became CBO. It remained because Senators
Percy and Metcalf saw a new purpose for the now uncharged joint
74
! 'WOM
staff. They felt that budget analysis was so important that a
nonpartisan group ought to be doing it.
Senator Ervin's Government Operations Committee opted
for this independent Congressional Office of the Budget which
would have broader responsibilities than the Legislative Budget
Office originally proposed by the Joint Study Committee. The
primary function of the Senate's Congressional Office of the
Budget was to assist the Budget Committees, and the two Com-
mittees were given oversight responsibilities for the Office.
However, the Office was also expected to assist any other com-
mittee or congressional member upon request and, in effect,
there would have been little direct control of its operations
by the Budget Committees. It is at this point that a division
between the two Bouses became clear- The House had done away with
the joint staff concept in favor of its own budget committee staff;
whereas the Senate now wanted not only its budget committee staff
but a Congressional Office of the Budget as well.
The general structure of the Office was maintained by
the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, but the Com-
mittee made two alterations: first, the director of the Budget
Office was to be appointed with Committee consultation; and,
second, the function of assisting other committees and members
was downgraded in priority. These changes were designed to
forge a stronger relationship between the Budget Office and
the Budget Committees, and the priority accorded the Budget
Committees' requests was enhanced,
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0The final version of the bill combined features of both
the House and Senate bills and established the Congressional
Budget Office as a legislative agency separate from the two
Budget Committee staffs. This final version, Title II of the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,
Public Law 93-344, included various features which were devised
to assure a close relationship between the Congressional Budget
Office and the Budget Committees.
The development of the Budget Office reflects the
various modifications that were made in the House and Senate
Budget Committees. These changes affected the manner in which
the Director of the Budget Office was to be appointed.
Since the Joint Study Committee preferred a joint budget
staff, the appointment or removal of the legislative
budget director was the responsibility of the two Budget Com-
mittees. The Legislative Budget Office proposed by the Rules
Committee and passed by the House (H.R. 7130) excluded the
Senate from any role in the appointment process, by giving
appointment power to the Speaker of the House upon the recom-
mendation of the House Budget Committee.
Though the Senate's original version (S.1541) gave
appointment power to the Speaker of the House, the Government
Operations bill modified this power into a procedure involving
both the House and the Senate. This arrangement excluded the
Budget Committees in the selection process, since the appoint-
ment of the director (and the deputy director) was to be made
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jointly by the Speaker of the House and President pro tempore
of the Senate, and the appointment had to be approved by the
House and the Senate.
The Senate Committee on Rules and Administration
established a three-step procedure which involved consultation
with the Budget Committees, appointment by the Speaker and the
President pro tempore, and confirmation by the House and Senate.
In this instance, the enacted version of the bill differs from
previous procedures in three ways: one, it deletes the
confirmation requirement; two, it clarifies the role of the
Budget Committees; and three, the deputy director is selected
by the director.
The early versions of the Budget Control Act had no
fixed term of office for the Director. The Senate Committee on
Rules and Administration set a six-year term of office, but a
four-year term was adopted. In the final version, a provision
for removal of the director by a vote of either the House or
the Senate was included.
It its proposed Legislative Budget Staff, the Joint
Study Committee required the approval of the two Budget Com-
mittee chairmen in order for the director to hire personnel but
it authorized the Legislative Budget Staff to procure the
services of consultants and experts. These two features were
incorporated without change in the House version. However, in the
Senate version, all hiring power was vested solely in the director
of the budget office, and this feature was adopted in the Act
establishing the Congressional Budget Office.
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With various refinements, all the versions of the
budget legislation provided broad authority for the new budget
office to secure information from executive agencies. In the
Joint Study Committee bill, approval of either chairmen of the
Budget Committees was required in order for the budget staff
to directly request information from the executive branch.
The original Senate version required agencies to
provide the budget office only with information "to the extent
permitted by law." However, as already mentioned, Senator Ervin's
Government Operations Committee expanded this requirement into an
authorization to obtain any information developed by executive
agencies "in the normal course of their operations and activities."
In addition, the Government Operations Committee provided for the
budget office to utilize the services and facilities of the
executive agencies. In the enacted version, CBO can secure
information without prior approval by the Budget Committees
and also has the authorization to utilize executive personnel,
facilities, and services.
Depending on the role and relationship of the budget
office to the Budget Committees, the duties and functions of
the office have varied. The Joint Study Committee bill simply
prescribed that the duty of the legislative budget staff was
to serve the House and Senate Budget Committees. The House
version expanded this role and authorized the budget staff to
provide other committees and members with information that
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0was readily available and any related technical assistance.
Though this arrangement maintained the "special relationship"
between the budget office and the Budget Committees, it also
would have permitted limited assistance for Congress as a whole.
The original Senate version made little differentiation
between service to the Budget Committees and other congressional
committees, However, by the time the bill was reported by
Senator Ervin's Government Operations Committee, a distinction
had been made which gave the budget office the "duty and function"
of providing budget data, any related information, or personnel
on a temporary basis upon the request of either of the Budget
Committees, and entitled other committees and members to avail-
able information and, where practicable, other budget-related
data, In this version, the budget office was given the dis-
cretion to assign personnel to other congressional committees
or individual members on a temporary basis.
The version reported by the Senate Committee on Rules
and Administration retained the priority status of the Budget
Committees but specified that other committees were to receive
available information upon request and temporary staff assist-
ance at the discretion of the budget office, Assistance to
members was limited to available information, and other inform-
ation only if practicable.
During the Senate floor debate, Robert C. Byrd (D) of
West Virginia, with the support of the bill's sponsors, proposed
an amendment which established priorities among committees for
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budget office assistance. As a result, the enacted legislation
establishes a four-level hierarchy:
o Highest priority is given to information and personnel
requests from the two Budget Committees.
o High priority is also given to the requests for in-
formation and staff assistance from the Appropriations,
House Ways and Means, and Senate Finance Committees.
o Other congressional committees are entitled to avail-
able budget information and, where practicable, ad-
ditional related information. The Budget Office can
assign personnel for a limited time at its own dis-
cretion; however, assistance to committees was not to
interfere with priority service to the budget related
committees.
o Members were limited to obtaining only available
budget information.
The importance of this last point is that, while members
will be able to receive anything which is made available and pro-
duced regularly for the Budget Committees, they would probably
find it difficult to get the budget office to actually undertake
analyses and research for themselves.
If ever a law was the work of staff rather than members
it was the Budget Act of 1974;
Staff work; The conference committee that approved
the extraordinarily complex budget reform bill met
only twice -- on April 9 and June 5.
The April 9 meeting was devoted to provisions to
limit Presidential authority to impound funds
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0appropriated by Congress. At the June 5 meeting,
which lasted only one hour, conferees approved
the entire 47-page bill.
In the two months between the two meetings, congres-
sional staff members worked, under guidelines set
by their bosses, to put together a compromise bill.
The quick approval by the conferees was testimony
to their success.
"It's an unusual experience to have so much of a
potentially controversial piece of legislation
worked out at the staff level," said Sen. Edmund S.
Muskie, D-Maine. "They did a fine job."
"In six days I will have been here 20 years," said
Ervin, "and this is the finest example of staff
cooperation I've seen."55
The conference report was adopted by the House on
18 June 1974 and by the Senate on 21 June 1974, though the two
chambers apparently had different expectations about the staff
they had created:
The House had expected to create a small office
with the limited responsibilities of scorekeeping
and cost estimates for individual spending and
revenue bills. The Senate, though, envisioned a
major new organization which would analyze not
only individual bills, but also aggregate effects
of spending and revenue decisions. The Senate
anticipated an office with the stature of GAO,
CRS, or OMB. To prepare the annual report on
national priorities, the new staff would have
the capability to analyze virtually any domestic
or foreign issue as it related to the budget
process.56
In part, the difference between the expectations of
the House and the Senate with respect to the budget office is a
result of a much larger difference in philosophy between the
House and the Senate. It is generally acknowledgedthat House
members, because there are so many of them, because they only
serve on one committee, and because they are always running for
0office, tend to delegate less and take more of a direct responsi-
bility for their work than does the Senate. It follows, there-
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fore, that the House would prefer a smaller CBO than the Senate.
In addition, the House is much more appropriations
oriented, since it is the House that, under the Constitution,
0
initiates expenditures. The Appropriations Committee is a
singularly important committee in the House; it is more heavily
staffed than its Senate counterpart, and its members delve more
0
deeply into agency business. This produced concerns in the
House that were not present in the Senate regarding the respec-
tive roles of the Appropriations and the Budget Committees.
It probably also produced some feeling in the House
that the Budget Committees were not really all that necessary:
"Our Appropriations Committee has this all down...what the hell
is all the fuss about?" This is consistent with the fact that
the House membership rotates and because of that there is no
real incentive on anyone's part to make the House Budget Com-
mittee very powerful:
The outlook for the House committee is murkier.
Membership on the committee rotates; no one can
be a committee member for more than four years of
every 10. There is no permanent chairman of the
House committee, because House Members feared that
a permanent chairman would become a budget czar
with more power than the chairmen of the Appropri-
ations and Ways and Means Committees.57
Given that the House was not very overwhelmed by the idea of
Budget Committees, and never even wanted a Congressional Budget
Office, it stands to reason that this would somehow affect the
8
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0relationship between the Congressional Budget Office and the
House Budget Committee.
Duplication of services was a very real concern ex-
pressed by Lawrence Coughlin (R-Calif.):
I am concerned that we have the Joint Economic
Committee with a staff of some 35 people and a
budget in 1976 of $1.1 million; the Congressional
Research Service with 715 people and a budget in
1976 of $16 million; the House Budget Committee
with a staff of 60 and a budget in 1976 of $1.7
million; the Office of Technology Assessment
with 62 people and a budget of $6 million; the
GAO with 5,558 people and a budget of $135 mil-
lion; our own appropriations committee with 145
people. 58
It might seem, at first, that the biggest opposition
to any new budget process would come from the Appropriations
Committees (the "old boys" who ran the existing budget process).
But the 1974 Act enjoyed the support of veteran conservative
congressmen on the Appropriations Committees because, contrary
to the accepted myth, the "old boys" did not really run the
existing process. According to a study commissioned by the
Senate Government Operations Connittee, only 25% of the outlay
authority in 1974 was under the jurisdiction of Appropriations
Committees. Title IV of the 1974 Act gave them a chance to
regain some of their lost power by reversing a trend which can
be called "Appropriations Creep."
Bills establishing programs that entitle certain
groups to federal benefits must be referred for 15
days to the Appropriations Committees, which may
add amendments limiting the total amount of new
spending authority.
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SNew legislation permitting agencies to enter into
contracts and to borrow money not yet appropriated
will be effective only to the extent that money is
set aside in subsequent appropriations bills.59
Despite the fact that some of CBO's principal critics
within the Congress have been conservatives, the principal op-
position to the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974 came ironically from liberal groups. It was the
Democratic Study Group, the United Auto Workers, and the AFL-CIO,
who all went on record in opposition to the Congressional Budget
Office. The principal reason for this opposition was a fear
that the net result of any CBO would be a lessening of the
number and scope of future social programs.
This liberal fear of analysis seems to be rooted in
a perceived structural bias endemic to cost-benefit analysis.
Simply put...it is seen as easier to display and evaluate the
costs of a social program or proposed policy initiative, than it
is to quantify the supposed benefits of that program. This
leads to a bias that social programs are not cost-effective
relative to other kinds of programs.
The Congressional Budget Office also ran into sub-
stantial criticism within academic circles: 0
Aaron Wildavsky, then Dean of the School of Policy
Studies at the University of California, Berkeley,
argued against creation of a congressional analytic
capability on two grounds: First, members would be
swamped by responsibilities of managing a staff and 0
of consuming the quantities of information such a
staff would produce. 'It would make Congressmen
into bureaucrats,' Wildavsky told the Senate Govern-
0
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ment Operations Committee, 'It would deprive them
of the advantages of specialization, or representa-
tion, of being people who formulate, represent, and
broker preferences. It would effectively transfer
power from the Congressmen to the staff'.
Second, Wildavsky also questioned the need for a
Congressional analytic capability on more fundamental
grounds. He argued that the budget process is so
complex and irrational that 'no one can be certain
that the Presidential spending targets are correct
for economic spending purposes and, if they are,
whether the limits proposed will come near to meet-
ing them and, if they do, whether the contrary effect
may not well occur.' Indeed, he charged, 'The totals
are hunches, on top of guesses, wrapped up in con-
jectures.' To cope with the complexity and uncertainty
inherent in the federal budget, Wildavsky said, is
beyond the capability of any staff who 'could not
themselves, in their own minds, or with any available
formula, or with any bank of computers.. .really under-
stand all the myriad relationships of the activities
that go on in the budget as a whole, which is beyond
conception -- who knows what $300 billion is -- but
even with one of the dozen or so major bills.60
Both Wildavsky and Richard Musgrave, professor of
economics at Harvard University, argued for an incremental ap-
proach. Musgrave suggested:
...that the President be required to submit.a budget that
would show not one total but three -- one the desired
amount and the others an indication of what could be
done with expenditures and revenues 10 percent more
or less than the desired level.61
Wildavsky recommended a narrowed scope of attention for Congress
to use in approaching the budget:
Congress would be deciding among new ventures and
expansions of old ones. By a process of sequential
reduction, through successive iterations, Congress
would have refined its preferences on spending and
related items to notions of desirable tax and
economic policy. To carry out this incremental
process, he said, Congress would not need an ex-
tensive new analytic capability but could instead
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rely upon the existing staff of the Joint Committee
on Internal Revenue Taxation (JCIRT) and slightly
expanded staffs of the appropriations committees. 62
Arthur Maas, professor of government at Harvard, also
questioned the need for Congress to have the analytical capabil-
ity of a Congressional Budget Office:
To obtain the necessary expertise and information,
(Congress) would be forced to rely on a system of
standing committees with large professional staffs.
The Executive should normally be the leader in the
legislative process because of the importance in a
democratic system of pinpointing responsibility so
that the electorate can hold its agents accountable
for this activity.63
On the pro side, some of the liberal members of Con-
gress who supported CBO did so in the belief that CBO could un-
cover waste in the Defense Department's budget which could be
used for social programs. The need for this capability was
expressed during the hearings of the Subcommittee on Budgeting,
Management, and Expenditures on 7 May 1973 by Mary Vogel of the
National Organization for Women:
Despite the end of the Vietnam war, the fiscal
year 1974 Nixon budget reflects the administra-
tion's continued emphasis on defense spending at
the expense of key domestic programs, as well as
an attempt to shift responsibility for setting
domestic priorities to state and local governments
who do not have an impressive record of achieve-
ment in the area of social service programs.
The 1974 Nixon budget calls for the Federal Govern-
ment to spend 30 cents out of every dollar for
defense, but only 4 cents out of every dollar for
education and manpower, and only 2 cents out of
every dollar for community development and housing.
Where present spending priorities are of little help
to the poor, present taxing priorities are an extra-
heavy burden on them. With respect to revenues, the
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1974 budget calls for increased reliance C75
percent) on regressive payroll taxes and in-
equitable income taxes, with only 15 percent
of estimated revenues to come from corporate
taxes -- where 23 percent of our Federal rev-
enue came from corporate taxes in 1969.
NOW is concerned about all of Nixon's budget
cuts, impoundments, and impoundments by guide-
lines insofar as these are an attempt to usurp
congressional power over the purse, but NOW
is particularly concerned about the adverse
effects these cuts will have on the poor of
this Nation.
Most importantly, there was the view that the execu-
tive branch would never supply Congress with the information
needed to perform its role as overseer. This group (by now a
majority) felt that Congress should assume an active role in
initiating policy through the budget process, and they advocated
a significant strengthening of existing staff capability or the
creation of a new analytic office:
If knowledgeable outsiders testify, they are
usually private consultants or members of
government advisory committees with ties to
the programs on which they are testifying....
Since the hearings are dominated by department
and agency advocates, the committee lacks the
opportunity to become aware of the President's
perspectives and reasons -- except as they are
revealed in the budget documents -- for making
a particular decision on program expenditures....
...No institutionalized "nay sayers" are regu-
larly available to tell the committee why some
project should not be undertaken or why one
alternative might be better than another....
Even if the present committee and minority staff
could make sufficient time available for in-depth
studies, they lack some of the necessary analytic
skills for such undertakings.64
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Democratic Congressman John Conyers summarized Congress'
need for independence from the Executive Branch:
As long as we remain dependent on the President
and the OMB for our budgetary information, we
permit them inordinate influence over the decisions
we make. A false sense of minor economies and an
exaggerated fear of legislative bureaucracies must
not cause us to deny ourselves the resources we so
desperately need.65
The liberals were threatening to hold up the Budget
Control Act because of their strong dislike of the Congressional
Budget Office and one afternoon a showdown took place in
Senator Muskie's office. In no uncertain terms, Senator Muskie
made it clear that, with or without the support of the liberals,
there was going to be a Budget Control Act. It was Senator
Muskie who persuaded the liberal groups to go along. He did not
share their fear of analysis. He felt that Congress had to
reform itself or risk being forever subservient to the Executive,
and he was personally committed to seeing that budget reform
would be implemented in an even-handed way.
Like Alexander Hamilton, Senator Edmund Muskie was
uniquely qualified to give birth to budget reform. He is an
extraordinarily effective legislator and one of the Senate's
senior liberals. He has a reputation for being able to work
with members of diverse political ideologies.
According to Bernard Asbell, writing in The Senate
Nobody Knows, Muskie rarely describes anyone in terms of moti-
vation, rarely judges or even characterizes anyone. He describes
an action, or something said, or a vote cast, or a political
88
person's general position -- something observable and factual,
Muskie sees a person not as a bundle of passions but as a
performer of external actions, Even someone who persistently
gets in his way is accepted as a fact to deal with, pointless
to complain about, like paying the mortgage,
Whether deliberate or not, this is a useful style of
mind in the Senate, where a relatively small community of one
hundred must live together for years and years, where one may
team up with another as a partner one day and heave a wrecking
ball to crush the other's position the next.
Senator Muskie is also unique among powerful chairmen
for his bipartisanship:
It's really very simple. I assumed from the begin-
ning that if any man on the committee, whatever his
politics, were given a meaningful role, a meaningful
input into the legislative process, he'd be glad to
become part of it. You have to remember that in my
days in the Maine legislature, my first experience in
office, the Democrats were in a very small minority.
We were just sort of tolerated. It was recognized
that the two-party system had to be there, but you
weren't really invited to participate. We weren't
asked to offer our ideas or be part of the creative
legislative process, When I first came here, the
minority on the Public Works Committee was just sort of
tolerated. It was recognized that they could advance
their proposals. When there'd be an automatic party-
line vote. The majority would work its will. The final
product was usually shaped around the chairman's ideas.
But constantly there was this air of confrontation.
-Which was the old politics.
When I got a subcommittee of my own, it just seemed to
me that it would be better to invite the others to get
involved, to accept their ideas as though they were
members of a cormattee. So that's been the style of
this subcommittee ever since it was created.66
Perhaps, most importantly, Senator MYuskie has
a strong concern for the effects of government spending which
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is somewhat rare for someone with such- impeccable liberal
credentials. This approach was evident -in a speech he-delivered
t'o- the Liberal Party Convention in New York in 1976:
We failed in 1972.. .and on the eve of 1976, we face
the grim possibility of failing again.... How can
that happen? After seven years of a Republican
administration distinguished only by its failures,
how could the American electorate fail to vote for
a new liberal administration? When we know what's
right, how can so many Americans not follow our
leadership? How can so many Americans miss the
point?
The answer, I submit, is that we have missed the
point. For in the past decade liberals have devel-
oped an ideology and state of mind that is narrow,
unimaginative, and often irrelevant.... Four decades
ago we discovered the possibilities of government
action to better the lives of Americans. People...
prospered as a result. But something has happened
since then -- and it's basically happened through us.
People are still discontented. They still want
change.... Yet when the average citizen turns to us
for help, what does he find?
Consider, for example, the 1972 national platform of
the Democratic Party. It runs about fifty pages,
nearly fifteen thousand words, and reads like the
catalogue of virtually every problem we liberals
think bothers the American people.... Wonderfully
comprehensive and esoteric.... It showed that we
knew all about government, and know just what govern-
ment programs needed change.
In promising so much for so many, it was meaningless.
Nowhere in there was there any statement of what
those hundreds of changes would cost. How much, for
example, would the new towns program cost? Would we
need higher taxes to pay for it? How many people
would be helped?
... The Democratic Platform of 1972 represents to me
the culmination of years of liberal neglect -- of
allowing a broad-based coalition to narrow -- of
progressively ignoring the real fears and aspira-
tions of people -- and of assuming we know best what
the people need....
90
I read my mail. I talk with voters in the towns of
Maine, and I listen.... Most important, they don't
believe that government really cares about them.
All they need is one encounter with some government
bureaucrat to confirm that. In Maine, for example,
it now takes a full year to process a Social Security
disability claim....
My basic question is this: Why can't liberals start
raising hell about a government so big, so complex,
so expansive, and so unresponsive that it's dragging
down every good program we've worked for?
Yet, we stay away from that question as if it was
the plague. We're in a rut. We've accepted the
status quo. We know that government can do much to
improve the lives of every American. But that con-
viction has also led us to become the defenders of
government, no matter its mistakes. Our emotional
stake in government is so much that we regard common-
sense criticism of government almost as a personal
attack. We resist questioning the basic assumptions
of the structure and role of government, fearing the
unknown, fearing that somehow we have more to lose
than gain through change.
Budget reform could mean cutting back spending on
health programs, but it could also mean fewer gold-
plated weapons systems. Productivity standards could
cost union support, but they could help restore
public confidence in the many government workers
who work hard. Or regulatory reform could jeopardize
health and safety regulation, but it could also
loosen the grip of special interests on agencies.
Plainly, we cannot move forward without questioning
such basic assumptions -- and running certain dangers.
We must adopt government reform as our first prior-
ity -- as an end in itself. We must recognize that
an efficient government -- well managed, cost-effective,
equitable, and responsive -- is in itself a social
good.
We must do this secure in the conviction that first
priority on efficient government is not a retreat
from social goals but simply a realization that
without it those goals are meaningless.
The problem was how you express a liberal's concern
for the plight of government today. How you take
what has been in the past an orgy of breast beating
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about the failure of liberalism, the junking of
the ideals of the New Deal, and turn them positive
and affirmative: let's make liberalism work, let's
be proud that we're liberals.
As important as Senator Muskie was in the creation
of the Congressional Budget Office, he must share the credit
with Richard Nixon whose imagination and creativity in the art
of budget impoundment (as well as his unique interpretation of
the Constitution) succeeded in doing what many believed to be
impossible -- namely uniting both conservatives and liberals
in the 93rd Congress:
The June 5 meeting at which the conference com-
mittee approved the budget reform bill was
remarkable for the absence of strong disagree-
ments. The controversial impoundment issue,
which divided the Senate and House for a year,
was not even raised.
Democrats were effusive in their praise of the
budget reform bill. 'This is one of the most
important pieces of legislation that Congress
has considered since the First Congress,' said
Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D).
Republicans were more restrained. Rep. Dave
Martin (R) said after the conference: 'This
bill will give Congress its first opportunity,
even though a lame one, to get some control
over the budget. The way we operate here now
is the most haphazard thing that's ever been
concocted. Now we'll have a chance to make
some sense out of the budget.'
At the June 5 meeting, Martin led the subdued
opposition to a few provisions of the bill.
He particularly objected to the failure of the
new bill to place a deadline for enacting
authorizing legislation. When other conferees,
including some Republicans, maintained that the
new budget timetable is the best one available,
Martin replied mildly, 'I can see I'm not very
persuasive.'
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Some other Republican conferees expressed
reservations about other features of the bill.
Sen. William V. Roth, Jr., R-Del., said he
fears the bill does little to encourage tight
spending.
But when Rep. Richard Bolling, D-Mo., called
for a vote, the conferees unanimously supported
the bill. No member was willing to let his
opposition to individual provisions get in the
way of a vote in favor of better congressional
control of the budget.
During its 18-month life in Congress, the issue
of budget reform became a bandwagon that Members
clamored to board. In the fall of 1972, President
Nixon challenged Congress to set a ceiling on the
1973 budget. When Members could not decide what
programs to cut, they realized the time had
come to establish procedures that would improve
their traditional piecemeal approach to the
budget. Members felt especially obliged to sup-
port reform when they read public opinion polls
showing that Congress ranked below even the
President in public esteem.67
The Act passed by a vote of 401 to 6 in the House,
and 80 to 0 in the Senate. (See Appendices A and B) Its im-
portance was underscored by Senator Ervin in his introduction:
For more than 40 years, the Congress has con-
tributed to, and acquiesced in, the growth of the
power of the executive branch. Several important
laws were enacted during the 93rd Congress design-
ed to arrest this trend and to reassert the co-
equal status of Congress in our constitutional
system. The most important of these is the Con-
gressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974. To my mind, it is the single most import-
ant piece of legislation enacted during my service
in the Senate, which has spanned more than 20
years.68
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CHAPTER 4
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CBO
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The Congressional Budget Office is just small enough that
there is no visible trail of memoranda and position papers
which a serious researcher can folZow unerringly to the
"proper conclusions", and so all such journeys take on
some of the characteristics of the forensic sciences and
Isaac Assimov,
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PURPOSE AND DUTIES
The tasks of CBO, as outlined in the Budget Act (see
Appendix C ) fall into two general categories: budgetary
estimates and fiscal and programmatic analysis.
Budgetary Estimates
Each spring, the Congress formulates and adopts a con-
current resolution on the budget, setting expenditure and revenue
targets for the fiscal year to begin on the coming October 1.
In September, the Congress reviews the detailed spending and
taxing decisions it had made during the summer in the form of
individual bills. It then arrives at and adopts a second con-
current resolution, reconfirming or changing the totals in the
spring resolution. While the first resolution sets targets,
the second establishes an actual ceiling for spending and a
floor for revenues. The Congressional Budget Office keeps
score of congressional action on individual bills, comparing
them against the targets or ceilings in the concurrent resolu-
tions. The Congressional Budget Office issues periodic reports
showing the status of congressional action.
The Congressional Budget Office prepares 5-year
estimates for what it could cost to carry out public bills or
resolutions reported by congressional committees (except the
two appropriating committees).
The Congressional Budget Office furnishes to a report-
ing committee a report on each committee bill providing new
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budget authority. Each report shows;
(a) The position of the bill with respect to the most
recent concurrent resolution.
(b) A 5-year projection of outlays associated with the bill.
(c) The amount of new budget authority and resulting out-
lays provided for state and local governments.
The Congressional Budget Office also furnishes to a
reporting committee an analysis of each bill providing new or
increased tax expenditures. The report covers;
(a) An assessment of how the bill will affect levels of
tax expenditures most recently detailed in a concurrent resolu-
tion.
(b) A 5-year projection of the tax expenditures resulting
from the bill.
Early in each fiscal year, CBO prepares a report that
analyzes the 5-year costs of continuing current Federal spend-
ing and the taxing policies as set forth in the second con-
current resolution.
Fiscal and Programmatic Analysis
The Congressional Budget Office prepares periodic fore-
casts of economic trends. It also prepares analyses of alter-
native fiscal policies and analysis of programmatic or policy
issues that affect the Federal budget. These reports include an
examination of alternative approaches to current policy, and are
undertaken at the request of:
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(1) The chairman of a committee or subcommittee of
jurisdiction of either the House or the Senate;
(2) The ranking minority member of a committee of
jurisdiction of either the House or the Senate;
(3) The chairman of a Task Force of the House Budget
Committee. By 1 April of each year, CBO furnishes
to the House and the Senate Budget Committees an
annual report that presents a discussion of
alternative spending and revenue levels, levels
of tax expenditures under existing law, and
alternative allocations among major programs and
functional categories.
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THE SELECTION OF A DIRECTOR
Although the law specifies that the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the
Senate shall appoint the Director of CBO, in reality it was
the chairman of the House Budget Committee and the chairman of
the Senate Budget Committee who had the final say in selection.
From the very beginning, the Congressional Budget
Office was more a creature of the Senate than of the House.
The Senate had fought for it, in fact had insisted upon it.
According to Senator Muskie, the Senate saw budget-making as
something more than a numbers game, It involved the very sub-
stantive policies of the government as well. It involved an
understanding of the economic implications of the budget, the
economic and social problems that the country faces. So it
had to be something more than simply an adding machine, a kind
of process, As far as the Senate is concerned, CBO was to be
an important tool in the policy-making field as well as in the
numbers field.
To the Senate, CEO was the anchor of the new budget
process, There was nothing overwhelmingly stable about the
Budget Committees. It was understood that chairmen and members
of the two Budget Committees would come and go, choosing their
own staffs. It was also understood that these staffs would
reflect at least, to some extent, the political philosophy of
the individual members. There was additional uncertainty
brought on by the fact that from time to time the administration
in the White House will be the same as the party in control of
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the Congress; a fact which could potentially change the political
context in which the budget process went forward. (There are two
different versions of this:, one has the White House work-
ing everything out with the leadership of the Congress thus
negating the need for a CBO or anything beyond political analysis;
the other version has the White House using the Congressional
Budget Office to subvert the Congress; a kind of budgetary fifth
column on the Hill.)
These two factors contributed to a strong desire on
the part of the Senate to stabilize the Congressional Budget
Office so that it could continue to function effectively no
matter what happened between the White House and the Congress.
There were approximately thirty-five candidates inter-
viewed by the staff of the Senate Budget Committee for the job
of director of the Congressional Budget Office. Alice Rivlin
was one of these but she was not originally one of the four
finalists, There was skepticism as to whether the Budget Com-
mittees would go along with her nomination because she was a
woman, an academic with little experience on the Hill, and an
employee of the Brookings Institution; this latter fact being
perceived as the most serious obstacle.
Dr. Rivlin had been very involved with the development
of the counter-budget while at Brookings and some members of the
Senate Budget Coimittee saw her as being too actively connected
with specific budget. options. Senator Buckley expressed the
reservations of those members of the committee who were wary of
Dr. Rivlin's experience with respect to budgeting:
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I find that Ms. Rivlin has the reputation for
activism in causes that involve the redirection
of the Federal budget of a sort that I think
would start us off at a tremendous handicap in
terms of public acceptance of what we are trying
to do. I think people would say that there is
an in-built bias if the person at the pinnacle
is someone who has these very strong personal
opinions and has worked so hard in the past to
see personal opinion translated into policy.69
Senator Cranston made a compelling case for Dr. Rivlin
being included as a finalist. The five finalists were all in-
vited to appear in closed session with members of the Senate
Budget Committee, and by all accounts, Alice Rivlin's presentation
was at least one hundred percent better than the other finalists.
She was strongly in favor of policy analysis. Her concept of how
the job should be done and of how CBO should relate to the committees
was felt to be superior to that of the other finalists. Senator
Muskie met with Dr. Rivlin to discuss her impartiality and came
away with the assurance that though she had been very strongly
involved with various budget proposals in the past, her neutrality
as director of CBO could be assured. She became the Senate's
principal candidate.
The House had decided on Philip S. Hughes as their
leading candidate. Sam Hughes was a public administration type
with twenty years of budgeting experience in the executive branch
of government. Hughes wanted to emphasize an approach which
would fit the Budget Committees into the Appropriations Committee
process. Hughes felt that economic analysis (and analysis, in
general) was very useful but his professional history and biases
centered around budgeting as a tool for accomplishing program
and policy objectives. In Hughes' opinion, it was important to
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be'i'n by identifying what was possible witin the politcal
framewo-k of the Hill. Otherwise, a problem could only be ap-
proached in an abstract context,
The Senate committee was not as enthusiastic about
Hughes because they felt that the position of director required
a person of more vision:
Senator Cranston: ...I think it is much more im-
portant to fill the job with the best possible
person.... I agree again with Jack that Hughes is
an adequate fellow but I do not think he is a
great fellow.... I would like to see us with
somebody with a great deal more get-up and go and
my favorite happens to be Alice Rivlin....
Senator Fannin: Mr. Chairman, I feel Hughes can
do an adequate job. At the same time, I do feel
this is quite a challenge and whether or not he
would accept that as a challenge and go forward
the way we would expect a person to do is question-
able in my mind....
Senator Muskie: Now, my feeling about it is that
Hughes couId do a competent administrative job.
I really would like to see somebody a cut above that,
somebody who can grasp the dimensions of this
global problem that this committee is going to be
struggling with, conceptualize it and, you know,
give us some real policy advice in addition to
simply administering data-gathering operations.
I think Rivlin is of that order of ability.
Morrill, maybe, but he did not impress that much.
I think Sawhill may be. He is at least very
articulate.... 70
The Senate wanted an authoritative voice in the Congress
that would be able to counteract OMB and Treasury Secretary
William Simon. The Senate wanted a highly visible policy type;
the House wanted someone who would be authoritative with
respect to the numbers. The, House saw budget reform as a
step toward greater control over budget reporting, so the
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House Budget Committee was oriented toward a CBO which emphasized
the details of bills costing and the like. The Senate, on the
other hand, viewed budget reform as a step toward priority
setting and the making of major policy choices. The choice
narrowed down to Sam Hughes or Alice Rivlin, and the two chair-
men could not agree:
Sen. Edmund S. Muskie CD), chairman of the
Senate Budget Committee did not challenge the
qualifications of Hughes to be CBO director.
Rep. Al Ullman (D), chairman of the House
Budget Committee, found Rivlin fully qualified,
Their different first choices stemmed from their
different views of the role that the CBO should
play.
Muskie and the Senate Budget Committee are
looking for a CBO director who can help shape
congressional budget policy. Ullman and the
House committee want a director who can
administer a staff of about 100 professionals
who can provide technical information that
Congress will need to determine its own policy.
'The Senate committee generally feels the
congressional budget director should make
policy proposals, Bennet said, 'whereas the
House views the CBO as a service instrument.'
Bennet,said Hughes, while *'a very competent
public administrator,' is not a 'political
person.' He said Rivlin, Sawhill and Morrill,
all (final candidates) younger than Hughes,
could be advocates as well as administrators.
A House committee staff member, who asked not
to be identified, said, 'Ullman doesn't see
the CBO director as an activist or a policy
innovator. The CBO is not an OMB. It is an
information-gathering, analytical, option-
proposing organization.' 71
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As a result of this disagreement, eight months passed
between the time the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974 was signed into law by President Nixon, and the ap-
pointment of a CBO director.
Thanks to Wilbur Mills' love of Rock Creek Park and
the people of Argentina, Representative Al Ullman became Chair-
man of the Ways and Means Committee, and Representative Brock
Adams took over as Chairman of the House Budget Committee.
Representative Adams, who was new to the committee, did not
feel as strongly pro-Hughes. In a closed meeting between he
and Senator Muskie, the Senate's view prevailed. Dr. Rivlin
was appointed the first director of the Congressional Budget
Office with the understanding that "she would adopt a low-key,
neutral approach., 7 2
In a sense, the selection of a director of the Congres-
sional Budget Office can be seen not so much as a choice of who
was the ablest person to run CBO but rather as a choice of what
kind of CBO Congress would get. It is important to note that
the House did not come around to agreeing that Dr. Rivlin
was the right choice. It was more a case of the Senate prevail-
ing and Senator Muskie getting his way. There is a saying in
the Congress that whichever House cares the most about an
issue will ultimately triumph. Senator Muskie, who had been
involved in the creation of CBO from the very beginning and who
had fought with his liberal counterparts to gain passage of
the bill, was able to select a liberal, woman economist from
the Brookings Institution as director.
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It was somewhat ironic that the Congress (or more
precisely the Senate) should turn to the Brookings Institution
in its effort to regain its sovereignty with respect to budget-
ing, a sovereignty which was traded away in. the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921.
Brookings was founded in 1916 by a group of businessmen
and educators to support scholarly studies designed to improve
the efficiency of government operations. Its first director,
William Willoughby, wrote the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921.
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STRATEGY
Before her appointment as the first Director of the
Congressional Budget Office, Alice Rivlin spent eighteen
years- at the Brookings Institution and three years as
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation at the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), under President
Johnson,
She started at CBO with a top down hiring strategy, bring-
ing on board her senior managers, and then relying on them to put
together what was needed in order to do the task as they saw it.
One of the first things she did after being named Director was
to hire Robert Reischauer, an economist from Harvard and her
colleague at Brookings. Together they added David Mundel, a
political scientist from the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy, who was teaching at the Kennedy School of Government
and who had worked at HEW with Dr. Rivlin; Alfred Fitt, a
lawyer and the Special Advisor to the President of Yale
University; Robert Levine, an economist, President of the New
York Rand Institute and a former Assistant Director of the
Office of Economic Opportunity; Frank DeLeeuw, an economist
and former senior staff person at the Federal Reserve Board and
the Urban Institute;'and James Blum, an economist, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Labor and a former Deputy Director
of the Council on Wage and Price Stability.
Alice Rivlin saw the goal of the Congressional Budget
Office as raising the level of debate in the Congress by in-
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creasing the amount of relevant information from which Congress
made budgetary decisions, Initially, she did not consider the
Congressional Budget Office's mission as including influencing
Congress on specific decisions but rather as generally helping
Congress to become more aware of existing alternatives and
their tradeoffs;
Rivlin has tried to hire economists with a wide
range of views, and she has asked them to keep
their views to themselves as they communicate
with Congress. 'The people who work here have to
care more about doing a professional job and get-
ting the process going than about any particular
outcome,' she said.73
To achieve this end, she saw CBO engaging in a number
of activities some of which were clearly specified in the law,
such as economic forecasts, five year projections, bill costing
and scorekeeping. However, at least one class of activities
which Dr. Rivlin wanted to emphasize (programmatic and policy
analysis) was not so mandated.
For the Congressional Budget Office, with its relatively
high proportion of professional employees to support personnel,
the key choice with respect to staffing was whether to recruit
those whose principal strength was their congressional experience
or to recruit analysts. Dr. Rivlin chose the latter, and with
the exception of Stanley Greigg, a former Congressman, no other
senior person in CBO had ever worked on the Hill. This decision
to emphasize academic analytical ability rather than congres-
sional know-how was in contradiction to an explicit recommenda-
tion from the Budget Committee staffs:
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The primary task of the Director following his ap-
pointment will be to establish credibility in the
Congress and the Executive Branch as an agency
which is both professional and apolitical.
The calibre of the staff and the scope of work which
the office initially undertakes will condition the
response of the various clients the CBO must respond to.
Four Assistant Directors are suggested: Liaison;
Information Systems and Management; Planning and the
April 1 report. Together with the Director, Deputy
Director and staff, they will form a core policy group.
The Assistant Director-Liaison will be principally
responsible for liaison of all kinds with Congres-
sional committees and members in conjunction with
the Director and Deputy.
Six staff, at the level of Senior Counsel, each of
whom should have considerable Hill experience and
credibility, are the minimal requirements. 74
It is revisionism to see the Congressional Budget
Office as the finely-tuned execution of a well-thought out plan
in which alternatives were clearly displayed and evaluated.
In reality CBO was a setting in which people were playing things
largely by ear. This occurred because of the nature of the
people involved in the "adventure", because the organization
was wholly without precedent in the Congress, and because there
was enough contradiction in the wishes of two houses to justify
any number of variations in the Congressional Budget Office.
Though CBO's strategy, such as it existed, was
selective rather than comprehensive, there were at least five
areas of concern facing the new Congressional' Budget Office,
First, the delay in starting the CBO had a direct impact on the
House and Senate Budget Committees which., in turn, influenced
the character of the emerging Congressional Budget Office.
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The new budget act had called for the creation of Budget
Committees in each house to assist Congress in developing
its spending and revenue raising priorities. The original
intention was that the two Budget Committees would number no
more than 30 staff members each, and the law anticipated that
the committees would make extensive use of CBO for all technical
and analytical work.
The law was not entirely prescient, however, for it
failed to anticipate a situation in which the budget process would
begin without a CBO to provide this analytical support. By
April 1975, when CBO had four employees, the two Budget Com-
mittees had a combined staff of 125, more than half of whom
were analysts. To many members of Congress, the Budget Com-
mittees could do all of the necessary work to make the new
budget process effective.
Second, 53 years after Congress first authorized it
to do so, the General Accounting Office suddenly set up its
new budget office on the eve of the creation of the Congres-
sional Budget Office.
Third, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
was a very recent example of how not to set up a viable congres-
sional organization. OTA was created in 1972 as an advisory
arm of the Congress, and its basic function was to assess the
impacts on society of the application of scientific and techno-
logical knowledge. OTA was slow getting off the ground because
it had to wait almost a year for the appropriations cycle. In
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addition, because the chairman of its Oversight Committee
(Senator Kennedy) controlled both the selection of staff and
the projects to be undertaken, OTA was seen as his personal
organization and as a kind of adjunct committee. This dominance
ultimately resulted in the loss of OTA's credibility with other
members of the Congress,
Fourth, the Congressional Reference Service CCRS),
which had a staff of more than 700 people, was suffering a
continual erosion in prestige and impact in part because of the
sheer volume of requests that it handled and in part because a
large majority of these requests were for individual members of
Congress. There was really no force within Congress to protect
CRS from this kind of explosive growth.
Fifth, in the opinion of many analysts, OMB was losing
its policy edge and becoming increasingly involved in routine
information processing. As a result of the constant numbers
grind, 01B never seemed to have any time to develop an overall
perspective.
Taken together, the responses to these and other related
concerns can be viewed as the central elements of CBO's strategy.
From the very beginning, CBO made what appears to be
a conscious effort to ensure that it would be relatively in-
dependent. This shows up in the hiring of staff (unlike some
other congressional staffs, CBO employees are chosen by the
director and not appointed by members of the budget committees);
in the way that funds are requested and allocated (in total
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and not project by project); and in CBO's repeated insistence
on its right to draw its own conculsions, to follow any inquiry
to its end, and to publish its findings.
The budget process was already underway and the
Congress was into consideration of the first concurrent resolu-
tion by the time Alice Rivlin was chosen:
TIMETABLE75
Action to be completed
President submits current services
to Congress
President submits annual budget
message to Congress
Congressional committees make recom-
mendations to budget committees
Congressional Budget Office reports
to budget committees
Budget committees report first
budget resolution
Congress passes first budget
resolution
Legislative committees complete
reporting of authorizing
legislation
Congress passes all spending bills
Congress passes second budget
resolution
Congress passes budget reconciliation
bill
Fiscal year begins
On or Before
November 10
15 days after Congress
meets
March 15
April 1
April 15
May 15
May 15
7 days after Labor Day
September 15
September 25
October 1
Consequently, CBO felt that they had to get started rather
quickly, and the first decision they made was that they were too
late to affect the first concurrent resolution. However, they
thought it was important for them to be in a position to assist
by the time of the second concurrent resolution.
There was a strong feeling that the smart thing for
CBO was to begin by doing something which no one else was doing,
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preferably something which was clearly mandated by the law, so
that there would be minimal problems, They began, therefore,
by analyzing what the federal revenue system would yield under
specified assumptions about the economy (fiscal analysis) and
by developing the capacity to estimate the costs of proposed
legislation (budget analysis).
There was also a strong feeling that this generation
of high quality numbers in budget and fiscal analyses could be
a way to develop a solid reputation and a rapport on the Hill.
Further, this reputation and rapport, it was felt, could be
exploited to market CBO's less popular policy analyses studies
of the pros and cons of alternative federal policies. This was
CBO's wedge strategy.
The wedge strategy was to be a "clear channel" (in
the broadcasting sense); one that would provide entree to all
congressional committees, since all committees needed numerical
support. The Congressional Budget Office's first publication
was this economic forecast:
The two economic forecasts formally presented to
Congress projected economic conditions if Congress
pursues the policies of its spring budget resolu-
tion. They also looked at the consequences of a
more expansionary budgetary policy (a $10 billion
spending increase and an additional $15 billion
tax cut) and a more restricted policy (a $10 bil-
lion spending cut and failure to extend the 1975
tax cut into 1976.
Rivlin said in an interview that the economic
forecasts must be achieving a certain degree of
objectivity because they have been criticized by
both liberals and conservatives as slanted in
favor of the other side.76
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This priority, given to economic forecasting, is espe-
cially interesting (unfortunately it is also coincidental) in light
of the fact that one of the principal reasons why the budget
reform of 1946 failed was because Congress lacked a capacity to
make well-grounded macroeconomic forecasts. It was clear early
on that budget analysis was a necessary task for the existence
of CBO; i.e., if budget analysis was not performed decently,
then CBO would not survive.
There was no way for the supporters of CBO to ensure
the stability and continued growth of CBO as an institution
past 1976. They thought it was important for the CBO staff to
achieve a respectable size by the end of the first year, and
their immediate concern was how to get CBO the money necessary
for a fast start.
There was a certain political reality about the situ-
ation that the drafters of the legislation anticipated. For
example, they purposely did not require an appropriation until
the second year. This was not simply because they thought that
CBO might get set up (as it was) out of the appropriations phase,
it was because they did not want the Appropriations Committee to
have a check on the size of the institution for its first 12
months. They were reminded of the OTA experience where OTA,
lacking an appropriation, had to wait until the next appropri-
ations title to get funding. So, after delicate last minute
negotiations between people in the House and the Senate, a
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provision was included in the Act which allowed CBO to draw
from the contingency funds in the Senate,
Because of the 8 month delay, CBO lagged in hiring
and, therefore, faced the demand of staffing quickly. In terms
of supply, CBO was almost the only new game in town for analysts
during the Ford Administration (the other being the two Budget
Committees) and people were attracted by the prospect of work-
ing in what appeared to be an exciting new institution. The
quick staff buildup (from 2 to 193 in 6 months) was underwritten
by this contingency fund which allowed CBO to spend an almost
unlimited amount of money; a buildup which must certainly be
seen as permissive in the conventional context of appropriations
committees and oversight hearings.
There are two other elements of CBO's strategy that
relate to organizational weaknesses in the Congressional Refer-
ence Service. First, and perhaps most important, is the question
of the negative implications of unplanned growth and the
question of just how much service CBO was to provide. One
could imagine, given that CBO was a free resource, that
enormous demands would be placed on it, not just by the Budget
Committees but by other committees as well. This was potential-
ly a big pitfall since their initial success could cause them to
become increasingly spread out until they could no longer
provide quality service. Ultimately, the reputation of
an organization catches up to the reality.
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In a market setting, one can imagine raising prices
as a way of holding down unwanted demand but, since this was
not possible, CBO chose to restrict access to its resources
and to consciously keep those resources somewhat limited.
According to CBO's own master plan, its maximum size was only
260 people as opposed to the staff of 750 each in the Congres-
sional Reference Service and the Office of Management and
Budget, and the 5,528 member staff of the General Accounting
Office.
Part of the Congressional Reference Service's (CRS)
problem was that there was no one in the Congress who was really
concerned with insulating it organizationally so that it could
maintain a sense of quality and exclusivity. The effect of
CRS being organizationally responsible for all areas meant that
they were not able to build sufficient vertical expertise in
any area. Put another way, CRS was seen as being a mile wide
but only one inch thick.
Given the legislative history leading to the estab-
lishment of the Congressional Budget Office and in view of
the Congressional Reference Service's experience, CBO sought
to protect itself in two ways: first, by forging very strong
ties to the Senate Budget Committee, chaired by Senator Muskie,
and its staff, headed by Douglas Bennett; and, second, by
creating a bipartisan economic advisory panel:
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Rivlin set up a panel of 18 economic advisers to
use as a sounding board for future economic fore-
casts before making them public, The panel is
chaired by Paul W. McCracken of the University of
Michigan, who was chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisers (CEA) under President Nixon
(1969-71), A range of economic views are re-
flected by the members, who include Walter W.
Heller of the University of Minnesota, CEA chair-
man for Presidents Kennedy and Johnson (1961-64),
as well as representatives of the AFL-CIO and the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States.77
Since CBO was a special purpose institution, the
definition of its function was more flexible than is generally
possible for a government agency. Two factors were equally
significant in defining the new organization's purpose: what
the law required and what Alice wanted to do. It was Robert
Reischauer who came up with the organizational design for the
Congressional Budget Office. As he puts it, he played king for
a day one Saturday night.
In organizing CBO, there were two principal design
considerations. First, there was a strong desire to minimize
hierarchy and to have an essentially flat organizational
structure. This was intended to facilitate communications
between divisions based on the kind of peer relationships one
usually finds among senior faculty or at a place like the
Brookings Institution. Considerable autonomy was given to the
assistant directors to run their divisions. Alice Rivlin was
like the dean of a college with the assistant directors like
department heads.
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The organizational design also stipulated that the
head of a division should, whenever possible, be an analyst, an
expert in the area of specialization. (This preference owes
its origins to the Brookings Institution.) The decision to
hire analysts as heads of divisions expanded what was initially
two program divisions -- one for domestic and the other for
international -- into six areas under three assistant directors.
Implementation of the wedge strategy was the midwife
to the second important organizational design issue. The wedge
strategy, which was designed in response to CBO's sense that
in OMB and elsewhere the immediate drives out the long-term
policy analysis, caused CBO to separate budget analysis from
policy analysis. At CBO, they are really separate: upstairs
are the policy analysis people and Alice Rivlin; downstairs, the
Budget Analysis Division exists as a separate fiefdom, under
James Blum. Alice Rivlin has very little interest in what goes
on downstairs and seldom visits. This separation is graphically
illustrated in the fact that CBO has two baseball teams: one
composed of people who work upstairs; the other composed of
people who work downstairs. Upstairs, the players' jerseys
say CBO; downstairs, they say BUDGET ANALYSIS.
There was a precedent for this clustering at OMB
which had a central point for controlling all numerical estimates.
It can also be argued that there is a common methodology in costing
across the different areas and that it might simply be more ef-
118
ficient to have one person responsible for getting all the
numerical analyses completed,
Summary of the' Major Elements of CBO's Strategy
Problem '
Budget Committee and GAO spread
OTA's slow start
OTA's dominance
CRS sprawl
CRS lack of protection
OMB overload
Strategy
-Visibility
-The wedge
-Rush to 200
-Independence
-No individual requests
-Requests limited to
budgetary matters
-CBO's economic advisory
panel
-Upstairs/Downstairs
One of the most important influences in the develop-
ment of the organizational character of CBO was the attitude
of the core group who were present at its creation. As a
group, they were self-confident, brash, and they viewed CBO
as an exciting professional adventure. Their reputations
were well established, and they had fairly strong views of the
kind of work they wanted to do. They felt reasonably mobile
and if CBO did not allow for their purposes, they could always
move on. None of the core group foresaw CBO being as success-
ful as they now perceive it.
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In one sense, for the staff, CBO was virtually a
risk free endeavor. Its task of providing Congress with the
type of analysis was seen as herculean. Since their peers were
all aware of the obstacles and jealousies inherent in the budget
process, if for some reason CBO failed to take hold, no one
could really blame them; and if CBO was especially successful,
then they would be regarded as having made an important ac-
complishment against large odds.
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CHAPTER 5
CONGRESSIONAL ASSESSMENTS OF CBO
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The Congressional Budget Office's reputation is like
a gravity model in a way; i.e., the farther you get
from the HilZ, the more esteem C30 seems to have.
I go to the West Coast and people say, 'You're doing
such a wonderful job of running the government.'
The President gives Congress a budget, and the budget
is then given to 30, and it fixes it up and corrects
alZ the errors, and then the government runs on the
C30 budget.
Senior CBO staff person
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SENATE
There have been three major evaluations of CBO's ef-
fectiveness by outsiders. Two were sponsored by the Congress:
a 1976 study prepared for the Commission on the Operation of the
Senate and a 1977 study by the House Commission on Information
and Facilities. In addition, Joel Havemann, deputy editor of the
National Journal and a close observer of CBO since its inception,
has written about CBO in his book, Congress and the Budget.
Any judgment of CBO's performance must, of course, take
into account who is doing the evaluating. This is true of the
House and Senate studies as well. The Congressional Budget
Office was formally mandated in the Congressional Budget Reform
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 to produce budgetary analysis
and whatever policy analysis was necessary to issue an annual
report on the alternative budget courses available to Congress.
Alice Rivlin and her staff have had varying perceptions of how
much latitude CBO is to have in defining its responses to the
Act's mandate. In addition, the House and the Senate had sub-
stantially different expectations of the scope and function of
CBO, and their evaluation of CBO's performance is at least
partly a function of these original expectations.
The 1976 Senate study was prepared by William M.
Capron, Associate Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at
Harvard University. Capron's study was one of four commissioned
to examine the support agencies (CRS, GAO, OTA, and CBO) created
by Congress to meet its information needs. Capron utilized the
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staff of the Commission on the Operation of the Senate and
prepared his study through surveys and interviews of CBO and
congressional staff members and through analysis of the liter-
ature concerning CBO, Congress, and the budget.
Capron's study noted from the outset what is almost
immediately apparent about any assessment of CBO's performance:
that given the various perceptions of the parties involved re-
garding CBO's appropriate role, it is impossible to assign a
single standard by which to judge its effectiveness. Capron
found that the one area of agreement centered on CBO's non-
partisan and nonpolitical posture. He noted that Dr. Rivlin,
who received substantial congressional criticism for her high
visibility in the press, has been especially careful to remain
above politics in terms of CBO's output. Except for some very
conservative members of Congress, CBO has received praise for
its ability to remain nonpartisan even though this has sometimes
occurred to the chagrin of members who needed a more partisan
posture for support of a particular bill.
Capron's study found that both staffs of the two
Budget Committees were critical of CBO's initial efforts, though
the Senate Budget Committee tended to be more optimistic about
the long-range potential of CBO. The lack of Hill experience
was also noted as a problem by both Budget Committees, though
the ability and expertise of the CBO staffers otherwise received
high marks:
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... CBO's staff is a high caliber one, both young
and highly trained, though somewhat short on
congressional experience.... Since CBO's major
concerns cut across a wide spectrum of public
policy questions, the agency is in a unique
position to provide insights and first-class
analysis transcending committee jurisdictional
boundaries.78
While both Budget Committees expressed criticism of
the lack of Hill expertise among CBO staffers, Capron noted that
the Senate Budget Committee had made an effort to develop closer
relations with CBO leadership and staff; an occurrence which
could very possibly lead to a more effective CBO. The House
Budget Committee, on the other hand, seemed to Capron to have
written CBO off early on and was making little effort to go out
of its way in establishing more effective ties.
The policy studies prepared by CBO, according to Capron,
reflected the skill and expertise of the CBO staff members:
I would give those (policy studies conducted by CBO)
I have read a very high average. None of the formal
reports I have examined are shoddy or biased; most
are highly credible and knowledgeable, and a few are,
in my view, outstanding.79
Capron's study found that the criticism leveled at CBO's
staffing pattern in terms of lack of political expertise was per-
ceived as a major weakness:
In fact, we were repeatedly told by staff members of
the Budget Committees that the lack of Hill experience
of the CBO staff was a fundamental problem in enabling
CBO to effectively perform its basic mission as a
service organization to the committees.80
In his summary, Capron made several recommendations:
(1) The most crucial issue for CBO and the Congress is
the clarification and strengthening of CBO's relations with the
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two Budget Committees;
(2) CBO can be more effective in discharging its
functions when there are stronger and clearer links between
itself and the other support agencies, especially GAO and OTA;
(3) CBO's central role is direct support of the
congressional budget process and this should dominate its
staffing decisions and use of staff resources.81
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HOUSE
The second major evaluation of CBO, the Report on the
Organizational Effectiveness of the Congressional Budget Office,
was third in a series of reports on studies conducted by the
House Commission on Information and Facilities on the effective-
ness of OTA, CRS, CBO, and the GAO. The staff directors of the
House and Senate Budget Committees were apprised of the project
prior to its beginning, and the three month study was conducted
with the cooperation of Alice Rivlin who made facilities and
information available for the study team.
Among the background sources of information reviewed
by the study team were selected articles and reports including
some provided by CBO. CBO provided copies of most of its own
published studies, reports, news releases, hearing statements,
and other similar materials. During the first days of the on-site
phase of the study, CBO supplied copies to the study team of
internal literature including policy statements and statements
concerning CBO's functions and organizational structure. CBO
also provided administrative records which consisted of personnel
files, contact files, travel information, and training and budget
records. Those CBO analytical reports, issue papers, publications,
and other work products were examined more to identify their
significance in the context of CBO's work and its relationships
than for the purpose of direct, qualitative evaluation.
Additional information was collected by a series of
interviews with 16 CBO staff members on the executive level;
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some were interviewed more than once. Nine CBO analysts were
also interviewed. The committee examined 141 professional job
statements and 18 support staff job statements. In response to
its questionnaires, the Commission received a total of 17 legis-
lative committee responses, 14 responses from the Appropriation
Committees, the House Ways and Means Committee, and the Senate
Finance Committee combined, 15 responses from the professional
staff 6f the House Budget Committee, and 2 responses from the
Senate Budget Committee.
As a result of its study, the Commission concluded that
the major functions of CBO, from the point of view of the House,
include:
(1) Staff assistance to committees: House and Senate
Budget Committees are to receive information that CBO deems
helpful or that is requested by these two committees; Appropri-
ations, House Ways and Means, and Senate Finance Committees are
generally entitled to the same type of CBO staff assistance, but
only upon their specific request; other committees, upon their
request, are entitled to information already compiled and
requested information "as practicable" and all committees are
entitled to the temporary assistance of CBO staff presumably on
budget-related problems.
(2) Staff assistance to Members: Members of either
House are entitled to information already compiled or related in-
formation already available; specifically required reports and
work products; five year projection of budget authority, outlays,
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revenues and tax expenditures; the annual 1 April report of
fiscal policy options and priorities; continuing scorekeeping
reports on budget impact; bill costing analyses; and financial
effect analyses.
The Commission noted some of the problems that had
plagued CBO in its start-up efforts including the fact that
Dr. Rivlin was not appointed until about seven months after the
passage of the Act creating CBO. Since the Budget Committees
were established and functioning by that time, the Commission
noted that their staff were able to achieve a degree of profes-
sional self-sufficiency that would probably have been unnecessary
if CBO had also been operating from the beginning. The Commis-
sion focused its criticism of CBO staffing on the fact that
Dr. Rivlin's choices for senior staff were generally made from
persons who were of recognized policy-analysis ability, but who
lacked political experience particularly on the Hill.
The Commission warned against a duplication of effort
by CBO among the congressional support agencies, particularly
CRS, GAO, and to some extent, OTA. However, the Commission also
found that within CBO there existed a high degree of awareness
concerning the possibilities of this duplication and a conscious
effort to refer to these other agencies requests for information
or services more within their domain.
The House Commission reserved its criticism of CBO's
high profile in the press as its central conclusion. The chair-
man of the Commission, Representative Jack Brooks, personally
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wrote the summary of the Commission's findings in which he
observed:
The Congressional Budget Office maintains too high
a profile. Its willing visibility, unique among
the legislative branch support agencies, threatens
seriously to impair the usefulness and integrity
of a highly promising and productive policy research
agency.82
Nevertheless, the Commission report indicated that the
Commission was favorably impressed by "the rapid development of
CBO into a functioning and effective source of needed analytical
assistance."83 The budget estimates prepared by CBO for Congress
were noted by the Commission as being especially high quality:
CBO has become, in less than two years, an im-
portant element in the new congressional budget
process, a source of useful economic data, of
increasing skilled analytical support, of co-
ordination in efforts to integrate the complex
budget system, of organizational and administrative
competence -- all of which enable it to play an
increasing role in equipping Congress to exercise
control over the budgetary process.84
In its summary, however, the House Commission's report
reflected the overriding concern in the House that Dr. Rivlin's
penchant for publicity damaged the effectiveness of CBO by stat-
ing that CBO's public declarations on economic policy questions,
without prior sanction by the appropriate congressional com-
mittees, proved to be counterproductive.
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In contrast to the House Commission's report, Joel
Havemann, author of Congress and the Budget and widely recog-
nized as one of the most knowledgeable people on the new budget
process, feels that CBO has earned high marks from the Congress:
"The Congressional Budget Office has won the respect of sup-
porters and critics alike for its performance in supplying
budgetary information to Congress." 85 Havemann cites three con-
crete examples of CBO's growing influence:
When the Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee
prepared food stamp legislation in 1976, most of
its spending estimates came from the Congressional
Budget Office.
Senator Pete V. Domenici (R-N. Mex.) used CBO
analysis to support his legislation to charge
fees for barges using inland waterways.
President Carter's fiscal 1978 budget revisions
included a proposal construction of protective
shelters for American military planes based in
Europe -- a proposal that Administration planners
had seen analyzed by the CBO.86
In Congress and the Budget, Havemann addressed the
fundamental issue any evaluation of CBO must include which is
that the lack of clarity about the role of CBO produces con-
flict in assessing its effectiveness. The House opposition to
the policy analysis role performed by CBO can be clearly seen
in the attempt by one congressman to eliminate the three CBO
divisions for policy analysis:
Congressman Coughlin, a Republican, proposed to cut
the CBO staff to 123 by keeping the staff members
who performed budget estimates but eliminating the
three CBO divisions for policy analysis. The sub-
committee rejected the Coughlin proposal, which
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would have left Rivlin without the divisions that
she regarded as especially important. (In addition,
Senator Brock Adams assured the committee that he
would be able to control the policy divisions).
Instead, the subcommittee decided to freeze the CBO
staff at 193. Its decision was confirmed by the
full Appropriations Committee, the House, and
ultimately the Senate as well.87
Havemann views Rivlin's high visibility as a necessary
part of a strategy to bring CBO's policy analysis to the attention
of Congress. While Havemann acknowledges that this particular
strategy has upset some members of Congress, especially in the
House, he notes that it has been successful in attracting at-
tention to some of the CBO reports. In Havemann's view, clashes
are inevitable between CBO and the Congress as long as Dr. Rivlin
(or any other director) seeks to make an impact on the congres-
sional decision-making process, especially when this impact comes
in the form of analyses which bear out the arguments of one side
over another.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
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Before 1974, the President controlled the information.
With no source of its own, Congress had to go to the
executive branch when it wanted to know how much a
program would cost. If the President opposed the program,
he could make it appear unattractive by estimating its
cost at an artificially high level. Congress had no way
to chaZZenge him.
When it enacted budget reform, Congress sought to create
its own sources of budgetary information. In particular,
it established the Congressional Budget Office to provide
for Congress the scone kinds of budget estimates that the
Office of Management and Budget supplied to the President.
The roughly two hundred staff members of the CB0, along
with the staffs of the new budget committees, broke the
executive branch's monopoly on budgetary information.
JoeZ Havemann
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FINDINGS
There is no one way to evaluate, and it should be
remembered that the author is not giving a personal opinion but
rather presenting here how others view the organization. In
all cases, the following comments are the result of exhaustive
interviews with CBO senior staff, staff of the two Budget Com-
mittees, sponsors of the legislation creating CBO, the chairmen
of the two Budget Committees and the heads of other congressional
support agencies.
The impact of the Congressional Budget Office on the balance of power
#1 The balance of power appears to have shifted perceptibly in
the direction of the Congress, and part of that shift can be at-
tributed to Congress' new budget process. However, the impact
of the Congressional Budget Office is not easily separated from
that of the new budget process as far as the balance of power
is concerned.
#2 The shift toward the Congress appears to be the result of
two principal changes in the way that Congress handles the budget:
a) Congress now has its own comprehensive budget
process; one which links revenues and expenditures for the
first time since the Civil War when the appropriations com-
mittees came into existence; and one which ipso facto allows
Congress to determine its own unique priorities.
b) Congress now has the capacity to generate its own
authoritative numbers for fiscal and economic projections as
well as for bill costing. Thus, Congress can now critique
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executive proposals and defend its own initiative on economic
as well as political grounds,
#3 The Congressional Budget Office seems principally responsible
for creating this new capacity to generate authoritative numbers.
If there is one thing concerning CBO that both Houses
agree upon, it is that CBO's fiscal and budget analysis has
been accurate and indispensable to the budget process. 88 CBO's
fiscal and economic projections have so far proven to be more
accurate than those of OMB. According to Senator Muskie:
CBO has grown and developed very successfully and
it does an outstanding analytical job, by and large.
I think maybe the best test of that is that CBO's
estimates are rarely if ever challenged by anyone
in the Congress, let alone the budget committees.
And I think we tend to have more confidence in
their estimating than we do in OMB's, in many
cases, where there is a difference.
With respect to bill costing in any given year, ap-
proximately 75% of the budget is uncontrollable; i.e., already
committed expenditures resulting from spending from trust funds,
spending from previous year's obligations, or interest on the
public debt. The remaining 25% is considered controllable,
though this figure is somewhat misleading when one considers
that within the controllable figure are such inelastic items as
all of the current spending of the Defense Department (including
all military salaries) and the salaries of all federal employees.
Therefore, while in a strict sense 25% of the annual budget may
be called controllable, in reality the actual figure is between
2-5%.
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The Congressional Budget Office does cost estimates
for 90% of all bills reported from donmittee that have a budget-
ary impact, and the most compelling evidence of CBO's authorita-
tiveness is the fact that there has never been a single major
controversy over a CBO cost estimate on the floor of either the
House or the Senate. An additional indication of the high regard
in which CBO is held (with respect to budgetary and fiscal
analysis) comes from the fact that even though individual com-
mittees were authorized by the Legislative Reorganization Act
of 1970 to report out cost figures for their pending legislation,
both the House and the Senate appropriations committees used CBO
outlay estimates for all bills. In the only major cases where
CBO's budget numbers have differed from the Executive's, namely
on the President's energy proposals (25% difference) and on
welfare reform (Executive estimate $2 billion - CBO estimate $8
billion), CBO's figures were later accepted by the Executive as
more accurate.
The Congressional Budget Office's reputation for ac-
curacy and reliability with facts and numbers reflects both a
basic professionalism and its Brookings influence:
Whether or not the reader agrees with the con-
clusions in a Brookings book, he is hard put to
argue the facts therein. Statistics, charts and
footnotes enjoy the highest reputation for ac-
curacy, thanks to a Brookings process known as
'Fisherizing,' named after Evelyn P. Fisher,
legendary statistical associate. According to
a Brookings memo, Fisherizing 'required an un-
swerving suspicion of all factual assertion, a
congenital unwillingness to accept anything
reported or recorded until it has been proved
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accurate, a consummate mastery of how and where
to find source materials, and an ability to in-
spect the contents of whole libraries without
fatigue,'
On a more workaday level, when a gray-haired
lady spends days at the Library of Congress
reading the sports pages of the New York Times,
then peers into a manuscript titled Government
and the Sports Business and changes Satchel Paige
to Leroy Robert Paige -- that's Fisherizing.89
According to Jim Blum, head of CBO's Budget Analysis
Division, cost estimates have been one of the underrated
aspects of the budget reform. He feels that the fact that there
are cost estimates now in almost every bill recorded and that
these take part in congressional debate has raised the level of
budget awareness of the Congress. One can hardly go through a
congressional record without noting some reference to a CBO
supplied number.
This means that OMB and the Executive can no longer
perform budgetary sleight of hand. The farm bill would probably
not have been turned down in an election year if it were not
for the authoritative costs calculated by CBO. The same can be
said for President Carter's energy proposals. The result is a
clear increase in 'truth in budgeting,' with obvious balance of
power implications. The Congress can no longer be manipulated
by the Executive using favorable estimates. Growing out of this
is a degree of authority on the Hill about the consequences of
specific programs which puts the Congress in a much better
position to interact with the Executive,
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It should be noted that 'truth in budgeting' works
both ways. CBO's work can put a damper on programs that the
Congress wants and that the Executive is opposed to, since the
effect of more honest budgeting is to display the real costs
associated with any proposed project. The impact on the balance
of power depends, in part, on where the locus of initiation is.
For example, where CBO's cost estimates concur with those of
the Executive, the Executive can then use CBO to support its
position.
#4 Congress' budget authoritativeness seems attributable to
the budget and fiscal analysis divisions (downstairs) at CBO
only, and it is hard to prove that the policy analysis divisions
(upstairs) have so far had a comparable influence on the quality
of congressional debate or have significantly influenced congres-
sional decision-making.
The impact of the organizational strategy in its ability to establish itself
as a viable Congressional support agency.
Separate but related to its impact on the balance of
power, this study has looked at the subsidiary question of how
well CBO has done as a new congressional support agency. There
are several things which account for the ability of an organi-
zation to establish itself as a viable institution. Among
them are its organizational strategy, the institutional climate
in which the organization finds itself, the kind of leadership
that the organization displays, and others; some controllable
and some accidental. In the case of CBO, some of the elements
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of its strategy seem effective; others appear ineffective; and
in at least one case, CBO's actions seem counterproductive.
#5 It appears that CBO has established itself as a viable
congressional support agency.
When Congress created CBO, it created an institutional
capability to help it to make informed decisions about very
complicated matters. Because of CBO's assistance, Congress is
becoming more and more the branch of government that initiates.
Of the three budgetary decisions that will be made in FY 79
(the expansion of higher education funding; the rollback of the
social security taxes; and the tax cut), two of them are almost
entirely the creation of the legislative branch. The legislative
branch is becoming more dominant both because it has the capacity
and strength and because the President has less capacity and
strength. CBO has already established enough of a constituency
for its budget and fiscal analysis to ensure its continued sur-
vival as a major congressional support agency.
#6 CBO's decision to focus only on budgetary matters and to
position its studies between quick response and long-range seems
to have been effective.
The Congressional Budget Office's studies are usually
completed within two or three months. This compares with CRS
which answers many of its questions in two or three days and
GAO whose studies may go on for two or three years. The decision
of CBO to limit its response to requests for budgetary assistance
and to position its studies between the quick response type avail-
able from the Congressional Reference Service (CRS) and the kind of
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long-range efforts that characterize the General Accounting
Office (GAO) seems to have been a wise one in that it has
minimized institutional rivalry.
#7 CBO's wedge strategy appears to have failed.
It looked for a time as if the wedge strategy was
going to work. The Congressional Budget Office's first work was
in the fiscal and budgetary areas, and CBO did gain a national
reputation from Alice Rivlin's testimony concerning the state
of the economy based on the work of Frank deLeeuw's fiscal
analysis division. The numbers were very accurate, and the
testimony received headline coverage. As things turned out,
however, the notion that doing good budget and fiscal analysis
would ipso facto generate a demand for policy analysis (the
wedge strategy) was unfounded. Though the policy analysis
divisions are finding an increased demand for their work, it does
not come from sources which have used the budget analysis arm
of the Congressional Budget Office. Likewise, it does not come
as a result of the reputation for high quality work which the
budget and fiscal analysis divisions have earned.
An analysis of those areas where CBO studies have
actually had some recent impact on policy such as in energy and
welfare reform shows that the process was different from what
CBO expected in the formulation of its strategy. Policy analysis
has not entered on the heels of budget and fiscal analysis; it
has entered on its own; i.e., the demand for policy analysis
has been generated independently of CBO's budget and fiscal
analysis.
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Where the policy analysis divisions have been success-
ful it is because the heads of the divisions have demonstrated
a genuine flair for entrepreneurship and have established direct
and often personal relations with individual committees. This
is especially true for Robert Reischauer and David Mundel
(Human Resources) and Raymond Scheppach (Natural Resources) all
of whom are not only first-rate analysts but also recognized as
having considerable political savvy. This has enabled them to
become more intimately connected to the committee process on
the Hill. And this, in turn, enables them to do a better job
of anticipating upcoming committee needs, to do the kind of
preparatory work which cuts down necessary lead time for re-
quired reports, and to target their reports so as to include
the essential elements of the issues from the individual com-
mittee's perspective. All of which goes a long way in assuring
that the final CBO product will be more influential in the
committee's deliberations.
Reischauer, Mundel, and Scheppach represent a new
breed for reasons already stated. All have excellent relations
with Jim Blum and his budget analysis division. Scheppach came
up from "downstairs" and Reischauer and Blum are close personal
friends. Even though CBO felt that it would take longer to
establish the policy analysis divisions, it can be argued that
had Reischauer and Scheppach (or. people with their mix of skills)
headed those divisions from the beginning, this success could
have been achieved earlier. It is worth noting that the
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authorizing committees which, according to the law are the last
priority, are now the largest users of CBO's policy analyses.
#8 The Economic Advisory Committee appears to have been ef-
fective in maintaining CBO's nonpartisan reputation.
The Economic Advisory Committee which was set up
ostensibly to give guidance and direction to CBO meets only
twice a year for a day at a time, and its real purpose is not
to provide criticism of CBO products or to review draft docu-
ments at all. Its real purpose is to shield CBO from criticism
of being of any particular political persuasion. It seems to
have done a good job of protecting CBO. Criticism of CBO has
tended to be directed more at Alice Rivlin's high profile and
political ineptness than at the political bent of CBO work.
The Economic Advisory Panel can take some of the credit for
this occurrence.
The Economic Advisory Committee has three additional
impacts: First, it gives the organization ideas across a
spectrum of economic views. Second, it provides a network for
securing competent staff. Third, it helps to make certain that
CBO staff feel that they are not dropping out of the economics
world when they come to the Congressional Budget Office.
#9 CBO's quick staff buildup appears to have been a mixed
blessing.
Though the quick staff buildup was effective in
establishing the scale of the new organization, it had some
unintended consequences in that it contributed to a relatively
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high turnover rate (100% among senior people in the policy
divisions and 25% overall), And it appears to have caused some
of CBO's initial work to be uneven and, in some cases, even
inferior.
An additional criticism of CBO has been the charge
that its staffing pattern seriously weakened its impact on the
Hill because so many of the new staff members lacked political
experience:
...Sometimes CBO's leadership was criticized for
putting too heavy emphasis on getting bright, young
policy analysts who lacked any significant congres-
sional experience. (As noted previously, this is
an accurate assessment of CBO staff.)
In fact, we were repeatedly told by staff members
of the Budget Committees that the lack of Hill
experience of the CBO staff was a fundamental
problem in enabling CBO to effectively perform
its basic mission as a service organization to
the committees.90
The idea of staffing CBO with young analysts (only
about a dozen members of the original professional staff of
193 had any previous experience on the Hill) and the strategy
of the quick buildup seem to have been a barrier to the ability
of CBO to integrate itself into the congressional mainstream.
It is now recognized that for the first couple of years, at
least, while the analysts were learning the ropes, it might have
been better to have had more people with congressional experience.
#10 The decision to separate CBO into two main areas may become
a costly one from the point of view of organizational survival.
The decision to separate CBO into two separate oper-
ations, upstairs/downstairs, appears to have been successful
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from the limited point of view of giving the policy analysis
people sufficient space (in the California sense of the word)
to carry out their analysis. This was the hope and the reason
for the separation. The separation appears also to have pro-
duced an extra benefit. The opportunity to work with the
policy analysis people has contributed to CBO's ability to at-
tract high quality people to work in the Budget Analysis Division.
The upstairs/downstairs approach was originally seen as allow-
ing CBO to specialize in two distinct areas, in effect, getting
the best of both worlds.
Dr. Rivlin decided on this organizational strategy for
two principal reasons. First, she felt it was essential to have
an identifiable, central management responsible for numbers and
their validity; an organizational design also employed by the
Office of Management and Budget. Second,as one senior CBO
staffer noted:
We were concerned that the numbers people would
involve everyone in day-to-day crises so that no
time would be available for policy analysis....
The price you have to pay to get policy analysis
started is to do it for a while with no audience.92
He also noted that the original organizational design
of separating the two divisions because of a desire to avoid
day-to-day drain in capabilities was a less critical factor at
present:
There are two things that I think affected the
institution design more than anything else. One
is we had some substantive areas that we clearly
wanted to do work in, so that the divisions got
organized substantively. Human resources, tax
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policy, fiscal policy and then there was a formal
demand in the law to do this technical bill costing
which we decided to put into a separate institution
to protect the analytic stats from being sucked
into all day-to-day work and fire fighting so that
we could get some real longer term analysis done.
We consciously tried to design an institution
where a strategy would prevent that. Alice wanted
to have this institution create longer term more
formal kinds of analysis in addition to the legis-
latively mandated bill costing. She did not want
the staff to get seduced into that day-to-day
operation entirely and so that, said substantive
divisions, and the separation between the bill
costing and the forecasting staffs of budget
analysis and these more substantive divisions were
the principles of organizational design and we've
had continuing sort of disputes about turf given
that because there are staffs that do exactly the
same substantive areas.
In the beginning, it appeared not to be working but
now the individual analysts, whether upstairs or downstairs,
seem to operate in concert, and with the relationship between
Reischauer, Scheppach and Blum, conflict has diminished. As a
result, when each other's insight is needed, upstairs and down-
stairs work together.
When the advantages of the separate divisions are
juxtaposed against the risk to the survival of the entire or-
ganization, however, this begins to look like a more risky
decision.
The budget analysis people under CBO's organizational
model are a discrete unit and are increasingly well known, well
respected and in considerable demand. Budget analysis now
accounts for almost 4 million of CBO's 10 million dollar budget,
and 70 of its 208 staff members. To the extent that one can
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document examples where CBO has influenced congressional decision-
making, it has largely been through the Budget and Fiscal Analysis
Divisions.
Congress may well be tempted to keep just downstairs at
CBO since it so easily separable,and jettison the Policy Analysis
Divisions either through selective funding or through the selection
of the next director.
#11 Dr. Rivlin's strategy of high visibility appears to have
been counterproductive.
According to Dr. Rivlin, her own high press visibility
is a result of a conscious effort to extend the impact of CBO's
analyses on the Hill:
Rivlin has tried several techniques to bring the
CBO's policy analysis to the attention of Congress.
She has accompanied the release of some of the best
CBO studies with press conferences on the theory
that Members of Congress would be more likely to
read studies that they had seen reported in the news
media,93
Press coverage has been available whenever Alice Rivlin
wants it: in part because of her past relations with the press;
and in part because CBO was a major new congressional agency;
in part because CBO was a vehicle for critiquing the relatively
unpopular Nixon/Ford; and in part because the director is a
woman and, therefore, good copy in a Congress dominated by men.
This publicity has assured an almost continuous stream of bright
new graduates from the best schools to work as analysts. It has
also meant a ready supply of graduate students to serve as
interns and the like.
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Elizabeth Ray notwithstanding, working on Capitol Hill
is difficult. The hours are long, working conditions are rather
atavistic,and there is quite a bit of insecurity. The staff of
the Congressional Budget Office suffer all of the drawbacks of
working on the Hill, and they lack one of the more important
benefits (since they are staff to the Budget Committees's staff
and not to members) which is the satisfaction of knowing that
one is at the center of public policy formulation and can claim
to have a certain amount of direct influence.
According to Dr. Rivlin, CBO only does good work to
the extent that it can recruit good people and can maintain a
dialogue with the academic community. In addition to the fact
that high visibility helped CBO attract bright young profes-
sionals, the organization had two other reasons for publishing
its work: (1) any findings not made public could be suppressed;
and (2) members often fail to read CBO's reports unless they
were covered in the media.
It is certainly accurate to suggest that Dr. Rivlin
is a most skillful user of the media, similar to the style of a
John Lindsay. Her personal exposure, however, has not been
without considerable cost to CBO for it has alienated an im-
portant minority of the Congress,and that minority includes
most of the Democratic leadership. Dr. Rivlin's strategy of
high visibility seems to have exacerbated House resentment to
CBO and also to have weakened efforts to market CBO's policy
analysis.
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One running battle, in particular, has been with
Rep. Robert Giaimo, chairman of the House Budget Committee.
Representative Giaimo has repeatedly tried to impress upon
Alice Rivlin that the Congress is not the presidency and CBO
is not OMB. According to Giaimo, the CBO director cannot be
anyone's spokesman. Its analytical role must be modeled after
that of the Congressional Research Service, and the General
Accounting Office. To the extent that it has an analogy in
the Executive Branch, it comes closest to the professional
rather than the political staff of OMB, which traditionally
provides objective analytical support to the institution of
the Presidency regardless of the politics of the incumbent.
When directed by committees headed by Sen. Henry M.
Jackson (D-Wash.) and Rep. Thomas Ashley (D-Ohio)
to analyze Carter's energy program, CBO a few weeks
ago turned out a detailed report that plainly said
the President had overestimated the potential energy
savings.
What's more, Rivlin held a press conference to ex-
plain the CBO report and, when asked, said there
had been a lot of talk about 'sacrifice,' or of
'the moral equivalent of war,' but one doesn't see
it in this plan,
Representative Giaimo called Rivlin on the carpet
and told her to 'lower your profile.'
Giaimo then went public by telling reporters he
would set up 'guidelines' for CBO's future deal-
ings with the press.94
The Congressional Budget Office's shortcomings are
usually characterized as the result of a kind of naivete about
institutional politics, in general, and the Congress, in
particular. The apologists (in the Greek sense of the word)
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often go on to explain that this naivete is understandable.
Careful analysis does not support this impression.
With the exception of Dr. Rivlin, the other senior
people (Levine, Blum, Reischauer, Scheppach, Mundel) seem all
too well-grounded politically to have been naive about the nature
of the Congress.
Senior staff members of CBO have always been opposed
to Dr. Rivlin's media type but they have been singularly in-
effective in reducing Alice's passion for personal publicity:
Alice throws a press conference and half the world
come in and it is written up all over the place and
Congressman Jones who never gets any press and the
House absolutely goes bananas. That is a major
political mistake.
She's a tough lady, and very hard to control if she
doesn't agree with you.
It (Alice Rivlin's visibility) was not necessary to
the political enfranchisement of the institution
and it created backlashes which hurt the political
enfranchising. That is going to really come out, I
think, on the House side when she is replaced because
they are not going to let anything like that happen
again. And whether the Senate is going to be able
to prevail, that is hard to say. I think that the
next Director of CBO is going to practically have
to mortgage his life away in promises that there
won't be any press conferences and stuff like that
to the House. Her behavior was a major political
miscalculation.
Another thing is that CBO should have been a place
which created an effective demand for policy analysis
and it didn't do that. I think a lot of that is
Alice's fault. I don't know how you translate some-
thing like that into specifics but they would have
been the kind of institutional goals that CBO could
have had a very effective contribution in had its
political relationships with everybody else been
better.
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The trouble is that part of the reason why nobody
wants analysis on the Hill is because people don't
like Alice. That's a substantial institutional
and political setback that's going to take another
whole round before it can ever be repaired. I
think it is going to take a long time. Congress
has a great deal of political indigestion from
having to swallow CBO. OTA was never able to
recover from its beginning.
#12 The political climate that existed at the time of the
creation of the new Congressional Budget Office was optimal
for the start of a new congressional agency.
The 1974 Act could only have passed given the conver-
gence of a certain set of circumstances: Nixon's pressure on
spending; the concern about impoundment; and general appre-
hension about the executive encroachment over the legislature.
Liberals were concerned about the impoundment and encroachment
issues, and did not like President Nixon, while conservatives
were concerned about spending, the public debt, and deficits.
Congress also had the benefit of prior experiments in budget
control, and had created a joint study committee on the issue
which operated at the very time that a budget act was politically
feasible. Congress was also "blessed" with two weak Presidents
(Ford and Carter) in a row, while it was getting accustomed to
its newly regained power.
#13 The state of the economy at the time of CBO's inception
caused the focus of Congress like that of the country to be
on recovery and on actions directed toward that end.
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A senior staff member said in reference to these two
factors:
I would like to believe it's the great leadership
provided by Alice and me and other people, and
that the design and organization is absolutely
brilliant rather than accidentally brilliant, but
I really don't think that would be true. 95 per-
cent of our success is based on the fact that you
couldn't have chosen a more wonderful time to
begin a process like this when you did. There
was a Democratic Congress which was fighting a
Republican President, Nixon, and the worst reces-
sion since World War II, since the Depression and
the worst inflation too. Everybody's attention
was riveted on economic issues, and rather than
being business page news, it was front page news.
#14 Senator Muskie appears to be a most effective godfather
for CBO in preventing dissident members of Congress from
tampering with the basic organizational structure.
Muskie considers Alice Rivlin's role to be an analy-
tical one and feels that CBO ought to supply the Congress with
policy analyses. In addition, there are several other reasons
why Dr. Rivlin and, therefore CBO, might enjoy Muskie's support.
First, because of. the way the Senate Budget Committee (which
Muskie chairs) is staffed and organized, the Senate depends on
CBO for fundamental elements of the budget process in a way
that the House Budget Committee does not. As a senior staff
member of the Senate Budget Committee notes;
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We don't see any reason not to reappoint Alice;
that is, that outweighs what we think her good
performance has been. Yes. We would have pre-
ferred more political savvy, we would have pre-
ferred not to have the press conferences as it
was used against her, would have preferred to
see more Capitol Hill oriented people on the
staff, but those things are very small compared
to the stars she's been able to attract in the
private world, the academic world, the analysis
world -- given our salaries are relatively sub-
standard in the face of Brookings and the other
kind of world where you consult, while the ad-
ministration is a more attractive place to be
than it happens to be at the moment, was compet-
ing for the same people, she did an incredible
job holding the place together.
Second, Muskie chose Rivlin for the job and it would not
increase his standing for his choice to be driven out of office,
and this is exactly how a one term appointment would be perceived.
The same senior staff member also noted that:
One of the real disadvantages the House has in
general in this process, particularly dealing
with somebody of Muskie's patience (he is an
impatient man in debate but is immensely patient
with the legislative process and will outwait
anybody). Once he decided it was going to be
Alice Rivlin, it wasn't going to be anybody else,
and the House never had time to realize that but
they would have, I mean he might have compromised
to somebody later, that the House is in the
position of having lost Ullman, the guy who did
all the initial bargaining, they have a committee
that turns over every four years. Muskie knows
that whoever's there now won't be there next
year unless you change the rules,so not just on
that decision, but on the other, the turnover
on the House Committee puts them in a different
position in opposing the permanent committee
on the Senate side.
Third, Alice does not make statements which are of-
fensive to Muskie's political views or are disruptive of his
political gestalt. Alice Rivlin and Senator Muskie are of the
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same political school, and if she is operating under a certain
agenda, it is likely to be the same one he has.
#15 The ability of CBO to control its staffing was essential to
recruiting the high caliber policy analysts that CBO needed to do
the job as they defined it.
#16 CBO's ability to reach independent conclusions and then
publish them appears to have contributed to its survival.
Certainly one of the fundamental questions is that of
CBO's independence. (The law states that CBO should be non-
partisan. The law does not mention independence.) The decision
to retain the right to hire within the organization and to keep
control over the integrity of their products seems to have con-
tributed to CBO's staff having a very high reputation for
competence (if not political sophistication).
Beyond the basic agreem-ent on posture,there exist
both explicitly and implicitly serious differences
of view. First is the question of the independence
of CBO, and particularly of its director. Does the
director have a good deal of independent discretion
in setting CBO's agenda and in determining the man-
ner and style in which CBO will relate to the
Members and the committees of Congress? Indeed,
some observers have suggested that CBO seems, at
first, to act as an agency independent of Congress.95
During the late summer and fall of 1975, CBO was en-
gaged in a delicate struggle to establish their independence
from the budget committees:
Dole: ...There might be an area where we might want
to reject or direct even a more comprehensive study
of the CBO. If we don't see it until we get the
annual report, we will be surprised. Then you might
be surprised.
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Rivlin: I think that is right. That is the point
of trying to start the interaction early.
Dole: But we ought to have a chance at least to
say we don't believe this is a proper effort by CBO.
Are we going to have that opportunity?
Rivlin: Well, that is an interesting question. If
you wanted to veto our looking into something, I
would want to resist that. The report is our report,
as stated in the statute....
Dole: ... If you are working on 38 studies and 22
were initiated by the CBO, there might not be
resources available to the committees in the House
and Senate.... Then you really are not responsive
to the Congress and the budget committees.
Rivlin: We are trying to be as responsible as we
can to all committees. I don't think the way to
do that is to have a staff that is unemployed until
somebody asks them a question....
Muskie: I agree with that. There was a reason why
CBO was created as an independent office. Of course,
their primary responsibility is to respond to Congress.
When you talk about vetoing an initiative generated
within CBO, I mean who is going to have that veto?
The budget committee? Which budget committee?
Appropriations committee? Which appropriations
committee? Ways and Means committee? The finance
committee? Both together or the Congress as a whole,
or the Senate as a whole, or individual Senators
who might not like something on the list of 38
items...?
If your thinking is circumscribed by what occurs to
a Congressman to ask you, it is not going to be
necessarily wide ranging. I mean, Sears, Roebuck
people have a mail order department but they don't
wait for thoseorders to come in before they decide
what to manufacture.
#17 CBO appears to have remained a member in good standing of
the policy analysis profession and to have kept its ties to the
major research universities.
One of the by-products of CBO staffing up with analysts
is the degree to whichCBO, unlike the other three congressional
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support agencies, is tied to a profession. The Congressional
Budget Office is well respected by an academic discipline. CRS
does not have this respect because it is too broad; GAO has it,
but it is too large and its reference group is with accountants
who have a lower professional status than policy analysts. Many
of the elements of CBO's strategy can be seen as derivatives of
CBO's membership in the policy profession. It is consistent
with the organization's desire to control its products, and
hiring as well as its need for visibility.
People who come to work for CBO see themselves as
members of a profession and as being at CBO a relatively short
time, after which they continue in their profession. They care
about their professional reputations and the kind of work they
do. (Many of the analysts in CBO are more committed to their
professional role than to CBO itself.) They do not want to
short cut research or do anything which would not stand up to
the scrutiny of the academy (which is, after all, where
professional standards come from).
They do not want to be seen as too intimate or too
successful at pleasing the Congress since to do so might imply
a certain prostitution of their principles thus opening them
to question. They are trying to work in government yet main-
tain the standards which are common to scholarship at the
university. Because they do not expect to be at CBO for very
long, they are unwilling to make the kinds of sacrifices which
are typically associated with civil service types whose
principal objective is often tenure in an organization.
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The question of CBO's independence as an organization
and its apparent refusal to act like a "normal" congressional
organization may be inexplicably linked. Dr. Rivlin's un-
ambiguous commitment to the goal of raising the quality of the
debate in Congress, and of continuing to attract new applicants,
coupled with her sense of membership in the profession, all
seem to have shaped her approach.
#18 CBO appears to have received a certain amount of protection
because there is such a diversity of congressional opinion on
issues (for every faction that some CBO output aliented, there
was an opposing and often equal group which supported CBO's
conclusions.
#19 Notwithstanding the success of CBO in establishing itself
as a major congressional support agency, there is the sense
that perhaps had CBO embarked on a different strategy, it
would have enjoyed more of a success with its policy analysis
than it has so far.
#20 Dr. Rivlin's relative inexperience with the idiosyncracies
of the Congress, especially the differences between the House
and the Senate and their individual styles of operation and
differing expectations for CBO, was a factor which seems to
have limited the impact of CBO.
Unfortunately, Dr. Rivlin seems to display an almost
singular lack of ability to learn from past mistakes. Three
years after CBO's inception, her statements to the press rather
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than CBO's work continue to draw considerable heat for the
Congressional Budget Office.
As incredible as it may seem, six months passed before
Alice Rivlin became aware that the Congress was not in basic
agreement concerning the need for a CBO that emphasized policy
analysis. She believed until then that the fact that the law
had passed by large majorities in the House and the Senate, and
that she had been appointed director, were sufficient evidence
that Congress was in basic agreement concerning the need for a
CBO that emphasized policy analysis. Nothing could have been
further from the truth as even a casual reading of the legis-
lative history or the eight month deadlock in appointing a
director shows.
However, Dr. Rivlin's initial strategy assumed a-united,
supportive and monolithic Congress and one eager for policy
analysis. Many of CBO's initial mistakes derive from this as-
sumption. The first year, CBO was under fire mostly from
Republicans who saw CBO as a tool of the Democratic majority.
The press coverage of CBO served to further alienate CBO's
enemies and even to convince some that were neutral that CBO
had gone too far. This year it is the Democrats who are uneasy
with Dr. Rivlin's criticism of the President's energy package.
After three years, naivete begins to look very much
like ineptness. It may be that miscalculation, intellectual ar-
rogance, and a desire to set up another Brookings, rather than
naivete explain the inability of CBO to realize its full
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potential and its espoused goal of raising the level of debate
within Congress. Alice Rivlin is widely recognized as an out-
standing analyst but she has shown no real understanding of what
is necessary to develop such a controversial institution on the
Hill and, perhaps more importantly, she has demonstrated an
amazing inability to learn on the job.
Two things may help to explain why Alice Rivlin thinks
that the way to influence the Congress is to go through the
Washington Post. First, her background and training are in the
academic world. As a Brookings economist,expressing her views
on an issue and favorable recognition by the press built her
career and added to the Brookings reputation. As a director of
a congressional agency, however, publicity often has the op-
posite effect, and Dr. Rivlin's experience may not have prepared
her to notice this difference. A drafter of the 1974 Act noted
that:
Alice came from Brookings where staff could have
publicity and didn't have to have a passion for
anonymity. I think that is what has caused her
problems in the sense that she recruited very
high caliber people -- they want the recognition
--and that is hard to get in Congress for staff.
I mean, you get your kicks out of a job well
done, and you get credit from the members.
The Congressional Budget Office was an exciting new
organization which naturally brought press attention. However,
this press attention sometimes overshadowed members of Congress
or in some instances made the members' support of a particular
piece of legislation appear questionable. As a result, the net
effect of publicity for CBO was to create enemies in Congress,
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something that CBO as a new organization could ill afford.
Second, Dr. Rivlin is perceived by many as having what
looks like a somewhat condescending view of members of Congress --
one senior congressional staffer told about a CBO hearing on the
shortfall in 1976:
This was just before the election. And Alice was
campaigning for a slot in the Administration, and
she was taking on the Ford Aministration as having
created this shortfall, and it wasn't clear what
the reason for the shortfall was. And Ashley, a
very bright guy, and a man who does know economics,
said, 'what's your methodology? How did you arrive
at these conclusions about the reasons for the
shortfall?' She didn't know. And she said, 'I'm
not prepared to answer that.' 'Why aren't you
prepared to answer that?' 'Well, I didn't think
members would be interested.' And Ashley sort of
blew up: he said, 'Well, this member is interested.'
It also appears that there may be a fundamental mis-
perception on Dr. Rivlin's part as to how one gains power on the
Hill. There do seem to be alternative models of behavior in the
Congress. Under the first model, one can be very vocal (and,
perhaps, even be very right); under the second,one can be less
vocal and more likely to get what one wants. There is a trade-
off, of course, and Bella Abzug's career is illustrative of
this tradeoff. She started off being very, very vocal and having
almost no influence. After a while, particularly as a member
of the Public Works Committee, she realized that if one learns
the rules, works within the system,and makes some compromises,
one stands a better chance to accomplish something.
The tradeoff which exists for members of Congress is
even more definitive with respect to staff. The more public
recognition, the greater the chance for resistance. In part,
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because those drawing public attention may easily be perceived
as rival powers,
Few staff persons in the history of the Congress had
more power than Larry Woodworth or Eugene Wilhelm, yet neither
would allow their names to be mentioned in the press in con-
nection with a piece of legislation. Their influence, however,
was monumental, and their judgment was trusted by many. They
would present their data and let the members of Congress draw
their own conclusions,
Like a great many things having to do with the Congress,
however, there is a difference between the Senate and the House
views of the damage caused by Alice Rivlin's publicity. Senator
Muskie does not see it as an issue as far as he is concerned.
He acknowledges, however, that her publicity does appear to be
an issue with some people in the House and, for a while, it was
with some Republicans on the Senate Budget Committee. But he
thinks Rivlin has handled it so that there is no real problem
in the Senate.
#21 The perceived uneveness of its first annual report seems
to have limited CBO's impact, especially in the House.
The report drew very harsh criticism throughout the
Congress:
The House and Senate Budget Committees have told
the Congressional Budget Office in no uncertain
terms to go back to the drawing board with its
first annual report on budget alternatives,
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In highly critical language, the Committees com-
plained that the first draft of the CBO report
was so shallow as to be almost useless. For
example, one staff members said, 'the report said
Congress might want a Navy of 400, 500 or 600
ships, but it gave no reasons for making any of
these chioces.'96
First impressions are sometimes impossible to erase
and though since 1976 criticism of CBO has shifted from the
quality of its efforts to its style of operation, the House
Budget Committee, for one, still feels that their staff are far
superior to the Congressional Budget Office's. They settled on
an attitude back in 1976 and, in a sense, have written CBO off.
In fairness to CBO, two things occurred which were
uncontrollable from their point of view but which nevertheless
served somewhat to limit CBO's potential:
#22 The 8-month lag in selecting a director of CBO seems to
have diminished the potential role that CBO might have had.
This lag also gave the Budget Committees an excuse
to staff themselves up to more than three times their suggested
size, and on the House side the professional component of the
Budget Committee rivaled CBO. This set the stage for competing
relations (or non-relations to be more precise) with CBO.
#23 The election of a Democratic administration seems to have
diminished the role of CBO.
The coming of the Democrats (or the departure of
Nixon/Ford) created a climate of warmth and brotherhood among
members of the same party which served to diminish the hunger
for cannon fodder to tear apart executive proposals and thus
weakened congressional demand for some of CBO's analytical work.
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SUMMARY
If one revisits the history of the balance of power
as it relates to the Congress and the budget, it is possible to
see the 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act and
CBO as events of considerable importance. The locus of initiative,
which started off in the Congress and spent the great bulk of
the last two hundred years on Pennsylvania Avenue, now appears
to be resting somewhere between the court and the legislature.
The authors of the Constitution inadvertently opened
the door on a conflict which was to continue right up until the
present. The Constitution gave control over expenditures to the
Congress but did not specify whether the legislative or the
executive branch should have principal responsibility for the
formulation and execution of the budget. Alexander Hamilton's
attempt to assign budgetary responsibility to the Executive
touched off efforts by the Congress to retain budgetary control.
Unfortunately for Congress, the almost two hundred
years of conflict which followed are marked by its own efforts
to make the budget process more manageable, having the unintended
consequence of consistently tipping the balance of power in favor
of the Executive. The emergence of party platforms,an occur-
rence apparently unforeseen by the founding fathers, produced
presidents who were accountable both for proposing specific
programs and delivering them. This development forced the
Executive to compete for the right to initiate legislation and
eventually to push for budgetary control, since his performance
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was now judged on the basis of his ability to fulfill his
campaign promises,
In 1796, Congress created the Ways and Means Committee.
Ways and Means gave Congress control over the budget process
since it handled tax legislation, revenue raising and appropri-
ations. In effect, Ways and Means served as Congress' planning
agency and provided the only mechanism for a comprehensive over-
view of the government's finances.
In addition to dividing the country, the Civil War
also divided the old budget process. Congress intended to reduce
the workload of the Ways and Means Committee by creating the
Committee on Appropriations. However, again in its efforts to
make the entire budget process more manageable and controllable,
and hence increase its power, Congress actually decreased its
own power relative to that of the Executive's. Under the 1974
Act, the budget process has finally been reconstructed, and the
Congress can once again look at expenditures and revenues
together. As a result, it can now set its own priorities.
The Brookings-led 1921 Budget and Accounting Act saw
the Congress trade its sovereignty in budgetary matters for a
more active role in accounting. In its crusade to adopt profes-
sionalism and a business model over the pork barrel, and with
the general public's clamor for an executive budget, Congress,
as surprising as it seems in retrospect, overwhelmingly sup-
ported an act which again gave the Executive greater control.
Congress was left with specialized and fragmented resources in
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regards to the budget which did little to aid in its efforts to
manage either the budget or the Executive. Part of the damage done
in 1921 to the Congress has been corrected by the Brookings-led
CBO and its own crusade to replace political analysis with policy
analysis.
Both the Depression and World War II increased Execu-
tive power in many areas but especially in the area of the budget.
Congress gave the Executive special powers which, after the
crises were over, Congress was unable to take back. This un-
mistakable shift in the balance of power prompted the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946 which was the first major attempt by
the Congress to respond to the then rapid expansion of power by
the Executive branch. Unfortunately, the Congress was fragmented
and the legislation was ill conceived in that it required the
Congress to do economic forecasts and budgetary analysis when
it clearly had no such capacity. This resulted in the Act's
failure. By 1948, the Congress was faced with the reality that
the balance of power and control remained firmly in the hands of
the President. Here, again, the 1974 Budget Act succeeded where
the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 failed because of
CBO's capacity to provide accurate fiscal and economic projections,
something which the Congress had been unable to do in 1947 and
1948.
Twenty-four years later, Congress tried again in the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 which was significant
not only because it represented an authentic attempt by the
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Congress to reform the way it handled the budget, but because
it was also concerned explicitly with regaining its lost power.
Although it is not widely known, this attempt by the Congress
also proved unsuccessful when GAO failed to effectively implement
the Act which required that it develop a capacity to secure and
analyze information relating to budgetary and fiscal issues.
Again,in this instance,the 1974 Budget Act and especially
CBO has been instrumental in providing virtually all the budgetary
information requested by the Congress with respect to new spend-
ing initiatives.
By 1972, various members of Congress, including
Senator Metcalf, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Budgeting,
Management and Expenditures were becoming exasperated with GAO's
inability to supply the information that was needed. This
exasperation led to the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974 which created the Congressional Budget
Office.
Though CBO provides Congress with the resources to
secure budgetary information, Congress is of two minds with
respect to its need for analysis. From certain people, CBO has
experienced a kind of quiet hostility toward analysis in general
and CBO's brand in particular. In part, this occurs because
Congressmen are facing political rather than analytical decisions.
There is a view embedded in CBO there there are es-
sentially two types of decisions: decisions based on analysis
and decisions based on political considerations, and those
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decisions which are based on politics are of a lesser order.
This bias accounts for some of the disequilibrium between CBO
and the Congress, according to one senior CBO staff member:
The Speaker of the House hates us (CBO). There's
no question about it. He and Jim Wright are
politicians and they view this as a political
process and they don't see a role for an indepen-
dent agency such as CBO that provides nonpartisan
information. They say 'what the hell are we spend-
ing $10,000,000 a year for some eggheads to come
out with an analysis of the President's energy
proposal that says that it isn't worth crap these
days, after they have gone out on a limb and said
it is a great plan and they are going to support
it and get it through Congress.' You can under-
stand their position. It is largely because they
don't decide whether to support or not support
something based on analytical kinds of questions,
so when analysis is thrown in and when it is used
in the press when CBO says the plan isn't worth
shit, and the Speaker must be a fool, you can
understand how they feel. You'd feel the same
way; so would I. We have not been attuned to the
political ways.
In addition, sometimes the effect of more information
is to make a choice more difficult. Information can complicate
decisions. If the leadership of a committee or a particular
House feels that it can get people to agree and make compromises
in the absence of information describing the relative perform-
ance implications of alternatives, then the interests of the
leadership are not served by having this information accessible.
In many cases, committee chairmen control the committee staffs
and control the access to information of their members. The
Congressional Budget Office is an independent source of in-
formation, independent of the Executive who is more responsive
to committee chairmen, and independent of committee staff,
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who owe their jobs to the chairmen. Thus, CBO represents a
source of information which is often unpredictable.
When one takes a second look at the expectations of
the House and the Senate, in the light of CBO's implementation,
it is possible to see that the House got everything it wanted
and some things it did not want. The House's views about CBO's
role and function remained constant throughout the debate over
CBO and once the organization came into being, the House wanted
only technical fiscal budget analysis from CBO. Instead, it
received a larger and more active CBO than it desired plus an
extra spokesperson with considerable visibility.
On the other hand, the Senate's original expectations
of CBO were that it would provide the Congress with policy
analysis as well as budget analysis. Unlike the House; the
Senate foresaw a larger organization closer in size to what CBO
actually became. Thus, the Senate received some of what it
wanted and now foresees a growing possibility of achieving the
rest.
The views of the Senate have changed somewhat regard-
ing the role of the director of CBO as a spokesperson. Origi-
nally, the Senate wanted an economic spokesperson who could
stand up for Congress' programs while attacking programs pro-
posed by others, much in the same way as OMB directors Ash and
Lynn had done for the Executive. Soon after Dr. Rivlin's ap-
pointment, the need for such a counterspokesperson disappeared,
since OMB under Ford and to an even greater extent under Carter,
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has not played that role.
Nevertheless,in a very real sense, the Congress is
still the adversary of the Executive, and so CBO's strategy has
not really changed because of the Carter administration. There
have been only two non-war years in our recent history in which
the Congress really did what the President wanted: 1933 and
1964. It appears that the institutional rivalry between the
legislative and the Executive is stronger than party loyalty.
This is probably an advantage for CBO since it sees itself as
a technical instrument of the Congress, rather than a political
instrument.
The most important change brought about by the 1974
Budget Act may be an intangible one -- an increase in congres-
sional self-esteem. The Congress is no longer the object of
executive charges of fiscal irresponsibility such as those made
by Richard Nixon who repeatedly denounced the Congress for its
"reckless spending without regard to the overall consequences."
He made his vetoes stick, in part, because Congress had no
credible response to his charges. Gerald Ford tried the same
tactics, but he was unsuccessful because Congress had begun to
adopt its own budget and because the congressional budget was
just as "responsible" (though with different assumptions and
priorities) as the executive budget.
When Congress had no budget, its principal mode of
response was reactive. The President presented the budget
169
and the Congress could only make adjustments and those often
at the margin. Now that the Congress has the capacity to make
its own budget, it is no longer forced to simply react to the
President.
The founding group of CBO experienced the greatest gap
between their expectations and the reality of CBO's implementa-
tions. Since there was little planning or strategy for most of
them, CBO has been successful beyond their wildest dreams. They
created what appears to be a permanent addition to the Congress
and, for the most part, they did so with their people, without
major sacrifices -- in short,, they did it their way. However,
one of their primary objectives was the spread of policy
analysis and it was budget and fiscal analysis which accounted
for the vast majority of the requests for assistance and for
the lion's share of CBO's reputation as a viable congressional
agency. Since Dr. Rivlin has recently adopted a low profile
with respect to the press and the leadership has changed in
the policy analysis divisions, there appears to be new growth
and optimism on the policy analysis front.
It should be noted that none of the drafters of the
legislation, those people who witnessed the wranglings and
compromises that eventually created CBO, were involved in
actually setting up the organization. Had they been, perhaps
the original expectations of the founding group would have been
tempered both by the realities of the political setting in
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which they would be operating and by a sense of the various
positions of those key individuals on the Hill who would be
most involved with CBO. Such a group may have been able to
help steer the new CBO around some of the obstacles which al-
most claimed its life.
The most important evaluation of CBO must remain the
perceptions of the members of the budget committees and other
members of Congress, since they are the clients for whom the
organization was created. It can be argued that their per-
ceptions are not always correct; nevertheless, their assessment
is the most important since CBO's central function is to provide
them with assistance. It is worth noting, though, how CBO
assesses itself.
One way CBO assesses its performance is by looking
at increases in the demand for its services, the impact that
its work has on formulating policy, and the extent to which
the budget process begins to involve a mix of people who have
largely been uninvolved in budget issues. In this sense, CBO
views one of its most critical functions as its effort to make
programs more responsive to the priorities of the Congress as
a whole.
One member of the founding group said: "It's really
an integration problem. The Congress has largely been an un-
integrated institution: individual committees and subcommittees
doing their own thing. To the extent that the process is an
integrated one; that is, that people couple programs with
other programs, that individuals are cognizant of their im-
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pact on the whole, and that people on the whole are involved
and exercise discretion over segments -- then the process is
working." In terms of the budget and fiscal analysis, CBO
assesses its performance (using the above criteria) as very
effective. In terms of policy analysis, it assesses its per-
formance as much less effective then its original expectations,
both because they underestimated the task and because they
overestimated their ability.
What happens to CBO after Dr. Rivlin depends on who
is appointed the next director. Because of the wording of the
1974 Budget Act, Dr. Rivlin needs no new confirmation and so
she can stay as long as the Senate (i.e., Senator Muskie)
wants her. However, a new director would require joint ap-
proval of both the House and the Senate. And, unless the House
view is substantially different from what it appears to be
today, then one would expect that the question of CBO and
policy analysis will surface again in the deliberations around
the selection of a new director. Ironically, Jim Blum, the Head
of Budget Analysis (downstairs) may be the only viable candidate
with enough political currency to give policy analysis (upstairs)
another chance.
The following are some of the findings of my inquiry
into the Congressional Budget Office:
o The balance of power appears to have shifted perceptibly in
the direction of the Congress, and part of that shift can be
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attributed to Congress's new budget process, However, the
impact of the Congressional Budget Office is not easily
separated from that of the new budget process as far as the
balance of power is concerned.
o The shift toward the Congress appears to be the result of
two principal changes in the way that Congress handles the
budget:
a) Congress now has its own comprehensive budget process;
one which links revenues and expenditures for the first time
since the CivilWar when the appropriations committees came
into existence; and one which ipso facto allows Congress to
determine its own unique priorities.
b) Congress now has the capacity to generate its own
authoritative numbers for fiscal and economic projections as
well as for bill costing. Thus, Congress can now critique
executive proposals and defend its own initiative on economic
as well as political grounds.
o The Congressional Budget Office seems principally responsible
for creating this new capacity to generate authoritative
numbers.
o Congress' budget authoritativeness seems attributable to the
budget and fiscal analysis divisions (downstairs) at CBO
only, and it is hard to prove that the policy analysis divisions
(upstairs) have so far had a comparable influence on the
quality of congressional debate or have significantly in-
fluenced congressional decision-making.
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o It appears that CBO has established itself a viable
congressional support agency.
o CBO's decision to focus only on budgetary matters and to
position its studies between quick response and long-range
seems to have been effective.
o CBO's wedge strategy appears to have failed.
o The Economic Advisory Committee appears to have been ef-
fective in maintaining CBO's nonpartisan reputation.
o CBO's quick staff buildup appears to have been a mixed blessing.
o The decision to separate CBO into two main areas may become
a costly one from the point of view of organizational survival.
o Dr. Rivlin's strategy of high visibility appears to have been
counterproductive.
o The political climate that existed at the time of the creation
of the new CongressiQnal Budget Office was optimal for the
start of a new congressional agency.
o The state of the economy at the time of CBO's inception caused
the focus of Congress,like that of the country,to be on
recovery and on actions directed toward that end.
o Senator Muskie appears to be a most effective godfather for
CBO in preventing dissident members of Congress from tamper-
ing with the basic organizational structure.
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o The ability of CBO to control its staffing was essential to
recruiting the high caliber policy analysts that CBO needed
to do the job as they defined it.
o CBO's ability to reach independent conclusions and then
publish them appears to have contributed to its survival.
o CBO appears to have remained a member in good standing of
the policy analysis profession and to have kept its ties to
the major research universities.
o CBO appears to have received a certain amount of protection
because there is such a diversity of congressional opinion on
issues (for every faction that some CBO output alienated, there
was an opposing and often equal group which supported CBO's
conclusions).
o Notwithstanding the success of CBO in establishing itself as
a major congressional support agency, there is the sense that
perhaps had CBO embarked on a different strategy, it would
have enjoyed more of a success with its policy analysis than
it has so far.
o Dr. Rivlin's relative inexperience with the idiosyncracies of
the Congress, especially the differences between the House
and the Senate and their individual styles of operation and
differing expectations for CBO, was a factor which seems to
have limited the impact of CBO.
o The perceived uneveness of its first annual report seems to
have limited CBO's impact, especially in the House.
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o The 8 month lag in selecting a director of CBO seems to have
diminished the potential role that CBO might have had.
o The election of a Democratic administration seems to have
diminished the role of CBO.
It is important to note again that there is no one
way to evaluate the Congressional Budget Office or its impact
on the balance of power and control, and the author is not giving
a personal opinion but rather presenting how others, who are
in a position to judge, view the organization and its impact.
Nevertheless, this is one of the methodological limitations of
research which involves people's perceptions. Every possible
effort was made to check and recheck data and to fairly present
conflicting data such as the reporting of both the House
and the Senate's views of Dr. Rivlin's visibility. In a sense,
my approach sought to discover the findings thro4gh a kind of
sociological triangulation. While the author is confident
about what has been reported, one must recognize the possibility
of alternative interpretations of the research.
The author was fortunate that only one of the major
participants was deceased, though several of the participants
were in the process of retiring and nearly one quarter of the
participants had changed jobs or moved out of the area. Future
researchers engaged in similar inquiries may find this an in-
creasing problem.
Future researchers may want to revisit the Congres-
sional Budget Office four years hence to see whether the
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optimism of the policy analysis divisions was justified. It is
clear that the goal of raising the quality of debate away from
what is generally seen as a narrow constituent perspective
toward a more national focus represents a fundamental change in
the nature of government, yet one that is consistent with a
world with an increasing scarcity of resources.
The new budget process led by Senator Muskie has
changed the congressional perspective on the budget. But long-
run success is not yet assured. The Congressional Budget Office
and the budget committees have all kinds of adversaries -- the
appropriations committees are not certain what all this means
and rightly sense that the budget committees are really en-
croaching on their turf. Other committees are concerned that
the ceilings set by the budget committees will impinge or
restrict their own activities. Thus the relationship between
appropriations committees and the new budget process is a promis-
ing area for future research.
In one sense, the 1974 Act and the new budget process
represent only half of the job of budget reform, and it will
take some kind of action by the Congress to make some space in
the budget for new initiatives. Otherwise, one would assume
that the budget committees will increasingly be saying no.
And, at some point, there will be enough of a coalition to
overturn the process. Both sunset and advance budgeting are
ways of coming to terms with the fact that the great bulk of
the federal budget is uncontrollable. At this point, it appears
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that sunset has more of a political chance and the recent success
of Proposition 13 in California has renewed interest in the
legislation. Both sunset and advance budgetin~g represent promis-
ing new opportunities for future research in this general area.
The balance of power has clearly shifted toward the
Congress. It is not that Congress has more power now than the
Executive. Rather, Congress has more power than it did before
CBO and the Budget Act. The Constitution gave Congress the
power of the purse; the Budget Act has made that a reality once
again. The Budget Act, the War Powers Act (which limits the
President's ability to deploy military forces), the Clark
Amendment (which restricts the use of foreign aid), and the
executive bureaucracy all represent an assault on the Executive
branch. It remains unclear as to whether that shift is good
for the country. Congress is made up of people sent there to
represent geopolitical constituencies. The Executive is elected
from a national constituency and, as such, the Executive may be
in a position to push for certain broad humanistic objectives
which transcend (or to put it more bluntly are politically in-
feasible) what individual members of Congress are willing to
initiate. Shifting the locus of initiative and the balance of
power toward the Congress may turn out to be a regressive rather
than a progressive step. I will raise just two examples: one
in foreign affairs and one relating to domestic affairs. We
now see a President whose foreign policy is unable to reach out
in any decisive way. This may be acceptable or correct in our
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post-Vietnam and post-Watergate times; however, it is not clear
what the long-run effects of our conservatism will yield, given
the reality of an expansionist Soviet Union.
Secondly, there may be a relationship between the
shift in priorities toward the middle class in current legis-
lation mood and the shifting balance of power away from the
Executive -- as represented by the failure of welfare reform,
the postponement of national health insurance, and the advancement
of college tuition credits.
The question of the distributional impacts of this
shift in the balance of power from the Executive to the legis-
lative branch of government is a most important area for future
research.
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FLOOR ACTION (1973)
DATE HOUSE ACTION
(11 April)
(18 April) Bill Introduced: H.R. 7130
(26 Nov. ) Bills Reported: Reports were
filed as follows:
" H.R. 715, providing for the
consideration of H.R. 7130 to
amend the Rules of the House
of Representatives and the
Senate to improve congres-
sional control over budgetary
outlay and receipt totals.
Filed on Tuesday, November 20
(H. Rept. 93-652)
* H.R. 7130, to amend the Rules
of the House of Representatives
and the Senate to improve con-
gressional control over
budgetary outlay and receipt
totals. Filed on Tuesday,
November 20 (H. Rept. 93-658)
SENATE ACTION
Bill introduced: S.1541
0)
M~
r_4
DATE
(28 Nov.)
HOUSE ACTION
(30 Nov.)
(4 Dec. )
SENATE ACTION
Bill Reported: Reports were made
as follows:
" Report of Committee on Government
Operations to accompany S.1541,
to control Federal expenditures
and establish National Priorities,
with additional views (S. Rept.
93-579)
" Budget Control: By unamimous con-
sent, S.1541, to control Federal
expenditures and establish national
priorities, was referred to Committee
on Rules and Administration with
instructions that it be reported
back to the Senate not later than
than 21 January 1974.
Budget and Impoundment Control:
House completed all general debate
and began reading for amendment
H.R. 7130, to amend the Rules of
the House of Representatives and
the Senate to improve congressional
IL
"4ION
r_4
DATE
(5 Dec.)
SENATE ACTIONHOUSE ACTION
control over budgetary outlay and
receipt totals, to provide for a
Legislative Budget Director and
staff; but came to no resolution
thereon. Consideration under the
5-minute rule will continue
tomorrow (12/5). H.R. 715, the
rule under which the bill is being
considered, was agreed to earlier
by a voice vote.
Budget and Impoundment Control:
By a recorded vote of 386 ayes to
23 noes, the House passed H.R.
7130, to amend the Rules of the
House of Representatives and
the Senate to improve congres-
sional control over budgetary
outlay and receipt totals, and
to provide for a Legislative
Budget Director and staff.
c'J
C'
r-I
DATE SENATE ACTIONHOUSE ACTION
Agreed to the committee amendment
with the following amendment:
An amendment that incorporates a
previously adopted amendment that
extends the 5-day layover period
to a 10-day layover period, and
excludes Saturdays, Sundays, and
legal holidays from the layover
period for a reported concurrent
resolution on the budget, before
such resolution could be considered
in the House; and
Agreed to amend the title of the
bill.
Rejected the following amendments
to the committee amendment:
An amendment that sought to delete
language which designates a specific
composition of the 23-member Budget
Committee and language regarding
Oi
r-4
DATE SENATE ACTIONHOUSE ACTION
seniority, and prohibits a Member
from serving more than two
consecutive terms in a 10-year
period (rejected by a division
vote of 23 ayes to 76 noes);
An amendment that sought to
prohibit consideration of
authorizing legislation after
1 July in lieu of 31 March of
each year (rejected by a
recorded vote of 106 ayes to
300 noes);
An amendment that sought to
require the pilot-testing of
all Federal programs prior to
the implementation unless the
committee report on such
legislation indicates why this
is necessary (rejected by a
recorded vote of 185 ayes to
218 noes);
0~
'-4
DATE SENATE ACTIONHOUSE ACTION
An amendment that sought to
provide for a maximum
limitation on authorizations
for appropriations to 3 years
except those funded through
user taxes (rejected by a
recorded vote of 192 ayes to
217 noes);
An amendment that sought to
require Presidential submis-
sion of alternative spending
options for each major
functional category in the
budget, and to require in-
clusion of all relevant policy
and program evaluation (re-
jected by a division vote of
23 ayes to 63 noes);
LO
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r-4
DATE SENATE ACTIONHOUSE ACTION
An amendment that sought to require
all appropriation bills be sent to
the President at the same time with
no exceptions (rejected by a
recorded vote of 117 ayes to 289
noes);
An amendment that sought to delete
the title on impoundment control
(rejected by a recorded vote of
108 ayes to 295 noes);
An amendment that sought to
require both Houses of Congress
to take action before a
Presidential impoundment is dis-
approved, and to allow selective
disapproval of impoundments by
Congress (rejected by a
recorded vote of 186 ayes to
221 noes); and
0~
DATE
(6 Dec.)
(7 Dec.)
SENATE ACTION
Bill held at Desk: H.R. 7130,
Budget Impoundment Control Act, was
received and ordered held at the
desk until not later than the close
of business on Friday, 7 December.
Bill placed on Calendar: H.R. 7130,
Budget and Impoundment Control Act,
was read the second time and ordered
placed on the Senate calendar.
Budget Control: By unanimous-consent
agreement, S.1541, to control expendi-
tures and to establish national
priorities, was referred to committee
on Rules and Administration with in-
structions that it be reported back to
the Senate not later than 1 February 1974.
HOUSE ACTION
An amendment that sought to make
title II (impoundment control)
effective on 1 October 1975
(rejected by a recorded vote of
185 ayes to 221 noes).
FLOOR ACTION (1974)
DATE HOUSE ACTION
(21 Feb. )
(4 March )
(12 March)
SENATE ACTION
Bill Reported: S.1541, to provide for
the reform of congressional procedures
with respect to the enactment of fiscal
measures, and for other purposes, with
additional amendments (S. Rept. 93-688)
Committee Authority to Report:
Committee on Rules and Administration
was authorized until midnight, Wednesday,
6 March, to file its report on S.1541, W
to provide for the reform of congres-
sional procedures with respect to the
enactment of fiscal measures.
Legislative Program: By unanimous
consent it was agreed that following
disposition of S.1401, relating to
capital punishment, Senate will take
up S.1541, to reform congressional
procedures for enactment of fiscal
policy.
DATE
(19 March)
HOUSE ACTION SENATE ACTION
Congressional Budget Act: Senate
resumed consideration of S.1541, to
reform congressional procedures for
enactment of fiscal policy, and agreed
to Rules and Administration Committee
amendment in the nature of a sub-
stitute, and the bill, as thus amended,
will be considered as original text
for the purpose of further amendment.
Senate also agreed to a series of
amendments by Senator Ervin of a
technical and conforming nature.
Congressional Budget Act: Senate
continued consideration of S.1541, to
reform congressional procedures for
enactment of fiscal policy, taking
action on amendments proposed
thereto as follows:
(20 March)
r4
DATE HOUSE ACTION SENATE ACTION
Adopted:
(1) Modified Hathaway amendment to
require the Congress to consider
alternative courses of action in
light of changes in estimated outlays
or revenue receipts;
(2) Modified Brock amendment No. 1023,
to require a continuing study by the
Senate and House Committees on the
Budget of additional budget reform
proposals;
(3) By 55 yeas to 26 nays, Chiles
amendment No. 1017, to provide that
meetings of the Senate Committee on
the Budget shall be open to the public:
(4) McGovern amendment to provide that
the President shall include in the
budget supplemental budget estimates
for appropriations to be obligated in
the immediately succeeding fiscal
year; and
HOUSE ACTION
(21 March)
DATE SENATE ACTION
(5) Percy amendment of a technical
and corrective nature to title VIII,
Fiscal Budgetary Information and
Controls.
Rejected: By 29 yeas to 57 nays,
Harry F. Byrd, Jr., amendment to
require, beginning in fiscal year
1976, the President to submit a
balanced budget.
Congressional Budget Act: Senate 4
continued consideration of S.1541, to
reform congressional procedures for
enactment of fiscal policy, taking
action on amendments proposed thereto,
as follows:
Adopted:
(1) Nunn amendment No. 1037, to strike
from the bill, language permitting
action on spending, revenues, or debt
measures as of 1 June, even in the
absence of a budget resolution;
HOUSE ACTIONDATE SENATE ACTION
(2) Modified Nunn amendment No. 1035,
requiring study on feasibility of
adoption and implementing procedures
requiring enactment of a triggering
bill as a final step to the appropri-
ations process:
(3) Kennedy amendment No. 1028,
changing from 1979 to 1977 the so-
called grandfather clause provision
dealing with committee assignments
and membership;
(4) Mondale amendment to require the
Budget Committee to hold hearings prior
to reporting the first budget
resolution to the Senate;
(5) Robert C. Byrd amendment of a
technical and corrective nature; and
C,
HOUSE ACTIONDATE SENATE ACTION
(6) Robert C. Byrd amendment changing
from 20 March until 29 March the dead-
line for the Joint Economic Committee
to file its report on the President's
economic report.
Rejected:
(1) Nunn amendment No. 1035, to
restore language requiring the enact-
ment of a triggering bill as a final
step to the appropriations process;
(2) By 35 yeas to 52 nays, Harry F.
Byrd, Jr., amendment No. 1051, to
provide that government expenditures
not exceed its revenues during any
fiscal year;
(3) By 28 yeas to 60 nays, Roth
amendment to provide that impoundments
made by the President shall stand
unless overruled by the Congress; and
0-,
0)C.'4
HOUSE ACTIONDATE SENATE ACTION
(4) By 31 yeas to 55 nays, Ribicoff
amendment relating to recommendatory
reports by Committee on Appropriations
on reported bills providing new
advance spending authorizations prior
to their consideration by that House.
By unanimous consent, it was agreed
that during the further consideration
of this bill, debate thereon will be
limited to 6 hours, with 1 hour on oC'
amendments and 30 minutes on amendments
in the second degree, and vote on
question of its final passage shall
occur at 2 p.m. on Friday, 22 March.
It was agreed further that when Senate
convenes tomorrow it will take up, in
order stated, the following amendments:
Nelson, Roth, Stennis, Taft (30 minutes),
Javits (30 minutes), Nunn, Humphrey
(3-20 minutes each), Chiles (20 minutes),
HOUSE ACTION
(22 March)
DATE SENATE ACTION
and Cranston -- with 10 minutes on
amendments in the second degree to any
of these amendments.
Bill Passes:
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ACT: By unanimous
vote of 80 yeas, Senate passed H.R. 7130,
to reform congressional procedures for
enactment of fiscal policy, after
striking all after the enacting clause
LO
and inserting in lieu thereof pro- C
visions of the Senate companion
measure S.1541, to which Senate had
at first taken action on additional
amendments as follows:
Adopted:
(1) Robert C. Byrd amendment relating
to the duty of the Congressional Office
of the Budget in providing information
to the Committees on Appropriations,
Finance, and the Budget;
HOUSE ACTIONDATE SENATE ACTION
(2) Muskie amendment of a technical
nature, relating to provisions dealing
with information on tax expenditures;
(3) Ervin amendment of a corrective
nature;
(4) Javits amendment No. 1057, re-
quiring Director of the Congressional
Office of the Budget to submit an
annual report to Congress on national
goals and priorities;
(5) Cranston amendment to provide that
the first concurrent resolution in-
clude major sources from which
revenues are anticipated, as well as
the estimated total of such revenues;
(6) By unanimous vote of 80 yeas,
Nunn amendment to insure that legis-
lation which draws from general
revenues in excess of 10 percent of
its funds, and that is not now subject
0
HOUSE ACTIONDATE SENATE ACTION
to the appropriations process, will
be subject to the same backdoor
controls which apply to all such non-
trust fund items;
(7) Chiles amendment No. 1056, to
require, beginning in fiscal year
1979, budget information to identify
separate public needs that warrant
major Federal expenditures;
(8) By 43 yeas to 36 nays, Griffin
amendment setting salary of the
Directory and Deputy Director of the
Congressional Office of the Budget
at the levels of the Secretary of the
Senate and highest salary allowed
Administrative Assistants to Senators,
respectively.
P-
HOUSE ACTIONDATE SENATE ACTION
Rejected:
(1) By 24 yeas to 56 nays, Nelson
amendment No. 1045, limiting to 6
years the term which a Senator may
serve on the Committee on the Budget;
(2) By 23 yeas to 57 nays, Roth
amendment No. 1055, requiring a two-
thirds majority vote of the Congress
to increase Federal spending limit
after such limit has been established 0
by the first concurrent resolution; and
(3) Stennis amendment to increase pay
rates of certain higher level Senate
employees (tabled by 48 yeas to
29 nays).
Senate insisted on its amendment,
requested conference with the House,
and appointed as conferees Senators
Ervin, Muskie, Ribicoff, Metcalf,
Cannon, Pell, Robert C. Byrd, Allen,
DATE HOUSE ACTION
(5 June )
(11 June)
SENATE ACTION
Percy, Roth, Brock, Cook, Scott of
Pennsylvania, and Griffin.
S.1541 and S.1414, related measures,
were ordered placed on the calendar
under "Subjects on the Table".
Congressional Budget Act Conferees,
in executive session, agreed to
file conference report on the
differences between the Senate-
and House-passed versions of
H.R. 7130, to reform congres-
sional procedures for enactment
of fiscal policy.
Bills reported:
Conference report on H.R. 7130,
Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974 (93-1101).
(12 June) Bills reported:
Conference Report on H.R. 7130 to
reform Congressional procedures for
enactment of fiscal policy (S. Rept.
93-924).
ON
DATE
(18 June)
SENATE ACTIONHOUSE ACTION
Budget and Impoundment Control:
Buy a yea-and-nay vote of 401 yeas
to 6 nays, the House agreed to the
conference report on H.R. 7130, to
improve congressional control over
budgetary outlay and receipt totals,
to provide for a Legislative Budget
Office, and to establish a
procedure providing congressional
control over the impoundment of
funds by the executive branch;
clearing the measure for Senate
action.
(21 June) Congressional Budget Act: By
unanimous vote of 75 years, Senate
agreed to the conference report on
H.R. 7130, to reform congressional
procedures for enactment of fiscal
policy, thus clearing the measure for
the White House.
0
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CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETAND IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT OF 1974
Public Law 93-344
Title II. Congressional Budget Office
Section 201 (a) The Office and its Director
(1) There is established an office of the Congress
to be knowm as the Congressional Budget Office (hereinafter in
this title referred to as the "Office"). The Office shall be
headed by a Director; and there shall be a Deputy Director
who shall perform. such duties as may be assigned to him by
the Director and during the absence or incapacity of the Di-
rector or during a vacancy in that office, shall act as Director.
(2) The Director shall be appointed by the Speaker of
the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of
the Senate after considering recomendations received from the
Committees on the Budget of the House and the Senate, without
regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of his
fitness to perform his duties. The Deputy Director shall be
appointed by the Director.
(3) The term of office of the Director first appointed
shall expire at noon on January 3, 1979, and the terms of
office of Directors subsequently appointed shall expire at noon
on January 3 of each fourth year thereafter. Any individual
appointed as Director to fill a vacancy prior to the expira-
tion of a term shall serve only for the unexpired portion of
that term. An individual serving as Director at che expira-
tion of a term may continue to serve until his successor is ap-
pointed. Any Deputy Director shall serve until the expiration
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of the term of office of the Director who appointed him (and
until his successor is appointed),' unless sooner removed by
the Director.
(4) The Director may be removed by either House by
resolution.
(5) The Director shall receive compensation at a per
annum gross rate equal to the rate of basic pay, as in effect
from time to time for level III of the Executive Schedule in
section 5314 of title 5, United States Code. The Deputy Di-
rector shall receive compensation at a per annum gross rate
equal to the rate of basic pay, as so in effect, for level IV
of the Executive Schedule in section 5315 of such title.
Sec. 201 (b) & (c) Personnel., Experts, and Consultants.
(b) PERSONNEL - The Director shall appoint and fix
the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary to
carry out the -duties and functions of the Office. All person-
nel of the Office shall be appointed without regard to poli-
tical affiliation and solely on the basis of their fitness
to perform their duties. The Director may prescribe the duties
and responsibilities of the personnel of the Office, and dele-
gate to them authority to perform any of the duties, powers,
and functions imposed on the Office or on the Director. For
purposes of pay (other than pay of the Director and Deputy
Director) and employment benefits, rights, and privileges, all
personnel of the Office shall be treated as if they were
employees of the House of Representatives.
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(c) EXPERTS AND CONSULTANTS - In carrying out the
duties and functions of the Office, the Director may procure
the temporary (not to exceed one year) or intermittent ser-
vices of experts or consultants or organizations thereof by
contract as independent contractors, or in the case of indivi-
dual experts or consultants, by employment at rates of pay
not in excess of the daily equivalent of the highest rate of
basic pay payable under the General Schedule of section 5332
of title 5, United States Code.
Sec. 201 (d) Relationship to Executive Branch
(d) RELATIONSHIP TO EXECUTIVE BRANCH. - The Direc-
tor is authorized to secure information, data, estimates, and
statistics directly from the various departments, agencies,
and establishments of the executive branch of Government and
the regulatory agencies and commissions of the Government. All
such departments, agencies, establishments, and regulatory
agencies and commissions shall furnish the Director any avail-
able material which he determines to be necessary in the per-
formance of his duties and functions (other than material the
disclosure of which would be a violation of law). The Direc-
tor is also authorized upon agreement with the head of any such
department, agency, establishment, or regulatory agency or
commission to utilize its services, facilities, and personnel
with or without reimbursement; and the head of each such depart-
ment, agency, establishment, or regulatory agency or commis-
sion is authorized to provide the Office such services, facili-
ties, and personnel.
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Sec. 201 (e) Relationship to Congressional Agencies
(e)- RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER AGENCIES OF CONGRESS.-
In carrying out the duties and functions of the Office, and
for the purpose of coordinating the operations of the Office
with those of other congressional agencies with a view to
utilizing most effectively the information services, and capa-
bilities assigned to each, the Director is authorized to ob-
tain information, data, estimates, and statistics developed
by the General Accounting Office, the Library of Congress,
and the Office of Technology Assessment, and (upon agreement
with them) to utilize their services, facilities, and person-
nel with or without reimbursement. The Comptroller General,
the Librarian of Congress and the Technology Assessment Board
are authorized to provide the Office with the information,
data, estimates and statistics, and the services, facilities,
and personnel referred to in the preceding sentence.
Sec. 201 (f) Authorization of Appropriation
(f) APPROPRIATIONS. - There are authorized to be
appropriated to the Office for each fiscal year such sums as
may be necessary to enable it to carry out its duties and
functions. Until sums are first appropriated pursuant to
the preceding sentence, but for a period not exceeding 12
months following the effective date of this subsection, the
expenses of the Office shall be paid from the contingent fund
of the Senate, in accordance with the paragraph relating to
the contingent fund of the Senate under the heading "UNDER
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LEGISLATIVE" in the Act of October 1, 1888 (28 Stat. 546;
2 U.S.C. 68), and upon vouchers approved by the Director.
Sec. 202 Assistance to Conmittees and Members
Sec. 202. (a) ASSISTANCE TO BUDGET COMITTEES. -
It shall be the duty and function of the Office to provide
to the Committees on the Budget of both Houses information
which will assist such committees in the discharge of all
matters within their jurisdictions, including (1) informa-
tion with respect to the budget appropriation bills, and
other bills authorizing or providing budget authority or
tax expenditures, (2) information with respect to revenues,
receipts, estimated future revenues and receipts, and chang-
ing revenue conditions, and (3) such related information as
such Committees may request.
(b) ASSISTANCE TO COMMITTEES ON APPROPRIATIONS,
WAYS AND MEANS, AND FINANCE. - At the request of the Commit-
tee on Appropriations of either House, the Committee on Ways
and Means of the House of Representatives, or the Committee
on Finance of the Senate, the Office shall provide to such
Committee any information which will assist it in the dis-
charge of matters within its jurisdiction, including infor-
mation described in clauses (1) and (2) of subsection (a)
and such related information as the Committee may request.
(c) ASSISTANCE TO OTHER COMITTEES AND EYBERS.-
(1) At the request of any other committee of the House of
Representatives or the Senate .or any 'joint commitcee of the
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Congress, the Office shall provide to such committee or
joint committee any information compiled in carrying out
clauses (1) and (2) of subsection (a), and to the extent
practicable, such additional information related to the fore-
going as may be requested.
(2)At the request of any Member of the House or
Senate, the Office shall provide to such Member any informa-
tion compiled in carrying out clauses (1) and (2) of sub-
section (a), and, to the extent available, such additional
information related to the foregoing as may be requested.
(d) ASSIGNMENT OF OFFICE PERSONNEL TO COM4ITTEES
AND JOINT COMMITTEES. - At the request of the Committee on
the Budget of either House, personnel of the Office shall be
assigned, on a temporary basis, to assist such conmittee.
At the request of any other committee of either House or any
joint conmittee of the Congress, personnel of the Office may
be assigned, on a temporary basis, to assist such comittee
or joint committee with respect to matters directly related
to the applicable provisions of subsection (b) or (c).
Sec. 202 (e) Joint Committee on Reduction of Federal
Expenditures
(e) TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS OF JOINT COMTITTEE ON
REDUCTION OF FEDERAL EXPENDITURES. -
(1) The duties, functions, and personnel of the
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Joint Committee on Reduction of Federal Expenditures are
transferred to the Office, and the Joint Committee is abo-
lished.
(2) Section 601 of Revenue Act of 1941 (55 Stat.
726) is repealed.
Sec. 202 (f) Reports to Budget Committees
(f) REPORTS TO BUDGET COMITTTEES. -
(1) On or before April 1 of each year, the Director shall
submit to the Committees on the Budget of the House of
Representatives and the Senate a report, for the fiscal year
commencing on October 1 of that year, with respect to f is-
cal policy, including (A) alternative levels of total
revenues, total new budget authority, and total outlays
(including related surpluses and deficits), and (B) the
levels of tax expenditures under existing law, taking into
account projected economic factors and any changes in such
levels based on proposals in the budget submitted by the
President for such fiscal year. Such report shall also in-
clude a discussion of national budget priorities, including
alternative ways of allocating budget authority and budget
outlays for such fiscal year among major programs or func-
tional categories, taking into account how such alternative
allocations will meet major national needs and affect
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balanced growth and development of the United States.
(2) The Director shall from time to time submit
to the Committees on the Budget of the House of Represent-
atives and the Senate such further reports (including
reports revising the reports required by paragraph (1) as
may be necessary or appropriate to provi le such Cormittees
with information, data, and analyses for the performance of
their duties and functions).
Sec. 202 (g) Use of Comouter by the Budget Office
(g) USE OF COMPUTERS AND OTHER TECHNIQUES.- The
Director may equip the Office with up-to-date computer
capability (upon approval of the Committee on House Admin-
istration of the Mouse of Representatives and the Committee
on Rules and Administration of the Senate), obtain the ser-
vices of experts and consultants in computer technology
and develop techniques for the evaluation of budgetary
requirements.
Sec. 203 Public Access to Budget Data
Sec. 203. (a) RIGHT TO COPY - Except as provided
in subsections (c) and (d), the Director shall make all
information, data, estimates, and statistics obtained under
sections 201(d) and 201(e.) available for public copying
during normal business hours, sub'ject to reasonable rules
and regulations, and shall to the extent practicable, at the
request of any person, furnish a copy of any such informa-
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tion, data, estimates, or statistics upon payment by such per-
son of the cost of making and furnishing such copy.
(b) INDEX. - The Director shall develop and main-
tain filing, coding, and indexing systems that identify the
information, data, estimates, and statistics to which sub-
section (a) applies and shall make such systems available
for public use during normal business hours.
(c) EXCEPTIONS. - Subsection (a) shall not apply
to information data, estimates and statistics -
(1) which are specifically exempted from disclosure by
law, or
(2) which the Director determines will disclose-
(A) matters necessary to keep secret in the interests
of national defense or the confidential conduct of
the foreign relations of the United States;
(B) information relating to trade secrets or financial
or commercial information pertaining specifically to
a given person if the information has been obtained
by the Government on a confidential basis, other than
through an application by such person for a specific
financial or other benefit, and is required to be kept
secret in order to prevent undue injury to the competi-
tive position of such person; or
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(C) personnel or medical data or similar data the
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly un-
warranted invasion of personal privacy;
unless the portions containing such matters, information,
or data have been excised.
(d) INFORMATION OBTAINED FOR COMMITTEES AND MEMBERS.-
Subsection (a) shall apply to any information, data, esti-
mates, and statistics obtained at the request of any commit-
tee, joint committee, or Member unless such committee, joint
committee, or Member has instructed the Director not to make
such information, data, estimates, or statistics available
for public copying.
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APPENDIX C
TASKS OF CBO
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CBO'S TASKS
(1) In general, provide information to the two
Budget Committees on all matters within their jurisdiction,
2 USC 602(a), (202(a)).
(2) On request, provide information to the appropri-
ating and taxing committees, 2 USC 602(b), (202(b).
(3) On request of any other committee, provide in-
formation compiled under 1) and 2) plus "to the extent practi-
cable," additional information which may be requested, 2 USC
602(c)(1), (202(c) (1)).
(4) On request of a Member, provide information com-
piled under 1) and 2) plus "to the extent available," additional
information which may be requested, 2 USC 602(c)(2), (202)(c)(2)).
(5) Perform the duties and functions formerly per-
formed by the Joint Committee on Reduction of Federal Expendi-
tures, 2 USC 602(e), (202(e)), see also 31 USC 571.
(6) Annually on or before April 1, furnish to the
Budget Committees a report on fiscal policy for the next fiscal
year, to include a discussion of alternative levels of revenues,
budget authority, outlays and tax expenditures, plus alternative
levels of revenues, budget authority, outlays and tax expendi-
tures, plus alternative allocations among major programs and
functional categories, all in the light of major national needs
and the effect on "balanced growth and development of the
United States," 2 USC 602(f)(1), USC 603(b), (203(b)).
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(7) From time to time, furnish the Budget Committees
such further reports as "may be necessary or appropriate,"
2 USC 602(f)(2), (202(f)(2)).
(8) Develop and maintain filing, coding and indexing
systems for all information obtained by CBO from the Executive
Branch or from other agencies of the Congress, 2 USC 603(b),
(203(2)).
(9) With respect to each committee bill providing new
budget authority, furnish to the reporting committee for its
consideration: (a) a comparison of the bill to the most recent
concurrent resolution on the budget, (b) a 5-year projection
of outlays associated with the bill, and (c) the amount of new
budget authority and resulting outlays provided by the bill
for State and local governments, 31 USC 1329(a)(1), (308)(a) (1)).
(10) With respect to each committee bill providing new
or increased tax expenditures, furnish to the reporting com-
mittee for its consideration: (a) a report on how the bill will
affect the levels of tax expenditures most recently detailed
in a concurrent resolution on the budget, and (b) a 5-year
projection of the tax expenditures resulting from the bill,
31 USC 1329 (a) (2), (308 (a) (2)).
(11) Periodically, issue a scorekeeping report on the
results of Congressional actions compared to the most recently
adopted concurrent resolution on the budget, plus status
reports on all bills providing new budget authority or changing
revenues or the public debt limit, plus up-to-date estimates
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of revenues and the public debt, 31 USC 1329(b), (308(b)),
(12) Annually, "as soon as practicable after the begin-
ning of each fiscal year," issue a 5-year projection of budget
authority and outlays, revenues and tax expenditures, plus the
projected surplus or deficit, year by year, 31 USC 1329(c),
(308(c)).
(13) Prepare "to the extent practicable," a 5-year
cost estimate for carrying out any public bill or resolution
reported by any committee (except the two appropriating com-
mittees), 31 USC 1353, (403).
(14) Jointly study with OMB, but separately report,
on the feasibility and advisability of year-ahead budgeting
and appropriating, the report to be made by February 24, 1977,
31 USC 1020 note, (502(c)).
(15) Cooperate with the Comptroller General in develop-
ment of standard fiscal terminology, 31 USC 1152(a)(1), (801
(a)), (Sec. 202(a)(1) of the Legislative Reorganization Act
of 1970).
(16) Cooperate with the Comptroller General in develop-
ing an inventory of fiscal information sources, providing
assistance to Congress in obtaining information from those
sources and furnishing, on request, assistance in appraising
and analyzing information so obtained, 31 USC 1153(b), (801
(a)), (Sec. 203(b) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1970).
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(17) With the Comptroller General, establish a central
file or files "of the data and information required to carry
out the purposes of this title," 31 USC 1153(c), (801)(a)),
(Sec. 203(c) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970).
(18) Cooperate with OMB in providing useful federal
fiscal information to State and local governments, 31 USC 1153
(d), *801(a)), (Sec. 203(d) of the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1970).
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John Barriere, Senior Advisor to House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill,
U.S. House of Representatives
Dr. William Beeman, Assistant Director, Fiscal Analysis Division,
Congressional Budget Office
Wendell Belew, Esq., Chief Counsel, Committee on the Budget,
U.S. House of Representatives
Dr. Douglas J. Bennett, Assistant Secretary for Congressional
Relations, U.S. Department of State
Dr. James L. Blum, Assistant Director, Budget Analysis Division,
Congressional Budget Office
Robert S. Boyd, Esq., Minority Staff Director, Committee on the
Budget, U.S. Senate
Dr. Sid Brown, Office of Budget Review, Committee on the Budget,
U.S. Senate
Dr. William Capron, Associate Dean, Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University
Charles Davenport, Esq., Assistant Director, Tax Analysis
Division, Congressional Budget Office
Dr. Edward A. Deagle, Associate Director, Rockefeller Foundation
Dr. Frank deLeeuw, Office of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department
of Commerce
Dr. John Ellwood, Special Assistant to the Director, Congres-
sional Budget Office
Louis Fisher, Senior Specialist in American Government, Library
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Alfred Fitt, Esq., General Counsel, Congressional Budget Office
Alvin From, Esq., Staff Director, Subcommittee on Intergovern-
mental Relations, U.S. Senate
Honorable Robert N. Giaimo, Chairman, Committee on the Budget,
U.S. House of Representatives
Clifford Graves, Assistant Director for Program Planning and
Evaluation, Office of Management and Budget
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George Gross, Executive Director, Committee on the Budget,
U.S. House of Representatives
Honorable Gilbert Gude, Director, Congressional Research Service,
Library of Congress
Joel Havemann, Deputy Editor, National Journal
Philip Hughes, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy
Herb Jasper, Esq., Staff Director, House-Senate Conference
Committee on Budget Reform, U.S. Congress
Dr. Walter Kravitz, Senior Specialist, American National Government
and Public Administration, Congressional Research Service,
Library of Congress
Joan Leach, Chief Clerk, Committee on the Budget, U.S. Senate
Dr. Robert Levine, Deputy Director, Congressional Budget Office
Dr. Larry Lynn, Director of Research, Kennedy School of Govern-
ment, Harvard University
Bruce Meredith, Assistant Director, Budget Priorities, Committee
on the Budget, U.S. House of Representatives
John T. McAvoy, Esq., Staff Director, Committee on the Budget,
U.S. Senate
Dr. David Mundel, Deputy Assistant Director, Human Resources
and Community Development Division, Congressional Budget Office
Senator Edmund S. Muskie, Chairman, Committee on the Budget,
U.S. Senate
Dr. Richard Nathan, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
Dr. Russell Peterson, Director, Office of Technology Assessment
Dr. Robert D. Reischauer, Assistant Director, Human Resources
and Community Development Division, Congressional Budget Office
Dr. Alice Rivlin, Director, Congressional Budget Office
Dr. Raymond C. Scheppach, Assistant Director, Natural Resources
and Commerce Division, Congressional Budget Office
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Dr. Allen Schick, Senior Specialist, American Government,
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress
Dr. Eugene Skolnikoff, Director, Center for International
Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
E. Winslow Turner, Esq., Chief Counsel, Subcommittee on
Budgeting, Management, and Expenditures, U.S. Senate
Lauren Walters, Esq., Counsel, Committee on the Budget,
U.S. Senate
Eugene B. Wilhelm, Staff Director, Joint Study Committee on
Budget Control, U.S. Congress
Karen H. Williams, Esq., Chief Counsel, Committee on the
Budget, U.S. Senate
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